AMBIGUITY IN INSURANCE POLICY WILL BE INTERPRETED IN FAVOR OF INSURANCE COVERAGE

Posted on July 15, 2017July 15, 2017 by Edward Garber

An ambiguity in an insurance policy–after reading and interpreting the policy as a whole–will be construed against an insurer. This means an ambiguity will be construed in favor of insurance coverage (for the benefit of the insured) as opposed to against insurance coverage. This does not mean that every insurance policy contains an ambiguity. This also does not mean a court will interpret plain and ordinary words contrary to their conventional meaning or definition. But, as we all know, insurance policies are not the easiest of documents to decipher and ambiguities do exist relating to a particular issue or circumstance to the benefit of an insured. An insured that is dealing with specific insurance coverage issues should make sure they are working with counsel that looks to maximize insurance coverage, even if that means exploring ambiguities that will benefit an insured based on a particular issue or circumstance.

An example of an ambiguity in an insurance policy relating to a particular issue that benefitted an insured can be found in the Florida Supreme Court decision of Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Macedo, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S731a (Fla. 2017). This case involved an automobile accident and the interpretation of an automobile liability policy.

In this case, after an accident, a plaintiff sued the defendant that caused the accident. The defendant’s insurer GEICO provided a defense in accordance with the defendant’s automobile liability policy. During the litigation, the plaintiff served a proposal for settlement for $50,000, which is a procedural vehicle to create the argument for attorney’s fees if the defendant does not accept the proposal. The defendant—again, being defended by its insurer GEICO—did not accept the proposal. The case proceeded to trial and the plaintiff obtained a jury verdict of approximately $243,000. This meant the plaintiff had a basis to recover attorney’s fees since the defendant did not accept the proposal for settlement. The plaintiff moved to bind GEICO to a judgment, and the underlying issue was whether the defendant’s insurer GEICO was liable under the policy for attorney’s fees. If GEICO was not liable, then that meant the defendant was individually liable for the plaintiff’s incurred attorney’s fees.

This is a significant issue because by the defendant’s counsel not accepting the proposal for settlement, the defendant, individually, was exposed to substantial attorney’s fees incurred by the plaintiff. The defendant’s counsel was hired by GEICO and GEICO controlled any settlement of the case and the defendant was required to cooperate with GEICO.

The applicable language of the insurance policy as relied upon by the Florida Supreme Court was as follows:

ADDITIONAL PAYMENTS WE WILL MAKE UNDER THE LIABILITY COVERAGES

1. All investigative and legal costs incurred by us.

. . . .

4. We will upon request by an insured, provide reimbursement for the following items:

. . . .

Additionally, the index of the policy lists “Legal Expenses And Court Costs” as items that are covered under the Additional Payments section.

The Florida Supreme Court, interpreting the policy as a whole, found this language to be ambiguous relating to the insurer’s obligation to cover attorney’s fees incurred by the plaintiff due to GEICO’s defense counsel not accepting the proposal for settlement. This ambiguity was a big “W” for both the defendant-insured and the plaintiff because it meant that GEICO was liable for the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.

First, the Court explained that the terms “Legal Expenses” and “Court Courts” signify that legal expenses in addition to court costs would be covered under the policy; otherwise, there would have been no reason to separately include the language “Legal Expenses” in the index of the policy.

Second, the Court explained that there are numerous reasonable interpretations that attorney’s fees are encompassed by the terms “costs” and expenses” as used in the policy.

And, third, the Court explained that the legal expenses (attorney’s fees) incurred by the insured were the product of GEICO electing not to accept the proposal for settlement, and thus, were incurred by the defendant-insured at GEICO’s direct request. GEICO had complete discretion under the policy to settle the case with the insured being required to cooperate with its insurer. “It follows that any cost or fee incurred as a result of GEICO exercising its authority and control is something that it intended to pay.” See Macedo, supra

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

BAD FAITH IN THE FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE CONTEXT

Posted on December 10, 2016November 8, 2024 by Edward Garber

In a previous article I discussed bad faith when it comes to an insurance claim. Recently, in Barton v. Capitol Preferred Insurance Co., Inc., 41 Fla. L. Weekly D2736b (Fla. 5^th DCA 2016), the court discussed bad faith in the first-party insurance context (i.e., a property / homeowners insurance policy).

