ASSOCIATION BOUND BY ARBITRATION PROVISION IN PURCHASE-AND-SALE CONTRACTS AND DEEDS

Posted on December 24, 2021December 24, 2021 by Edward Garber

When an association files a lawsuit pertaining to matters of common interest, the lawsuit is typically filed as a class on behalf of the owners that make up the association (i.e., the association’s members). How do you deal with an arbitration provision that is included in an owner’s purchase-and-sale agreement or recorded in the deed? The recent opinion in Lennar Homes, LLC v. Martinique at the Oasis Neighborhood Association, Inc., 47 Fla. L. Weekly D15c (Fla 3rd DCA 2021) dealt with this exact issue with a homeowner’s association ruling that the association was required to arbitrate its latent construction defect claims against the developer (homebuilder).

In this case, a community in Miami consisted of 26 townhouse buildings. There was a broad arbitration provision in each owner’s purchase-and-sale agreement that included disputes relating to property damage. Further, with each closing, a special warranty deed was recorded that included a nearly identical arbitration provision.

The association became aware of latent defects relating to the exterior walls of the buildings and filed a lawsuit against the developer (homebuilder). The developer moved to compel the dispute to arbitration which was denied by the trial court because there was no specific agreement between the association and the developer that required arbitration and the lawsuit dealt with matters that the association was obligated to maintain.

The developer appealed contending that the association was bound by the arbitration provision in its members’ (the real property owners) purchase-and-sale agreements and deeds. The Third District Court of Appeal, relying on the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in Pulte Home Corp. v. Vermillion Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 109 So.3d 233, 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), agreed with the developer: “Consistent with our sister court’s analysis in Pulte, we hold that the Association’s right to proceed in its representative capacity in this case required it to abide by the members’ agreement with [the developer] to arbitrate this dispute.” Lennar Homes, supra.

As an aside, the association also argued that the arbitration provision in the purchase-and-sale agreement and special warranty deed should be deemed void against public policy under Florida Statute s. 720.3075(1)(b) that provides in material part: “It is declared that the public policy of this state prohibits the inclusion or enforcement of certain types of clauses in homeowners’ association documents, including declaration of covenants, articles of incorporation, bylaws, or any other document of the association which binds members of the association, which either have the effect of or provide that: A homeowners’ association is prohibited or restricted from filing a lawsuit against the developer, or the homeowners’ association is otherwise effectively prohibited or restricted from bringing a lawsuit against the developer.” The Third District Court of Appeal found this argument unavailing as the purchase-and-sale agreement and special warranty deed, both of which included the arbitration provision, are not association documents (e.g., declarations of covenants, articles of incorporation, bylaws, etc.).

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

COMMENCING OF THE STATUTE OF REPOSE FOR CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS

Posted on October 24, 2021October 24, 2021 by Edward Garber

Florida has a ten-year statute of repose which applies predominantly to construction defect claims. This can be found in Florida Statute s. 95.11(3)(c). After ten years, any rights relative to a construction defect claim are time-barred. However, the statute of repose date has been watered down and can be made to be more of a factual question due to the lack of objectivity as to the date that starts the ten-year repose clock. The watering down of the statute of repose date benefits parties asserting construction defect claims provided they strategically appreciate the question of fact that can be created when up against the statute of repose. Stated differently, when up against the clock to assert a construction defect claim, strategically develop those facts, evidence, and arguments to maximize creating a question of fact as to when the statute of repose clock commenced. Conversely, as a defendant sued for construction defects, you want to maximize the facts, evidence, and arguments to fully establish the date the statute of repose clock had to commence for purposes of a statute of repose defense.

The recent opinion in Spring Isle Community Association, Inc. v. Herme Enterprises, Inc., 46 Fla. L. Weekly D2306b (Fla. 5^th DCA 2021) demonstrates the factual question associated with the clock that starts the statute of repose date. This factual question is created by Florida Statute s. 95.11(3)(c) that provides:

[T]he action [founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property] must be commenced within 10 years after the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest.

Spring Isle Community Association, supra. (Note, see also current s. 95.11(3)(c) version in effect per hyperlink above.)

Thus, the statute of repose must commence AFTER: (1) after the date of actual possession by the owner, (2) the date of the issuance of the certificate of occupancy, (3) the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or (4) the date of completion or termination of the contract, WHICHEVER DATE IS LATEST. This foster the factual argument — which is the latest date and the facts supporting the latest date.

