COMPARATIVE FAULT APPLIED IN OWNER’S LAWSUIT AGAINST CONTRACTOR AND ENGINEER

Posted on July 26, 2020July 26, 2020 by Edward Garber

There is nothing like a good old-fashioned dispute between an owner and its general contractor and design professional relating to construction and design defects where both parties have a role in the owner’s damages. There are arguments that both the general contractor and design professional substantially contributed to the defects and damages. Are the contractor and design professional jointly and severally liable for the owner’s damages? Or, does comparative fault apply where the trial of fact allocates the contractor’s and engineer’s percentage of fault for the defects and damage? A recent case found that comparative fault applied such that the trier of fact, in this case the judge, could allocate damages based the judge’s finding of the parties’ percentage of fault. (For more information in comparative fault, please check this article.). Comparative fault is not what an owner ideally wants because joint and several liability would be preferred. However, this is what the contractor and engineer would want since their liability for damages is predicated on their percentage of responsibility as opposed to being liable for all of the damages.

In Broward County, Florida v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1736a (Fla. 4^th DCA 2020), a public owner hired an engineer for airport improvements that included a taxiway to be designed and constructed in accordance with the Federal Aviation Administration’s design requirements. The public owner also hired (i) a program manager to serve as its on-site representative and (ii) a separate engineering firm to provide materials testing and inspection services. The public owner also hired a contractor to construct the taxiway.

Prior to substantial completion of the taxiway, the public owner discovered indentations in the surface of the taxiway (referred to as rutting). This discovery prompted the public owner to investigate. The public owner directed the contractor to mill away two inches of asphalt and install new asphalt. The contractor achieved substantial completion in September 2008 and final completion in November 2008. The contractor then submitted its final payment application to the public owner. The public owner notified the contractor that it would retain money to deal with repairs associated with the indentations in the surface of the taxiway. The public owner hired a new engineer to design the repairs. The repair design was more robust (better) than the original engineer’s design because the repair engineer believed the new design was necessary to achieve a 20-year lifespan for the taxiway. A new contractor performed the repairs.

The contractor sued the public owner for nonpayment. The contractor also sued the engineer for professional negligence in the design of the taxiway. The pubic owner counter-sued the contractor for breach of contract and sued the engineer for breach of contract and indemnification. The public owner asserted that the contractor performed defective construction and the engineer committed errors, omissions, and defects in the design and was obligated to indemnify the public owner for liability arising out of the design. The public owner also sued its program manager (on-site representative) and testing engineer; these two parties settled prior to trial.

At trial, the public owner’s expert testified that both the contractor and engineer contributed to the indentations in the surface of the taxiway. The expert testified that the engineer’s design deviated from the Federal Aviation Administration’s requirements and was doomed to fail such that if the contractor complied with the design, it would still fail. The expert further testified that while the contractor contributed to the indentations as it failed to construct subgrade per the engineer’s design, it was to a lesser contributing factor than the engineer.

The engineer’s expert testified that the indentations were caused by undercompaction performed by the contractor. The expert further testified that the public owner’s program manager violated its standard of care by allowing the contractor to deviate from the engineer’s original design in numerous ways.

The contractor’s expert testified that the indentations were caused by the design and undercompaction.

The trial court found that both the engineer and the contractor’s breaches were the proximate cause of the redesign of the taxiway. The trial court also found that the public owner’s program manager, which had settled prior to trial, was also liable. The trial court further found that public owner’s total damages were $6,2703,303 of which $725,000 was paid to the public owner pre-suit by the program manager and testing engineer. After deducting this amount from the total damages, the trial court allocated damages as follows: (1) 60% was allocated to the non-party program manager (that had settled pre-suit); (2) 25% was allocated to the contractor; and (3) 15% was allocated to the engineer. The public owner appealed the allocation in the final judgment. The public owner argued that the trial court should not have apportioned liability at all because comparative fault does not apply in breach of contract cases. Instead, the public owner contended that the trial court should have found that the engineer and contractor were jointly and severally liable for the damage (indentations) because their separate contractual breaches caused a single, indivisible injury.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed with the public owner concluding that Florida Statute s. 768.81 dealing with comparative fault authorized the trial court to allocate fault. While comparative fault under s. 768.81 deals with negligence actions, it defines a negligence action as a “civil action for damages based upon a theory of negligence, strict liability, products liability, professional malpractice whether couched in terms of contract or tort, or breach of warranty and like theories. The substance of an action, not conclusory terms used by a party, determines whether an action is a negligence action.” Broward County, Florida, supra, quoting Fla. Stat. s. 768.81.

The public owner’s claim against the professional engineer was predicated on the engineer breaching a contractual standard of care that required it to design the taxiway pursuant to the Federal Aviation Administration’s standards. Although the public owner’s claims against the engineer were couched as a breach of contract, it was based on a theory of professional negligence (violation of a standard of care) warranting the application of comparative fault.