In this case, homeowners, as the insured, sued their homeowners insurance carrier for sinkhole coverage. The homeowner filed a Civil Remedy Notice of Insurer Violation (also known as a Civil Remedy Notice) against their insurer with the Florida Department of Insurance in accordance with Florida Statute s. 624.155. This Civil Remedy Notice is a prerequisite to initiating such a bad faith claim; the notice specifies the statutory violations committed by the insurer and gives the insurer 60 days to cure the violation.

The insurer denied the assertions in the Civil Remedy Notice. Thereafter, the homeowners served a proposal for settlement / offer of judgment trying to settle the claim for $65,000. The insurer paid $65,000 and the lawsuit was dismissed. But, the proposal for settlement did not require the homeowners to release the insurer. In other words, there was no release of any bad faith insurance claim. So, naturally, the homeowners refiled a lawsuit against their homeowners insurance carrier for bad faith.

“[A] bad-faith action is premature until there is a determination of liability [coverage] and extent of damages owed on the first-party insurance contract.” Barton, supra. citing Vest v. Travelers Ins. Co., 753 So.2d 1270, 1276 (Fla. 2000). An insured can obtain a determination of liability through an agreed settlement, arbitration, or stipulation—the determination of liability / coverage does not have to be made through trial. Id. quoting Fridman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., 185 So.3d 1214, 1224 (Fla. 2016).

Here, the court held that there was a determination of liability because the insurer paying the insured-homeowners $65,000 was a favorable resolution to the homeowners. It did not matter that the $65,000 was less than the insured’s original demand or less than the policy limits for sinkhole coverage. Why? Because the settlement operated as a determination of liability and extent of the homeowners’ damages, thereby satisfying the condition precedent to filing a bad faith claim.

This was a clever move by the homeowners not to give the insurer a release in consideration of the $65,000 (and not to condition the proposal for settlement on giving the insurer a release). From an insurer’s standpoint, after it receives a Civil Remedy Notice and, then, a proposal for settlement, it should try to obtain such a release. Perhaps the insurer tried hard to get that release but the homeowners were unwilling to give such a release. This may have forced the insurer to pay the $65,000 pursuant to the proposal for settlement to minimize its exposure in the underlying insurance coverage dispute. The fact that accepting a proposal for settlement can satisfy the determination of liability and extent of damages requirement (even if the proposal for settlement amount is less than any original demand) before initiating a bad faith claim may motivate insurers to negotiate and pay for a release that protects them from such bad faith claims.

ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER (A) FLORIDA’S DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT AND (B) OFFERS OF JUDGMENT

Posted on January 4, 2014November 8, 2024 by Edward Garber

In Florida, a party can recover attorney’s fees if it has a contractual or statutory basis. If a party has neither a contractual or statutory basis to recover attorney’s fees, another vehicle is to serve an Offer of Judgment (also known as a Proposal for Settlement). Whether there is an argument to recover attorney’s fees is an important consideration.

A. Attorney’s Fees Under The Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act

The Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”) is a consumer-protection related law designed to allow parties to sue other parties for deceptive and unfair trade or business practices. FDUTPA is discussed in more detail in https://floridaconstru.wpengine.com/actual-damages-under-floridas-deceptive-and-unfair-trade-practices-act/. There are certain circumstances when asserting a FDUTPA claim is worthwhile and should be explored such as when a party is looking for a statutory basis to recover attorney’s fees.

FDUTPA contains a statutory basis to recover attorney’s fees. Section 501.2105 of FDUTPA provides in relevant part:

“(1) In any civil litigation resulting from an act or practice involving a violation of this part, except as provided in subsection (5), the prevailing party, after judgment in the trial court and exhaustion of all appeals, if any, may receive his or her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs from the nonprevailing party.”

The reason the word “may” is highlighted is because this is permissive, not mandatory, language. In other words, it is not automatic or mandatory that attorney’s have to be awarded to the prevailing party, but they could (i.e., may) be awarded. This is an important distinction. However, recently, Florida decisions have indicated that attorney fees should be mandatorily awarded to the prevailing party in a FDUTPA action.

Recently, in Bull Motors, LLC v. Alicia Borders, 39 Fla. L. Weekly D28a (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), the Third District stated:

“FDUTPA’s attorneys’ fees provision recognizes the policy of protecting consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices and the need to attract private attorneys to take such cases by assuring them of a legal fee proportionate to their effects if their clients prevail. Such an award requires that the client prevail by recovering a judgment and, if there are counterclaims, by recovering a net judgment in the entire case. There is no express requirement of proportionality between the amount of the FDUTPA judgment and the attorney’s fees and costs incurred in obtaining the judgment.”

Bull Motors, supra (internal quotations omitted).