In this case, an association of a townhome community sued a homebuilder for construction defects. The homebuilder third-partied in implicated subcontractors. The homebuilder had a master contract with subcontractors and would issue applicable work orders to the subcontractors, which is a common practice with homebuilders. The stucco subcontractor moved for summary judgment based on the ten-year statute of repose arguing that the statute of repose period started when each townhome was issued a certificate of occupancy. This was based on this date occurring AFTER the homebuilders’ records reflecting it made payment to the stucco subcontractor after the stucco work was complete on a townhome building but prior to the certificate of occupancy on each townhome building. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment as to the homebuilder’s third-party claim against the subcontractor. The homebuilder appealed arguing that the statute of repose period started when their contract was completed which occurred after the certificate of occupancy date. The appellate court found this was a question of fact and reversed summary judgment:

Additionally, the fact that [the homebuilder] may have made payments to [the stucco subcontractor] after completion of each unit does not establish that the payment constituted “final payment”…. Quite simply, the summary judgment evidence presented below was insufficient, as a matter of law, to determine the number of contracts that may have existed between [the homebuilder] and [stucco subcontractor] or to determine the completion date of the contract(s).

In the absence of competent evidence as to the date of occurrence for each of the four triggering events set forth in section 95.11(c)(3), or evidence that one or more statutory events is inapplicable, there is no way to determine which event occurred last. Therefore, without sufficient evidence to determine the contract completion date, a genuine issue of material fact remains as to the commencement date of the repose period. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting [the stucco subcontractor’s] motion for partial final summary judgment.

Spiring Isle Community Association, supra (internal citations omitted).

DETERMINING OCCURRENCE FOR INJURY UNDER COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY WITHOUT APPLYING “TRIGGER THEORY”

Posted on June 26, 2021June 26, 2021 by Edward Garber

Oftentimes an occurrence in a commercial general liability policy is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” It is this occurrence that causes the bodily injury or property damage that may be covered by the policy.

An interesting non-construction case determined an occurrence under a commercial general liability policy occurred when the negligent act occurred irrespective of the date of discovery or the date the claim was discovered or asserted. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London Subscribing to Policy No. J046137 v. Pierson, 46 Fla.L.Weekly D1288c (Fla. 4^thDCA 2021). This is interesting because the appellate court did NOT apply a “trigger theory” to first determine the occurrence’s policy period. The appellate court found it did not need to determine which “trigger theory” applied to determine the occurrence for the injury and relied on a cited case: “trigger theories are generally used in the context of deciding when damage occurred ‘in cases involving progressive damages, such as latent defects, toxic spills, and asbestosis’ because the time between the ‘injury-causing event (such as defective construction, a fuel leak, or exposure to asbestos), the injury itself, and the injury’s discovery or manifestation can be so far apart.” Pierson, supra, citing and quoting Spartan Petroleum Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 805, 808 (4^th Cir. 1998).

In Pierson, police officers were found civilly liable for civil rights violations that occurred twenty-years earlier when the officers physically and verbally forced a 15-year old boy to confess to a crime. Many years later, DNA evidence proved the boy did not commit the crime he was forced to confess and was incarcerated for. The officers sued the police department’s commercial general liability policy for failing to indemnify them in the civil lawsuit. The policy, however, was NOT in effect twenty years earlier when the officers verbally and physically forced the confession. “Since it is undisputed that the Officers’ misconduct occurred twenty years prior to the execution of the policies, there can be no duty to indemnify in this case…. [T]he fact that [the boy] suffered the consequences of the Officers’ wrongful conduct throughout his incarceration, including while the subject policies were in effect, is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether the Insurer has a duty to indemnify. Likewise, the fact that [the boy] was exonerated while the 2009 policy was in effect is of no consequence.” Pierson, supra.

What does this holding mean? It could likely mean outside of a latent defect scenario or a pollution liability issue–or property damage scenario–a “trigger theory” to determine when an occurrence occurred or is triggered is not applicable. An occurrence will be deemed to occur when the accident causing the injury occurred, as defined by the policy.

BASIS TO RESCIND A CONTRACT UNDER EQUITABLE REMEDY OF RESCISSION

Posted on July 18, 2020July 18, 2020 by Edward Garber

When a seller of residential real property fails to knowingly disclose defects that are not readily observable and materially affects the value of the real property, this gives rise to a fraudulent nondisclosure or concealment claim, otherwise known as a Johnson v. Davis claim. (See this article that discusses this claim.). This is not the easiest claim to prove because a seller rarely will concede they knew of a hidden defect that they failed to disclose. Thus, discovery is warranted to show they evidently knew but elected not to disclose because doing so would have impacted the sale or the value of the sale. If you believe you have a fraudulent nondisclosure claim, make sure to consult with counsel so that you understand your rights relative to the facts associated with the claim.

In a recent case, Rost Investments, LLC v. Cameron, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1717a (Fla. 2d DCA 2020), a lessee/potential buyer of residential property entered into a lease with an option to purchase contract. The option to purchase needed to be exercised by the lessee. Immediately after entering into this contract, the lessee claimed the contract should be rescinded based on the lessor’s fraudulent nondisclosure of defects that materially affect the value of the real property and the seller’s refusal to complete warranty-type items on an intake sheet.

First, the lessee claimed that when they moved into the house, the lessor agreed it would repair certain items that were identified on an intake sheet – hot water in the showers, low water pressure, two remote controls for the garage, and the refrigerator needed to be replaced. The lessor did not.

Second, the lessee claimed there were latent defects with the property that the lessor knew about but failed to disclose.

After trial, the trial court granted rescission in favor of the lessee. The Second District Court of Appeals reversed.

Rescission of a contract is an equitable remedy if the party seeking rescission has no adequate remedy at law (such as with a breach of contract claim where monetary damages would be awarded for the breach). Rost Investments, supra (citation omitted).

“[A] party who voluntarily executes a document . . . is bound by its terms in the absence of coercion, duress, fraud in the inducement or some other independent ground justifying rescission.”

***

“While an agreement may be rescinded for fraud relating to an existing fact, as a general rule, rescission will not be granted “for failure to perform a covenant or promise to do an act in the future, unless the covenant breached is a dependent one.” “A covenant is dependent where it goes to the whole consideration of the contract; where it is such an essential part of the bargain that the failure of it must be considered as destroying the entire contract; or where it is such an indispensable part of what both parties intended that the contract would not have been made with the covenant omitted.”

Rost Investments, supra (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The Second District held that the items on the intake sheet that the seller did not address “were [not] so essential to the bargain that [the lessor’s] failure to attend to them destroyed the contracts.” These are items that could have been resolved with money damages through a breach of contract claim, i.e., an action at law. Hence, the lessor’s failure to fix these items did not serve as a basis for the lessee to rescind the contract.

Next, the fraudulent nondisclosure claim for latent defects did not apply because the lessee was leasing the house as the option to purchase the real property had not been exercised. The fraudulent nondisclosure claim applies to buyers of real property. While perhaps the lessee had an argument for fraudulent misrepresentation, the trial court found that the lessor’s nondisclosure of certain defects was not intentional and, without the intent, there was no basis for a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. (Notably, in a fraudulent nondisclosure claim that applies to buyers of real property, a seller’s state of mind is not at-issue– what is at-issue is that the seller had knowledge of a defect not readily observable that materially affects the value of the real property and did not disclose it.) See Rost Investments, supra, n.7.

TEN-YEAR STATUTE OF REPOSE TO SUE FOR LATENT CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS

Posted on August 18, 2019August 18, 2019 by Edward Garber

If you are dealing with latent construction defects, it is imperative that you consult with counsel to understand your rights. This not only includes claims for property damage stemming from latent construction defects, but also personal injury stemming from such defects. There is a ten-year statute of repose to sue for latent construction defects. See Fla.Stat. s. 95.11(3)(c). After the expiration of this statute of repose you are out of luck, meaning you can no longer sue.

Now, I probably will not be the first to tell you that the statute of repose is not written so clear that you know the precise date it ends (or the last date you can sue for a latent defect). For this reason, you really want to operate conservatively, meaning it is always better to sue early if you think you could be running on the end of the statute of repose period. It is always advisable to avoid any legitimate argument that you filed your construction defect lawsuit too late.

In Harrell v. The Ryland Group, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2054b (Fla. 1st DCA 2019), a subsequent owner of a house sued the original homebuilder in negligence for a construction defect causing a personal injury. The subsequent owner claimed the homebuilder defectively installed an attic ladder (that provided access to the attic for the original construction) which collapsed as he was using it. The homebuilder filed a motion for summary judgment that the statute of repose expired so the owner’s claim was time-barred. The First District agreed.