However, the public owner’s claims against the contractor were not based on a professional negligence theory. Nonetheless, the Fourth District held that comparative fault did apply:

Applying a holistic approach to analyzing the complaint, we conclude that the contract action against [the contractor] fell under the umbrellas of the ‘negligence action’ against [the engineer], so that the circuit court’s allocation of fault was appropriate. After all, [the contractor] was to perform the contract according to specifications designed by [the engineer], so the causes of action against each were necessarily intertwined. To prove its case against [the contractor], the public owner was required to prove that [the contractor’s] ‘breach of its contractual responsibilities was a substantial factor in causing the [public owner’s] extensive damages.’ This is compatible with the concept of ‘fault’…and parallels the tort notion of a violation of a duty of care that is the proximate cause of damages. Based on the evidence, the circuit court properly allocated fault among all actors whose conduct substantially contributed to the [public owner’s] damages.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

CONTRIBUTION CLAIMS TO PASS-THROUGH LIABILITY

Posted on October 7, 2013November 8, 2024 by Edward Garber

In lawsuits, there are times the defendant elects to sue a third-party defendant to pass-through its liability to the plaintiff to the third-party defendant. For example, in a construction defect scenario where the owner sues the general contractor, the general contractor will often sue subcontractors (third-party defendants) in order to pass-through its liability to the owner to subcontractors that performed the scopes of work at-issue. In other situations, a defendant may assert a cross-claim against another defendant to, among other things, pass-through any liability it has to the plaintiff to the other defendant. For example, in a construction defect scenario where the owner sues both the general contractor and subcontractors, the general contractor will often assert a cross-claim against the subcontractors to pass through its liability to the subcontractors.

A claim for contribution used to be a common claim asserted to pass-through liability in negligence-related actions. Contribution claims were routine in negligence actions when there used to be joint and several liability, i.e., a party could be responsible for all of the plaintiff’s damages irrespective of its percentage of fault with other defendants. “To state a claim for contribution, the claimant must allege a common liability to the injured party [plaintiff].” Horowitz v. Laske, 855 So.2d 169, 174(Fla. 5th DCA 2003). In other words, the defendant and third-party defendant must be jointly liable / negligent to the plaintiff for the injuries the plaintiff sustained. Therefore, by asserting a contribution claim, the defendant ensures that fault is allocated to another party that is jointly liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff.

However, Florida abolished joint and several liability in negligence actions and, now, a defendant can only be liable based on its determined percentage of fault. See Fla. Stat. s. 768.81; see also T&S Enterprises Handicap Accessibility, Inc. v. Wink Indus. Maintenance & Repair, Inc., 11 So.3d 411 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (affirming dismissal of defendant’s third party claim for contribution in underlying negligence action due to abolishment of joint and several liability). Because of this, third-party defendants or cross-claim defendants that are sued for contribution should argue that the contribution claim is moot because the party suing it can only be held liable for its percentage of fault or negligence. Some judges will dismiss a contribution claim for this reason on a motion to dismiss, but others will still allow the claim to proceed beyond a motion to dismiss for judicial efficiency and economy since it is easier to wrap up a dispute in one litigation instead of many (considering contribution claims have been routine claims to pass-through liability).

The opinion in Martinez v. Miami-Dade County, 2013 WL 5434159 (S.D.Fla. 2013) is a non-construction case that illustrates how a claim for contribution can proceed. In this case, a plaintiff sued Miami-Dade County and a bar for injuries the plaintiff sustained by off-duty police officers providing security for the bar. The claims against Miami-Dade Couty were sounded in intentional tort theories and not negligence theories. Miami-Dade County asserted a cross-claim against the bar and included a claim for contribution. The bar moved to dismiss the contribution claim arguing that contribution claims are obsolete under Florida law since there is no more joint and several liability. The Southern District Court disagreed expressing that because the plaintiff’s theories against Miami-Dade County were sounded in intentional tort and not negligence, section 768.81 did not apply. (Notably, section 768.81 section does not apply to intentional tort theories of liability.)

Under section 768.81, a negligence action means “without limitation, a civil action for damages based upon a theory of negligence, strict liability, products liability, professional malpractice whether couched in terms of contract or tort, or breach of warranty and like theories. The substance of an action, not conclusory terms used by a party, determines whether an action is a negligence action.” Fla. Stat. s. 768.81(1)(c). Therefore, even if the claims asserted are not labeled negligence claims, this section still applies to bar joint and several liability to ensure a party is only liable for their percentage of fault. It is designed so that substance over form is analyzed to determine whether the plaintiff’s underlying action is a negligence action even if it is not labeled as such.

This opinion in Martinez, however, could support the argument that a contribution claim could be asserted outside of a negligence claim such as a breach of contract action (since, in the case, a contribution claim was still allowed to proceed in an intentional tort action). And, even though section 768.81 shifts the focus from the label of the plaintiff’s claims to the actual substance underlying the claims, the objective is to argue that plaintiff’s claims are not based in negligence, but based in a material breach of a contractual provision. For example, in a construction defect setting, when the general contractor is sued for breach of contract, there may be strategic reasons why the general contractor would want to attempt to assert a contribution claim in addition to an indemnification claim against subcontractors to pass-through liability. The general contractor would argue that the plaintiff’s claims are not based in negligence but based in contract since the plaintiff is asserting that the project was not constructed per the contract documents (or in a workmanlike manner) per contractual provisions.

Finally, if a general contractor elects to assert a contribution claim, it is important to remember that the claim will only survive if it asserts and can establish that it and the subcontractor(s) share a common liability to the owner. This is challenging.

In Helmet House Corp. v. Stoddard, 861 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), a contractor was sued by an owner for breach of contract and breach of warranty for defective construction of a roof. The contractor asserted a third party party complaint against its roofing subcontractor for contribution. The Fourth District held that the contractor could not pursue a contribution claim against its subcontractor because the subcontractor did not share a common obligation / liability to the owner. The Fourth District found that parties share a common liability if they are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on an obligation. Importantly, many subcontracts contain flow-down provisions that bind the subcontractor to the general contractor to the same extent the general contractor is bound to the owner. Flow-down provisions attempt to impose the exact same liability on the subcontractor that the general contractor assumes towards the owner. With this type of provision, or an alternative provision that would make the owner an intended third-party beneficiary of the subcontract, there may be an argument that subcontractors do indeed share a common liability to the owner with the general contractor for defects with their scopes of work. From the general contractor’s perspective, the objective is to pass-through liability for defective construction with arguments based on the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint.