Tag Archives: duty to defend

BENEFIT OF THE COBLENTZ AGREEMENT AND CONSENT JUDGMENT

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If you are not familiar with the concept of what is commonly known as a Coblentz agreement relative to an insurance coverage dispute, review these prior postings (here and here and here). This is a good-to-know agreement if you are a claimant and need to consider an avenue of collection if the insured’s carrier denies coverage out of the gate (meaning the carrier has denied both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify).

A recent Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals opinion demonstrates the Coblentz agreement concept.  In Barrs v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2024 WL 3673089 (11th Cir. 2024), an owner asserted a construction defect claim against its contractor.  The owner hired the contractor to deconstruct a building and the contractor hired a demolition subcontractor. The owner noticed work was not being performed and materials (e.g., lumber) were missing; the demolition subcontractor had stolen materials. The subcontractor was terminated, and the owner claimed the contractor’s negligence allowed the theft and delayed his project. The contractor’s commercial general liability (CGL) insurer notified the insured-contractor that coverage did not exist and refused to defend the contractor. The owner sued the contractor under various theories of liability.  The owner and contractor entered into a settlement agreement (i.e., the Coblentz agreement) where the contractor “admitted liability in the amount of $557,500.00….A consent judgment was entered against [the contractor] that closely tracked the settlement agreement but did not indicate which portion of the damages award was attributed to which claims. The agreement also assigned [owner] and all of [the contractor’s] rights to claim coverage and to recover available funds under [the contractor’s CGL policy].”

The owner then sued the contractor’s insurer under the CGL policy based on the owner being assigned contractor’s rights under the policy. While the federal district court found Georgia law applied, it further found that the contractor’s CGL policy provided coverage for some of owner’s claims against contractor – it provided coverage for owner’s “claims of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision to the extent that he sought damages for stolen lumber and materials.” Barrs, supra, at *2. The CGL policy did not cover any faulty workmanship or improper deconstruction.  The district court subsequently entered judgment in favor of the owner against the insurer for $557,500. The CGL insurer appealed arguing, mainly: (1) the damages are not covered by its policy, and (2) it had no duty to indemnify the owner because the consent judgment did not allocate between covered and uncovered claims.

As for the CGL insurer’s first point of contention (damages are not covered), he Eleventh Circuit held no exclusion barred coverage for the negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claims for damages associated with stolen lumber and materials.

As for the CGL insurer’s second point of contention (no duty to indemnity because of lack of allocation in consent judgment), the Eleventh Circuit held that nothing under Georgia law precludes enforcement of an unallocated consent judgment:

“The district court held that “[w]hen an insurance company refuses to defend its insured, without any reservation of rights, and its insured secures ajudgment (without fraud or collusion), an insurance company must pay the entire judgment.” It determined that the consent judgment here wasenforceable because (1) it complied with the procedures established in Coblentz v. American Surety Company of New York, 416 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir.1969); (2) Georgia common law didn’t appear to allow an insurer a second bite at the apple when it chose not to participate in the underlying lawsuit; and (3) [owner’s] declaration attested that the $557,500 settlement was less than the value of the stolen lumber, so even if the consent judgment wasn’t properly allocated, the recovery was reasonable.

We agree that the consent judgment was crafted and executed in compliance with Coblentz. To be sure, although Georgia law estops an insurer from contesting its insured’s liability when it refuses to participate in the underlying lawsuit, it doesn’t necessarily prevent an insurer from later contesting coverage. Even so, we affirm because we’ve been pointed to nothing in Georgia law that clearly prevents the enforcement of unallocated consent judgments.  To hold that unallocated consent judgments are unenforceable would be to shift the burden to the insured and would require meddling in Georgia law to a degree that we think would be imprudent.

Barrs, supra at *5 (internal citations omitted).

When dealing with the Coblentz agreement and corresponding consent judgment, it is better practice to allocate damages between covered and uncovered damages. Regardless, this case demonstrates the benefit of a Coblentz agreement when the liability carrier denies coverage out of the gate and the carrier becomes the best avenue of collection.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

DON’T FALL IN TRAP OF BUYING THE CHEAPEST INSURANCE POLICY AS IT MAY BAD FOR YOUR BUSINESS RISKS AND NEEDS

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Don’t fall in the trap of buying the cheapest insurance policy.  It will come and bite you in the butt big time! Consult with an insurance broker that understands construction and, importantly, your specific industry, to provide you coverage within your industry.  Otherwise, you’ll be paying for a policy that may (i) not be a good policy, and (ii) may provide you minimal to no value for your industry’s RISKS and NEEDS when factoring in exclusions.  When procuring insurance, think of the old adage “penny wise and pound foolish,” and don’t make decisions that fit within this adage!