The subsequent owner tried to argue that the statute of repose did not apply because the installation of an attic latter does not constitute an “improvement” to real property and the statute of repose is based on actions “founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property.” The First District was not having this argument because “the attic ladder at issue here was installed as part of the construction process of the home, required labor and money, made the property more useful/valuable in that it provides a more convenient means of access to another level, was not mere repair or replacement, and was affixed to the attic, making it an integral part of the home.”

Even something perceived as nominal like the installation or construction of an attic ladder can constitute an improvement to real property making it subject to the ten-year statute of repose to sue for latent defects. Hence, do not sit idle if you are dealing with a latent construction defect – take the conservative approach and start the required litigation process sooner than later.

RELEASE LANGUAGE EXTENDED TO SUCCESSOR ENTITY BUT ONLY COVERED “KNOWN” CLAIMS

Posted on June 8, 2019April 24, 2020 by Edward Garber

A recent case contains valuable analysis that has impact on whether a “successor” entity will be bound by a settlement agreement it was not a direct party to. This case contains arguments for contractors that can be raised in a number of different contexts if it is sued by a successor or related entity.

The same case discusses the difference between releasing a party for “known” claims without releasing the same party for “unknown” claims. This is an important distinction because unknown claims refer to latent defects so a release that only releases a party for known claims is not releasing that party for latent defects.

In MBlock Investors, LLC v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 44 Fla. L. Weekly D1432d (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), an owner hired a contractor to construct a project. At completion, the owner transferred the project to an affiliated entity (collectively, the “Owner”). The contractor sued the Owner for unpaid work, the Owner claimed construction defects with the work, and a settlement was entered into that released the contractor for KNOWN claims. Thereafter, the Owner defaulted on the construction loan and agreed to convey the property through a deed in lieu of foreclosure to an entity created by the lender (the “Lender Entity”).

The Lender Entity sued the contractor for construction defects – in negligence (negligent construction) and a violation of Florida’s building code. The contractor argued that such claims should be barred by its settlement agreement with the Owner. There were two driving issues:

First, did the settlement agreement with the Owner extend to the Lender Entity because the Lender Entity was a successor entity to the Owner?

Second, even if the Lender Entity was a successor entity to the Owner, were the construction defects latent defects because the settlement agreement only provided a release of KNOWN (or patent) defects?

As to the first issue, the appellate court held that the Lender Entity was a successor entity to the Owner.

[I]t is rather clear that [Lender Entity] is in fact, [Owner’s] ‘successor’ for purposes of the settlement agreement with [contractor] because [Lender Entity] took over the Property and all of [Owner’s] rights with regard to the Property. Thus, [Lender Entity] clearly met the privity requirement for the application of res judicata in this case: it has a mutual or successive relationship to the same right that [Owner] had when it settled with [contractor]: a reduction in the amount owed to [contractor] for its services in exchange for releasing [contractor] from any claims of construction defects as provided for in the [settlement agreement].

As to the second issue, and really the driving issue whether or not the Lender Entity was a successor, was whether the release even protected the contractor from the types of construction defect claims sought. This is a question of fact because the settlement agreement only included a release of “known” claims and did NOT release the contractor for “unknown” claims, i.e., latent defects. Hence, the Lender Entity will establish such claims were unknown or could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of the settlement (a latent defect). The contractor will try to argue otherwise creating an issue of fact as to whether the settlement agreement released the contractor for the construction defects the Lender Entity is asserting.

SLAVIN DOCTRINE AND DEFENSE FROM PATENT DEFECTS

Posted on June 10, 2018April 27, 2020 by Edward Garber

The Slavin doctrine is an affirmative defense primarily geared to the personal injury context designed to protect contractors from third-party negligence-type claims when an owner accepts a patent defect.

The Slavin doctrine protects contractors from liability for injuries to third parties by presuming that the owner has made a “reasonably careful inspection” of the contractor’s work prior to accepting it as completed; if the owner accepts the contractor’s work as complete and an alleged defect is patent, then the owner “accepts the defects and the negligence that caused them as his own,” and the contractor will no longer be liable for the patent defect.

“[T]he test for patency is not whether or not the condition was obvious to the owner, but whether or not the dangerousness of the condition was obvious had the owner exercised reasonable care.” While in most cases, the patency or latency of a dangerous condition is a question of fact for the jury, thereby precluding summary judgment, there are exceptions where the undisputed material facts establish that if there was a defect, then that defect would have been patent.

Valiente v. R.J. Behar & Company, Inc., 2018 WL 2708712, *2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (internal quotations omitted).

Valiente is a recent decision where the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, ruled in favor of contractors (and an engineer) as to the applicability of the Slavin doctrine in a wrongful death action. In this case, the decedent was killed in 2008 when his motorcycle ran into another vehicle at an intersection. The estate claimed that the shrubs in the swale create a dangerous condition by blocking the view of motorists and causing the accident. The shrubs were planted in 2005 as part of a city’s roadway project. The estate sued the city, the designer, the general contractor, and the nursery hired by the city to provide the landscaping for the roadway project.

The designer, contractor, and nursery moved for summary judgment on their Slavin doctrine affirmative defense. They all claimed they should be relieved of liability for the accident (and, thus, the death) because the work was long completed, the City accepted the work, and the alleged defect dealing with the shrubs blocking passing motorist’s views was patent. The evidence revealed that when the shrubs were originally planted they were 2 feet taller than the maximum height required.

For purposes of patency under the Slavin doctrine, the relevant question is: if the plantings [shubs] created a visual obstruction (the alleged dangerous condition), was that dangerous condition latent or patent? And, to reiterate, the test for patency, is not what the City knew, but rather, what the City could have discovered [the dangerous condition] had the City performed a reasonably careful inspection.

Valiente, 2018 WL at *2.

Here, because the it was ruled that the city accepted a patent defect, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on their Slavin doctrine defense.

CONTRACTORS: CONSULT YOUR INSURANCE BROKER REGARDING YOUR CGL POLICY

Posted on February 10, 2018February 10, 2018 by Edward Garber

Contractors: do yourself a favor and consult your insurance broker regarding your commercial general liability (CGL) policy. Do this now, especially if you subcontract out work.

CGL policies contain a “your work” exclusion. The CGL policy is written such that it excludes “‘property damage’ to ‘your work’ arising out of it or any part of it and included in the ‘products-completed operations hazard.’” This exclusion will be raised in the post-completion latent construction defect scenario. (There are other exclusions that will be raised to a defect discovered during construction.) Certain policies will contain a subcontractor exception to this “your work” exclusion. You WANT this exception- no doubt about it so that this exclusion does not apply to work performed by your subcontractors. Without this subcontractor exception, truth be told, this “your work” exclusion is a total back-breaker to contractors. It will give your insurer an immediate out for many latent defect property scenarios since excluded from coverage is property damage to your work including work performed by your subcontractors.

In a recent opinion, Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. JWN Construction, Inc., 2018 WL 783102 (S.D.Fla. 2018), an owner discovered water intrusion and damage at his property. He sued the general contractor and the general contractor’s insurer filed a separate action for declaratory relief claiming it had NO duty to defend or indemnify its insured—the general contractor—in the underlying suit. The court agreed because the contractor did not have the subcontractor exception to the “your work” exclusion.

If work was performed by JWN [contractor] or on JWN’s behalf-here by a subcontractor-then the “your work” exclusion applies. Historically, insurers could be liable under commercial general liabilities policies resembling the policy in the instant case for certain types of damages caused by subcontractors….Nonetheless, insurers do possess the right to define their coverage as excluding damages arising out of a subcontractor’s defective work by eliminating subcontractor’s exceptions from the policy. An insurer is only liable for a subcontractor’s defective work when the “your work” exclusion does not eliminate coverage for work performed by a subcontractor….In conclusion, the insurance policy in this case excluded coverage for work performed not only by JWN, but also by JWN’s subcontractors.

JWN Construction, Inc., supra, at *4.

This ruling meant that the general contractor’s CGL insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify its insured—again, the contractor—for the defects or resulting water damage. A total killer illustrating the absolute importance of the subcontractor exception to the “your work” exclusion in your CGL policy.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND REPOSE FOR INDEMNIFICATION CLAIMS (STEMMING FROM CONSTRUCTION DEFECT)

Posted on September 6, 2015November 8, 2024 by Edward Garber

I have written articles regarding the statute of limitations and statute of repose relating to construction disputes governed under Florida Statute s. 95.11(3)(c):

Within Four Years. An action founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property, with the time running from the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest; except that, when the action involves a latent defect, the time runs from the time the defect is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. In any event, the action must be commenced within 10 years after the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest.

