THINKING ABOUT A DAUBERT MOTION TO CHALLENGE AN EXPERT OPINION?

Posted on January 29, 2023January 29, 2023 by David Adelstein

When you receive an expert opinion, one of the first things you are considering is whether it is worth filing a Daubert motion / challenge. A Daubert motion is a generally a pretrial motion you are using to challenge the admissibility of the expert opinion. Keep in mind this deals with the admissibility, not the credibility, of the expert opinion. A Daubert motion is based on three prongs that must be answered: 1) is the witness qualified to render the expert opinion?; 2) is the expert’s opinion reliable?; and 3) is the expert’s opinion relevant?.

A Daubert motion is premised after Federal Rule of Evidence 702 that provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

The qualification prong is the foundational prong. It is based on whether the witness has the “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to render to expert opinion. It’s a more liberal standard to determine whether the expert is qualified to testify competently as to his/her opinions. “This inquiry is not stringent, and so long as the expert is minimally qualified, objections to the level of the expert’s expertise [go] to credibility and weight, not admissibility.” See Clena Investments, Inc. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 280 F.R.D. 653 (S.D.Fla. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The reliability prong is generally the prong where focus is placed. Focus is whether the expert opinion is “based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge and not on belief or speculation, and inferences must be derived using scientific or other valid methods.” See Nease v. Ford Motor Co., 848 F.3d 219, 229 (4^th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “Under the reliability requirement, the expert testimony must have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline. To ensure reliability, the Court assess[es] the [expert’s] reasoning or methodology, using as appropriate such criteria as testability, publication in peer reviewed literature, and general acceptance.” See JH Kelly, LLC v. AECOM Technical Services, Inc., 2022 WL 1817415, *3 (N.D.Ca. 2022) (internal citations and quotations omitted). There are various guideposts the court uses to determine the reliability of the opinion and there is not necessarily a one-size-fits-all model applied universally to all experts.

The relevance prong is simply based on whether the expert’s opinion will assist the fact-finder to understand evidence and/or determine an issue in dispute. See JH Kelly, supra (internal citations and quotations omitted).

These prongs allow the trial court to serve as a gatekeeper to ensure the fact-finder (jury) hears admissible expert opinions. Just remember, a Daubert challenge is based on these three prongs: qualification, reliability, and relevance. Thus, when making a Daubert challenge, you want to focus on which of the prongs you are using to challenge the admissibility of the expert’s opinion. It could be one prong. It could be them all. Again, the focus is on the admissibility, not on the weight of the expert’s opinion because trial courts will view the weight of the expert’s opinion as a credibility issue that can be attacked through rigorous cross-examination.

JH Kelly is an example of a construction dispute out of the Northern District of California where a prime contractor and a subcontractor each filed Daubert motions. There were multiple experts and numerous challenges. Most of the Daubert motions were denied as the trial court found they were really credibility arguments, not admissibility arguments. However, there were a couple of rulings worth pointing out here.

The subcontractor moved to strike expert opinions from one of the prime contractor’s experts that was opining that the subcontractor “is not entitled to recover its: (1) post-project completion damages; (2) change management support fees; and (3) costs for changed work due to untimely and insufficient notice based on the Subcontract provisions….” The subcontractor claimed these opinions were a question of law and nothing more than attorney argument masked as an expert opinion. The trial court agreed.

[T]he Court agrees with [subcontractor] that although these opinions are purportedly based on [expert’s] reading of the Subcontract, they are at bottom attorney argument dressed up as expert opinion. [Expert’s] opinion that various provisions of the Subcontract preclude [subcontractor] from recovering its costs is just straightforward contract interpretation, and as such it permissibly treads on ultimate issues of law.

JH Kelly, supra, at *12.

The general contractor wanted to strike one of the subcontractor’s experts that was opining on lost productivity damages due to excessive changes to the project. The expert used four different methods to calculate lost productivity (e.g., measured mile, IBBS Curves, MCAA factors, and Modified Total Cost). The general contractor claimed all such calculations were not reliable – they were subjective and unsubstantiated. However, the court found that the flaws in the expert’s analysis go to the weight of the opinion, and not on admissibility, and can be vetted through incisive cross-examination. “The major theme here is that while the Court agrees that some of [contractor’s] criticisms of [expert’s] analysis have significant force, it will ultimately allow the jury to determine how much weight to assign his opinions.” JH Kelly, supra, at *6.