The recent decision in Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Pinnacle Engineering & Development, Inc., 2024 WL 940527 (S.D. Fla. 2024) serves as an example.  Here, a subcontractor was hired by a general contractor to perform underground utility work for a townhome development which consisted of 57 townhome units included in 18 detached structures. The subcontractor’s underground work was defective which caused damage to the property’s water line, sewer system, plumbing lines, pavers, etc. The general contractor was liable to the owner for this defective work.  Although the general contractor was an additional insured under the subcontractor’s commercial general liability (CGL) policy, the subcontractor’s CGL carrier denied the duty to defend and initiated an insurance coverage lawsuit. Motions for summary judgment were filed.

The subcontractor’s policy contained an exclusion in an endorsement for residential construction operations that provided that the policy does NOT cover bodily injury or property damage:

[A]rising out of, resulting from, related to, or in any way connected with, either directly or indirectly, your ongoing operations, “your product”, or “your work” performed by or on behalf of any insured, either prior to or during the policy period, that is incorporated into or performed at any of the following construction projects:

a. Any new townhouse or residential condominium project where the total number of individual residential units is greater than twenty-five (25), regardless of the number of buildings, developments, phases or associations;

b. Any new residential housing project (also known as a Planned Unit Development (PUD) or tract housing), where the total number of “residential housing units” is greater than twenty-five (25), regardless of the number of buildings, developments, phases or associations;”

The term “individual residential unit” in subsection (a) was not a defined term. The contractor argued this lack of definition created an ambiguity which should be interpreted in its favor and against the insurer. The court disagreed and entered summary judgment in favor of the insurer.  The exclusion in the endorsement applied to BAR coverage. This meant there was no duty to defend and, thus, no duty to indemnify.

I. Evaluation of Insurer’s Duties under Liability Policy

An insurer’s duty to defend arises from the insurance contract and policy. Therefore, “summary judgment is appropriate in declaratory judgmentactions seeking a declaration of coverage when the insurer’s duty, if any, rests solely on the applicability of the insurance policy, the construction andeffect of which is a matter of law.” “An insurer’s duty to indemnify is narrower than its duty to defend and must be determined by analyzing the policycoverages in light of the actual facts in the underlying case.”

“Under Florida law, an insurance policy is treated like a contract, and therefore ordinary contract principles govern the interpretation andconstruction of such a policy.” As with all contracts, the interpretation of an insurance contract — including determining whether an insuranceprovision is ambiguous—is a question of law to be determined by the court.

“Under Florida law, insurance contracts are construed according to their plain meaning.” The “terms of an insurance policy should be taken andunderstood in their ordinary sense and the policy should receive a reasonable, practical and sensible interpretation consistent with the intent of the parties-not a strained, forced or unrealistic construction.” However, if there is more than one reasonable interpretation of an insurance policy, anambiguity exists and it “should be construed against the insurer.”

A coverage clause is generally interpreted as broadly as possible to ensure the greatest amount of insurance coverage. To determine the parties’contractual intent, a court may only consider the language in the insurance policy, unless the policy is ambiguous. “As a general rule, in the absenceof some ambiguity, the intent of the parties to a written contract must be ascertained from the words used in the contract, without resort to extrinsicevidence.”

Nautilus Ins., supra at *6-7 (internal citations omitted).

II. The Exclusion in the Endorsement Barred Coverage – There is No Ambiguity

The “failure to define a term involving coverage does not necessarily render the term ambiguous.” In Florida, when a term is undefined in aninsurance policy, the term is to be “given [its] plain and ordinary meaning.” To find in favor of the insured due to an ambiguity in an insurancecontract, “the policy must actually be ambiguous.” Therefore, the necessary determination is the plain and ordinary meaning of the undefined term“individual residential unit” in the Endorsement Exclusion.

***

However, in Florida, “exclusionary provisions which are…susceptible to more than one meaning must be construed in favor of the insured.’ ” Forcases involving exclusions to insurance contracts, this rule is to be read more clearly in favor of an insured if “ ‘a genuine inconsistency,uncertainty, or ambiguity in meaning remains after resort to the ordinary rules of construction” Therefore, “courts should not strain to findambiguity…if there is no genuine ambiguity, there is no reason to bypass the policy’s plain meaning.” Id. (citations omitted).

***

Consistent with Florida law, providing a “plain meaning analysis” for the term “individual residential units” indicates a thing intended for one person, existing as a distinct entity and indivisible whole (individual), to be used as a residence (residential) which is a part of a whole (unit).

Nautilus Ins., supra at *9, 10 (internal citations omitted).

Based on the plain meaning of “individual residential units,” the exclusion in the endorsement barred coverage:

[T]he Endorsement Exclusion bars coverage and therefore [the CGL insurer] did not breach.  Moreover, the work [the subcontractor] conducted wasfor underground utilities for the Project, the work was done for the Project, incorporated into the Project, and at the Property pursuant to itssubcontract with [the general contractor]. Therefore, [the subcontractor’s] work is also barred by the Endorsement Exclusion as § A.1.a. excludes “ ‘property damage’ arising out of, resulting from, related to, or in any way connected with, either directly or indirectly. . . incorporated into orperformed at” what this Court has determined to encompass the Project. The Subcontract establishes that [the subcontractor] contracted with [the general contractor] to perform work at the Property and that it agreed to perform work for the Project. Additionally, the Subcontract establishes [the subcontractor] assumed “entire responsibility and liability…for any and all damage…of any kind…growing out of or resulting from the execution of theWork provided for in this Contract.” Therefore, the record establishes [the subcontractor’s] work was conducted at the Property and performed at andincorporated into the Project and the Endorsement Exclusion applies to [the subcontractor]. [The insurer] has met its burden to show the absence of agenuine issue of material fact and, absent any viable affirmative defenses, [the insurer] is entitled to summary judgment.

Nautilus Ins., supra, at *11.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

DOES “FAULTY WORKMANSHIP” CONSTITUTE AN OCCURRENCE UNDER YOUR CGL POLICY?

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There is nothing more scintillating than an insurance coverage dispute, right?  Well, some folks would agree with this sentiment.  Others would spit out their morning coffee in disagreement.  Regardless of where you fall in the spectrum, they are always important because maintaining insurance is a NECESSARY part of business, particularly in the construction industry.  The ideal is to have insurance that covers risks you are assuming in the performance of your work.

Sometimes, insurance coverage disputes provide valuable insight, even in disputes outside of Florida. Recently, the Western District of Kentucky in Westfield Insurance Co. v. Kentuckiana Commercial Concrete, LLC, 2023 WL 8650791 (W.D.KY 2023), involved such a dispute. While different than how Florida would treat the same issue, it’s still noteworthy because it sheds light into how other jurisdictions determine whether “faulty workmanship” constitutes an “occurrence” under a commercial general liability (CGL) policy.

In this case, the commercial general liability insurer of a subcontractor sued the subcontractor (insured) and the general contractor (additional insured) seeking a declaration that it had NO duty to defend either in a construction defect arbitration initiated by the owner of an apartment project.  More specifically:

The allegations at issue here concern water damage [the owner] ascribes to faulty workmanship by [the general contractor] and [the subcontractor]. Asserting claims for negligence and breach of contract, [the owner] accused [the general contractor] of failing to complete theproject with “skill, care and diligence,” breaking its “promise to perform the work according to the Contract Documents,” breaching “its warrantyof defect-free Work,” breaking “its promise to supervise and to coordinate the Work using its ‘best skill and attention,’ ” and breaking “its promise to beresponsible for the acts, omissions and qualifications of its supervisors and Subcontractors in performing the Work.  The engineer’s report enclosed with[the owner’s] initial arbitration demand concluded that damage occurred where [the general contractor’s] work “did not conform to the ConstructionDocuments, local ordinances and industry standard, was not workmanlike, and was negligent.”  [The general contractor’s] arbitration demand against [the subcontractor], moreover, incorporates all the allegations from [the owner’s] original arbitration demand and ascribes them to [the subcontractor].

Westfield Ins. Co., supra, at *2 (internal citations omitted).

The fundamental issue is that under Kentucky law “faulty construction-related workmanship, standing alone, is not a fortuitous ‘occurrence’ under CGL policies including language similar to that at issue here.”  Westfield Ins. Co., supra, at *2 (noting the CGL policy “defined occurrence as ‘an accident, including continued or repeated exposure to the same general harmful conditions.’”).

In this case, the trial court found that the CGL insurer had NO duty to defend the general contractor and subcontractor because “the alleged errors concern aspects of the project over which the general contractor and subcontractor exercised control over the work.” Westfield Ins. Co., supra, at *3.

In short, Kentucky law is clear that “faulty workmanship” does not ordinarily “constitut[e] an occurrence under a CGL policy” because the“ultimate liability falls to the on  one who performed the negligent work … instead of the insurance carrier.”  The allegations brought by [the owner] do not implicate events that were beyond the control of either [the general contractor] or [the subcontractor]. So neither the breach nor the faulty-workmanship allegations leveled against [the general contractor] and [subcontractor] constitute a fortuitous event amounting to an “occurrence” covered by the [CGL] insurance policy. To hold otherwise would essentially convert [the subcontractor’s] CGL coverage into a construction bond.