In the construction defect context, a claimant has four years to sue from the date they knew or reasonably should have known with the exercise of due diligence the defect (e.g, the latent defect). This is the statute of limitations. Nonetheless, a claimant must sue no matter what on a latent defect within ten years from the project’s completion (see statute above). This is the statute of repose. A construction defect lawsuit cannot be initiated after the expiration of the statute of repose.

Let’s assume the following dates:

Project completion (start of limitations) 2005

First discovery of water intrusion 2008

General contractor completes repairs 2011

General contractor sues subcontractor for indemnification 2013

In this scenario, the subcontractor may argue that the general contractor’s statute of limitations to sue the subcontractor for the defect and damage is barred by the statute of limitations since the first discovery of water intrusion was in 2008 and the general contractor waited to sue until 2013 (five years later).

But, wait…the general contractor is going to sue the subcontractor for indemnification (preferably, contractual indemnification based on the terms of the subcontract). In this scenario, the general contractor is suing after it completed repairs and established its liability to the owner for repairing the defects and damage.

“The statute of limitations for an action seeking indemnity does not being running until the litigation against the third-party plaintiff [general contractor] has ended or the liability [against the third-party plaintiff], if any, has been settled or discharged by payment.” Castle Constr. Co. v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 425 So.2d 573, 575 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (finding general contractor’s indemnity claim against subcontractor did not accrue until the owner’s litigation against the general contractor ended or the general contractor’s liability determined). Stated differently, the statute of limitations for the general contractor’s indemnification claim did not begin to start running until 2011 when its liability to the owner for the defects was discharged / settled.

Now, let’s assume the following dates:

Project completion (start of limitations) 2005

First discovery of water intrusion 2008

General contractor completes repairs 2013

General contractor sues subcontractor for indemnification 2016

In this instance, the subcontractor may argue that the statute of repose expired because the general contractor waited until 2016 or eleven years after the statute of limitations started to accrue in 2005. Guess what? The subcontractor would be right. See Dep’t of Transp. V. Echeverri, 736 So.2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (explaining that the statute of repose for construction defect claims still applies to claims for indemnity). Stated differently, even though the general contractor sued the subcontractor for indemnification within three years of establishing its liability, it was still bound by the ten year statute of repose that started accruing in 2005, meaning such lawsuits were barred after 2015.

IS THE 10 YEAR STATUTE OF REPOSE FOR CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS REALLY A 10 YEAR STATUTE OF REPOSE?

Posted on May 9, 2015November 8, 2024 by Edward Garber

It is time for a very favorable case for an owner that experiences latent defects. In construction defect cases, there is a ten-year statute of repose to sue for latent defects. Specifically, under Florida Statute s. 95.11(3)(c), the “action must be commenced within 10 years after the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest. Stated differently, the latent defect lawsuit must be commenced no later than 10 years from the latest of one of the specified conditions or else the lawsuit is forever barred.

The question is when does the ten-year repose period really begin to run; what condition specifically triggers the running of the period. The Fifth District Court of Appeal in Cypress Fairway Condominium v. Bergeron Construction Co. Inc., 40 Fla. L. Weekly D1097b (Fla. 5^th DCA 2015) concluded that the statute of repose in a construction defect case began to run on the completion of the contract which was the date the owner made final payment under the contract. Naturally, the completion of the contract would be the latest condition and completion does not occur until the owner fulfills its obligation by making final payment.

What does this mean? This means that the repose period does NOT commence when construction is actually completed or when the certificate of occupancy is issued. Rather, it commences when the owner tenders final payment to its contractor (after it accepts the construction and punchlist work).

The ramifications of this type of opinion are unknown and potentially scary. What if the owner withholds payment and does not make final payment for months if not years after the contractor completed construction and the owner has received a certificate of occupancy. Maybe there is a dispute as to punchlist or warranty items that results in the owner not making final payment. Does the owner get the benefit of withholding money or delaying making final payment? Perhaps.

There have been recent cases that have been fairly generous to owners with respect to the statute of repose in construction defect cases. Thus, if you are an owner and discover latent defects, consult with counsel because all may not be lost regarding a potential defect lawsuit. And, if you are a contractor, do not automatically dismiss a construction defect lawsuit as being outside of the statute of repose and be sure to consult with counsel to best protect your interests.