There are numerous considerations, including strategic, when filing a Daubert motion.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.THI

JUST BECAUSE I MAY BE AN “EXPERT” DOES NOT MEAN I AM GIVING EXPERT TESTIMONY

Posted on January 8, 2022January 8, 2022 by Edward Garber

On a construction project, it’s hard to argue that the involved parties — whether an architect, engineer, contractor, subcontractor, developer, etc. — are not experts in their field, i.e., they all some scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge or skill particular to their industry. However, this does NOT mean when they testify in trial, at an arbitration, or at a deposition regarding the construction project they are offering expert opinions / testimony as it pertains to that project. Testifying as to facts based on personal knowledge or involvement on a project makes you a fact witness and is different than evaluating and rending an after-the-fact opinion as to the work of others. This does not minimize your knowledge or expertise; it simply means that relative to the construction project you are involved with, your testimony is that of a fact witness and not of an expert. (It is possible to wear both the fact witness and expert witness hat, but that depends on your subsequent role in the litigation or arbitration.)

A good discussion on this premise can be found in a non-construction case, Buzby v. Turtle Rock Community Association, Inc., 47 Fla. L. Weekly D99a (Fla. 2d DCA 2022), dealing with whether a lawyer was testifying as an expert regarding his own fees. The attorney thought he should be paid for his testimony because he was a professional testifying as to his own attorney’s fees. Yet, his testimony was not actually in the form of expert testimony, but factual testimony as to his own fees. The appellate court held the lawyer was NOT entitled to an expert fee (being paid for this time as an expert), and this rationale can equally be extended to parties testifying on construction projects:

This distinction between testimony (i) describing historical facts from personal knowledge and (ii) evaluating the work of others is not limited to doctors; it applies to attorneys as well.

Thus, the question of whether a witness testifies as an expert – and is thereby entitled to an expert fee – depends not only on the witness’s credentials, but also on whether the witness actually gives expert testimony.

***

Like a treating physician, [the attorney] testified to facts within his personal knowledge about acts that he either took or supervised. Even though the acts [the attorney] described involved technical matters, [the attorney’s] recollections of them “are facts nonetheless.”

***

[The attorney’s] decision to volunteer an opinion about his own work did not transform the nature of the deposition or his purpose of testifying.

Buzby, supra (internal citations omitted).

QUICK NOTE: …BACK TO THE DAUBERT STANDARD FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY

Posted on May 24, 2019April 24, 2020 by Edward Garber

In what has previously appeared to be a game of moving chairs, the Florida Supreme Court formally adopted the Daubert standard to determine the admissibility of expert testimony. This allows Florida to move on from the Frye standard and the moving chairs associated with which standard should apply to the admissibility of expert opinions. A good discussion on the Florida Supreme Court’s recent application of the Daubert standard can be found here. The Daubert standard determines the admissibility of expert testimony / opinions in federal court and now it is officially back in Florida to apply to Florida state court litigation. This is important to know, particularly in the construction context, because many construction-related disputes utilize the services of an expert witness to render expert opinions.

AN EXPERT’S QUALIFICATIONS ARE IMPORTANT

Posted on December 15, 2018April 24, 2020 by Edward Garber

An expert’s qualifications are important. Please remember this the next time you retain an expert to analyze documents or data and render an opinion based on that information. An expert must be qualified to render an opinion. Otherwise the expert will not be allowed to render the opinion you may be looking for or need for purposes of trial, as discussed below.

A recent personal injury case, White v. Ring Power Corp., 43 Fla.L.Weekly D2729a (Fla. 3d 2018), involved a crane operator that became severely injured when operating a leased crane. The case proceeded to trial against only the equipment lessor of the crane based on the plaintiff’s contention that there were deficiencies with the crane. The plaintiff intended on using expert witnesses to interpret the crane’s load movement indicator (referred to as LMI) and render opinions that the LMI data showed prior overloads of the crane which resulted in the injury to the operator of the crane.