Westfield Ins. Co., supra, at 84 (internal citations omitted).

Now, while I don’t agree with this holding, this is the law in Kentucky, meaning a CGL policy does not provide the preferred (and, really, necessary) coverage for faulty workmanship.  Does your CGL policy provide coverage for faulty workmanship?  Or, does faulty workmanship constitute an occurrence under your CGL policy? If you do not know the answer to these questions, make sure to find out!

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

CGL COVERAGE DISPUTE REGARDING THE (j)(6) and (j)(7) PROPERTY DAMAGE EXCLUSIONS

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A new insurance coverage opinion dealing with a commercial general liability’s (CGL) duty to defend involved exclusions commonly known as the (j)(6) and (j)(7) property damage exclusions (and in certain policies known as the (j)(5) and (j)(6) exclusions). These are the exclusions that apply during ongoing operations.  Exclusion (l), or the “your work” exclusion, applies post-completion, i.e., it is an exclusion for “property damage” to “your work” included in the “products-completed operations hazard.”

Exclusions (j)(6) and (j)(7) in the policy at-issue exclude coverage for property damage to:

(j)(6) That particular part of real property on which any insured or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations, if the “property damage” arises out of those operations;

(j)(7) That particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because “your work” was incorrectly performed on it.

In this coverage dispute, Southern-Owners Ins. Co. v. MAC Contractors of Florida, LLC, 2023 WL 2709389 (M.D.Fla. 2023), a CGL carrier denied coverage and the duty to defend in a residential construction defect lawsuit. The underlying dispute pertained to a contractor (insured) not finishing its construction due to a dispute with the homeowners. The homeowners claimed the work was defective and alleged various defects:

“[r]epair loose, broken or chipped pavers in driveway and walkways and install edge restraints”; “[r]epair underside of lap siding – inconsistent paint finish at bottom of boards”; “[r]epair chatter marks on T&G ceilings”; “repair damage to all exterior doors” and “[r]epair all pocket doors”; “[r]eplace damaged top stair tread”; “[r]emedy damage to hardwood floors, includ[ing] damage resulting from use of blue tape and dirt”; “[r]epair metal roof dents, scratches and hems”; “[c]lean wall and ceiling paint on cabinets”; “[r]emove paint spots on baseboards throughout the house”; “[r]emedy scratches in granite”; and “[p]atch and paint all holes in ceilings and walls and twin holes in exterior hardi plank.”

The contractor resolved the underlying lawsuit with the homeowners, but the issue was whether the carrier should have defended the contractor in this underlying lawsuit and incurred the defense fees and costs. If so, the carrier would need to reimburse its insured.  There are times where the main focus of the coverage dispute is on the duty to defend and less about the duty to indemnify. The duty to defend is a critical duty and should NOT be overlooked or cast aside.

Initially, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer based on the “your work” exclusion in exclusion (l). However, this was reversed by the Eleventh Circuit finding that the “underlying complaint could fairly be construed to allege damages that fell outside the exclusion.” Southern-Owners Ins. Co., supra, at *2.

On remand, the trial court again entered summary judgment for the insurer finding that the underlying complaint “did not allege ‘property damage’ within the meaning of the CGL policy…did not allege any damage beyond the faulty workmanship or defective work….”  Id.  The Eleventh Circuit again reversed finding “that the underlying operative complaint can be fairly construed to allege ‘property damage’ within the meaning of the CGL policy and Florida law.” Id.  The Eleventh Circuit also previously held that, regardless, the completion-operations hazard exclusion would also NOT eliminate the carrier’s duty to defend. Id.  “The Eleventh Circuit held: ‘Construing the Your Work exclusion narrowly and resolving all doubts in favor of [the contractor], we conclude that the underlying allegations can fairly be construed to allege damage during ongoing operations.” Id. at *4.

So, back to the trial court on more summary judgments.  Is the third time the charm here for the insurer?  No! The trial court, this time, granted summary judgment for the insured finding the carrier had a duty to defend.

Since it was previously held that the completed-operations hazard exclusion would not eliminate the carrier’s duty to defend, the primary focus was on the (j)(6) and (j)(7) exclusions. The carrier’s fundamental argument was that the phrase, “That particular part of” (as underlined above) refers to the entire project. The contractor argued these exclusions don’t apply “to property damage that occurred during operations on the property as a whole ‘but at a moment in time whether neither [the contractor] nor its subcontractors specifically worked on’ the ‘particular part of [the] property’ that was damaged or must be restored, repaired, or replaced.’”  Southern-Owners Ins. Co., supra, at *2.