Bull Motors relied on the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So.3d 362 (Fla. 2013). In Diamond Aircraft, a plaintiff asserted a FDUTPA claim against a defendant. However, it was determined that FDUTPA did not apply because Arizona law, not Florida law, governed the case. Thus, the defendant prevailed under the plaintiff’s FDUTPA claim. A question certified to the Florida Supreme Court to answer was whether FDUTPA entitled a prevailing party to attorney’s fees if the court determines that FDUTPA does not apply to the case because the substantive law of another state (in this case, Arizona) applied. The Court stated that it did (or answered the question in the affirmative) holding that by a plaintiff asserting a FDUTPA claim, it exposes itself to both the benefits and potential consequences of the statute. Further, the Court expressed: “Under FDUTPA, a prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in civil litigation arising from a violation of that act ‘after judgment in the trial court and exhaustion of all appeals.’” Diamond Aircraft, supra, at 370 quoting Fla.Stat. s. 501.2105.

Hence, even though the statute contains permissive language, there is strong legal authority that would mandatorily entitle a prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees. This cuts both ways. This means that a plaintiff could expose itself to attorney’s fees by improperly asserting a FDUTPA claim without facts to support a deceptive or unfair trade practice or without evidence to support actual damages as provided under the statute. Plaintiffs need to be cognizant of this before asserting a FDUTPA claim.

B. Attorney’s Fees By Serving Offers of Judgment

Moreover, Bull Motors discussed the vehicle to create an argument for the recoverability of attorney’s fees known as offers of judgment or proposals for settlement (“Offer of Judgment”). The Offer for Judgment statute in Florida Statute 768.79 provides in material portion:

“In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this state, if a defendant files an offer of judgment which is not accepted by the plaintiff within 30 days, the defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred by her or him or on the defendant’s behalf pursuant to a policy of liability insurance or other contract from the date of filing of the offer if the judgment is one of no liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than such offer….If a plaintiff files a demand for judgment which is not accepted by the defendant within 30 days and the plaintiff recovers a judgment in an amount at least 25 percent greater than the offer, she or he shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred from the date of the filing of the demand.”

In a nutshell, a defendant can recover its attorney’s fees if it serves an Offer of Judgment and the plaintiff gets a $0 judgment against the defendant or the plaintiff gets a judgment of at least 25% less than the offer. For example, and using simple math, let’s say the defendant serves an Offer of Judgment for $100,000 and the plaintiff obtains a net judgment against the defendant for $50,000. In this situation, the defendant could be entitled to its attorney’s fees from the date of the Offer of Judgment and forward since the plaintiff obtained a judgment of at least 25% less than its $100,000 Offer.

And, if a plaintiff serves an Offer of Judgment, it can recover its attorney’s fees if gets a net judgment of at least 25% greater than the Offer. Let’s say the plaintiff serves a $100,000 Offer of Judgment and recovers a net judgment against the defendant for $150,000. In this situation, the plaintiff could be entitled to its attorney’s fees from the date of the Offer of Judgment and forward since the plaintiff obtained a judgment of at least 25% greater than its $100,000 Offer.

However, serving Offers of Judgment are not sure-things under Florida law that will guarantee a party to attorney’s fees even if the math (shown above) works. There are numerous Florida decisions that find defects in Offers of Judgment (including technical defects) that ultimately prevent a party from recovering its attorney’s fees. Both Bulls Motor and Diamond Aircraft are examples of decisions whereby the Courts found flaws in the Offers of Judgment. Offers of Judgment do not apply to claims for equitable relief, only claims for damages. Thus, parties need to be crystal clear that the Offers only apply to claims for damages. But it is unfortunately not that simple. The Florida Supreme Court in Diamond Aircraft stated:

“Courts have also held that when a plaintiff seeks both monetary and nonmonetary relief, and a party makes a general offer of settlement, section 768.79 is not applicable. The reasoning adopted in those decisions is that strict construction of the phrase “any civil action for damages” in the offer of judgment statute does not include a claim for equitable relief, or one that involves claims for both monetary and nonmonetary relief.
***
We hold that section 768.79 does not apply to an action in which a plaintiff seeks both damages and equitable relief, and in which the defendant has served a general offer of judgment that seeks release of all claims.”
Diamond Aircraft, 107 So.3d at 373-74 (internal citations omitted); accord Bull Motors, supra (“The offer of judgment statute, section 768.79…does not apply to cases that, as here, involve a general offer seeking release of all claims in the case, both equitable and monetary.”).