During a pre-trial motion, the trial court held that the experts were NOT qualified to interpret the LMI data and, therefore, were not qualified to render opinions based on this data. The experts were not allowed to render such expert testimony at trial. After the trial, the plaintiff appealed this ruling. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed this pre-trial ruling.

The trial court’s decision to exclude portions of White’s [plaintiff] experts’ testimony was based upon a finding that these witnesses were unqualified to interpret the LMI data or offer opinions on its significance. This finding is supported by competent substantial evidence, including the experts’ own deposition testimony, in which they acknowledged, for example:

· Expert witness Barth: He has never been trained to interpret LMI data, never took a course on LMI systems, and stated he “self-trained” regarding LMI data by reviewing the instant accident and reading depositions of other witnesses. Barth acknowledged he was not proficient in reading LMI data, and a review of the deposition establishes that Barth was unfamiliar with the LMI system and had difficulty answering basic questions about its purpose and use.

· Expert witness Barbe: Although he certifies crane operators, he does not certify crane maintenance workers, is not a certified crane inspector, and none of his training specifically involves wire ropes. The cranes he inspects do not use LMI systems. He did not know how to download the LMI data on the crane in question, received no training on how to read LMI data, and was unfamiliar with many of the LMI codes contained in the data.

· Expert witness Mankins: He conceded to “not being an expert on LMI or this type of data”; “I wouldn’t know an LMI if I saw one”; “I have no personal experience with LMI systems, nor do I profess to have any expertise associated with such a system.” Mankins did not know the significance of a one-, two- or four-parts line on a crane, and acknowledged “I essentially know nothing about cranes.”

None of the three experts had ever interpreted LMI data or used LMI data to investigate the cause of a crane accident or wire rope failure. Instead, all three of White’s expert witnesses accepted the LMI data at face value without sufficient knowledge, training or expertise to interpret the data or opine as to its significance. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding that portion of their proposed testimony.

COMPETING EXPERT WITNESSES IN AN INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTE

Posted on April 2, 2018April 2, 2018 by Edward Garber

Oftentimes, insurance coverage disputes involve competing expert witnesses. The experts render different expert opinions regarding a topic that goes to coverage and/or damages. An example of competing expert witnesses can be found in the recent property insurance coverage dispute, Garcia v. First Community Ins. Co., 43 Fla.L.Weekly D671a (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).

In this case, an insured submitted a claim under her homeowner’s policy for water damage due to a roof leak. She claimed her damage was approximately $23,000. The insurer denied coverage and an insurance coverage dispute ensued.

The insured’s policy, akin to many homeowner’s policies, contained exclusions for loss caused by:

h. Rain, snow, sleet, sand or dust to the interior of a building unless a covered peril first damages the building causing an opening in a roof or wall and the rain, snow, sleet, sand or dust enters through this opening.

***

i. (1) Wear and tear, marring, deterioration;

The insurer sent an engineer to inspect the insured’s property and the engineer (expert) opined that the water intrusion was not covered under the policy based on the aforementioned exclusions. Her opinion was that the water intrusion through the roof was the result of deterioration from age, tree branch abrasions, and construction defects based on how nails were installed into the shingles. Based on this opinion, the insurer was denying coverage based on the (i) wear and tear, marring and deterioration exclusion and (ii) rain intruded through the roof based on a peril (construction defect) that was not covered under the policy.

The insured, as expected, had a competing expert that opined that a hail impact or high wind uplift (covered peril) in the days leading up to the rain event caused water to intrude through the roof and cause interior damage. Under this opinion, the insured was presenting an expert opinion for coverage and why the insurer’s exclusions were inapplicable.

In this case, surprisingly, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer. However, this was reversed on appeal because the competing opinions as to coverage and the cause of the insured’s loss created a genuine issue of material fact. Summary judgment cannot be granted if there are genuine issues of material fact. See Garcia, supra, (“Given this conflict in the material evidence as to the cause of the loss, the trial court erred in entering final judgment in favor of First Community [insurer].”).

Another argument the insurer raised was that its engineer inspected the property within months after the date of loss whereas the insured’s expert is basing an opinion on an inspection that occurred three years after the fact. This fact, albeit true, does not create a genuine issue of material fact. Rather, it goes to the credibility of the experts at trial. Which expert is more credible regarding the cause of the loss: the insurer’s expert that inspected the property a few months after the loss or the insured’s expert that inspected the property years after the loss. Well, the issue of credibility and how a jury / trier of fact weighs this in consideration of other evidence is not appropriate in determining a motion for summary judgment. See Garcia, supra.

Experts are an important part of construction disputes including insurance coverage disputes and it is not uncommon for there to be competing expert opinions as to the cause of a loss, a defect, and, of course, damages.

VIOLATION OF THE BUILDING CODE IS A QUESTION OF LAW

Posted on December 25, 2015December 25, 2015 by Edward Garber

In construction defect disputes, oftentimes the owner (or developer or association, as may be applicable) will assert a claim against the general contractor, and perhaps, subcontractors for a violation of the building code. Such a claim is authorized pursuant to Florida Statute s. 553.84 that provides:

Notwithstanding any other remedies available, any person or party, in an individual capacity or on behalf of a class of persons or parties, damaged as a result of a violation of this part or the Florida Building Code, has a cause of action in any court of competent jurisdiction against the person or party who committed the violation; however, if the person or party obtains the required building permits and any local government or public agency with authority to enforce the Florida Building Code approves the plans, if the construction project passes all required inspections under the code, and if there is no personal injury or damage to property other than the property that is the subject of the permits, plans, and inspections, this section does not apply unless the person or party knew or should have known that the violation existed.

A violation of the building code serves as evidence of negligence by the offending party. See Russ v. Wollheim, 915 So.2d 1285, n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“A building code is designed to protect the general public rather than a particular class of individuals, and therefore, violation of a building code is merely evidence of negligence.” )

But who determines whether an asserted defect, error, or omission constitutes a violation of the building code? Is this a question of law for the judge? Or, is this a question of fact for the jury (in a jury trial)? Remarkably, cases have held that a violation of a building code, a complicated and rather specialized issue, is a question of law for the judge to determine.

In Edward J. Seibert, A.I.A. Architect and Planner, P.A. v. Bayport Beach and Tennis Club Ass’n, Inc., 573 So.2d 889 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), a condominium association filed suit against the architect among others. The jury found that the architect was liable for violating the building code in the fire exit design even though the design had been approved by the building department upon the issuance of the building permit. To support this violation, the association had an expert testify regarding his interpretation regarding the building code. The architect testified that his design complied with the building code and had two supporting expert opinions. The verdict form asked the jury if the fire exist design complied with the applicable code. The Second District held that the interpretation of the code was a question of law that should not have been submitted to the jury.

They [the parties] instead presented conflicting opinions as to how the code should be interpreted. The jury was allowed to determine the meaning of the code and then whether Seibert [architect] violated the code by designing only one fire exit. This was error. An expert should not be allowed to testify concerning questions of law, and the interpretation of the building code presented a question of law.

It was the duty of the trial court to interpret the meaning of the code and instruct the jury concerning that meaning. Any conflicts in interpretation were for the court to resolve and their resolution was not a jury issue.

Edward J. Seibert, 573 So.2d at 891-9 (internal citations omitted).

Further, in Lindsey v. Bill Arflin Bonding Agency, Inc., 645 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1^st DCA 1994), a personal injury plaintiff sued an owner for slipping on a wet spot on stairs. The plaintiff claimed that the stairs lacked handrails in violation of the building code. The owners relied on testimony from a building department official opining that handrails were not required based on his interpretation of the code / ordinance at-issue. The First District, however, found:

Expert testimony as to the meaning of an ordinance is not appropriate when the disputed language consists of “ordinary words susceptible to being given plain effect consistent with their ordinary meaning.” The legal effect of a building code presents a question of law for the court, not a question of fact for the jury. While expert testimony may be relevant and helpful to the court where a statute or ordinance contains words of art or scientific and technical terms, even then such testimony cannot dictate the court’s construction of the enactment.

Lindsey, 645 So.2d at 568 (internal citations omitted).