As to the (j)(6) and (j)(7) exclusions, the trial court reasoned (relying on various case citations):

[I]f a subcontractor is hired to install a project component and, by virtue of his faulty workmanship, installs a defective component, then the cost to repair the defective component is not property damage. On the other hand, a claim for the costs of repairing damage to other property caused by defective work does qualify as a claim for property damage.

Property damage occurs when the damage happens, not when the damage is discovered or discoverable. And where the underlying allegations, even though silent as to the timing of damages, can be reasonably construed to allege property damage that occurred during the policy period, there is potential for coverage.

The[se] exclusions are triggered only when the faulty work and the damage are to the same part of the property. The potential for coverage is triggered when an occurrence results in property damage. There is not requirement that the damages manifest themselves during the policy period. Here, although the underlying allegations are silent as to the timing of the damages, the allegations can be reasonably construed to allege damages that occurred during ongoing operations. Under paragraph j7, property damage to that particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because your work was incorrectly performed on it is excluded from coverage.  Paragraph 7 does not apply to property damage included in the products-completed operations hazard, which excludes work that has not yet been completed or abandoned.

Southern-Owners Ins. Co., supra, at *5-6 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

UNDERSTANDING LIABILITY INSURER’S TWO DUTIES: TO DEFEND AND TO INDEMNIFY

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A liability insurer has two duties that are the crux of a liability policy: the duty to defend the insured in legal actions and the duty to indemnify the insured from losses covered under the policy.  Many times, policyholders (insureds) do not fully understand or appreciate these two important duties. They need to and this is why having private counsel assist with coverage-related considerations is an absolute must.

An insurers’ duty to defend is separate from its duty to indemnify.  A recent opinion out of the Middle District of Florida in Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Tate Transport Corp., 2022 WL 16963815 (M.D.Fla. 2022) clarifies the distinction between these duties with a focus on an insurer’s initial duty — the duty to defend.  Please read below so you can have more of an appreciation of these duties.  The court does a good job discussing Florida law with the emphasis on when an insurer’s initial duty to defend kicks-in:

Duty to Defend

Under Florida law, “an insurer’s duty to defend its insured against a legal action arises when the complaint alleges facts that fairly and potentially bring the suit within policy coverage.”  The duty to defend is a broad one, broader than the duty to indemnify, and “[t]he merits of the underlying suit are irrelevant.”  We determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend its insured based only on “the eight corners of the complaint and the policy,” and only as the complaint’s alleged facts are “fairly read[.]” The “facts” we consider in evaluating the duty to defend come solely from the complaint, regardless of the actual facts of the case and regardless of any later developed and contradictory factual record.  “Any doubts regarding the duty to defend must be resolved in favor of the insured,” and “where a complaint alleges facts that are partially within and partially outside the coverage of an insured’s policy, the insurer  is not only obligated to defend, but must defend that entire suit[.]” But of course, because the lawsuit must be for something covered by the insurance policy, “the insurer has no duty to defend” when “the pleadings show the applicability of a policy exclusion.”

An insurance policy can, without creating a conflict or ambiguity, both provide coverage and exclude some things that might otherwise fall within that coverage.  On the other hand, an insurance policy’s coverage becomes illusory if it grants coverage in one provision and completely takes it away in another provision. 

Because [insurer] relies on an exclusion to deny coverage, “it has the burden of demonstrating that the allegations of the complaint are cast solely and entirely within the policy exclusion and are subject to no other reasonable interpretation.” 

***

An insurer’s duty to defend an insured in a legal action under Florida law “arises when the complaint alleges facts that fairly and potentially bring the suit within policy coverage.”  Even if the allegations in the complaint are meritless, the duty to defend nonetheless arises. All doubts about whether the duty to defend applies are resolved in favor of the insured.  “If an examination of the allegations of the complaint leaves any doubt regarding the insurer’s duty to defend, the issue is resolved in favor of the insured.” 

Progressive Express Insurance, supra, at *3-5 (internal citations omitted).

Duty to Indemnify

“While the duty to defend is broad and based on the allegations in the complaint, the duty to indemnify is determined by the facts adduced at trial or during discovery.” 

Therefore, unlike the duty to defend, the trial court must look beyond the allegations in the underlying complaint to decide whether an insurer has a duty to indemnify. The duty to indemnify arguably may not become fully ripened until the merits of the underlying litigation are resolved.

Progressive Express Insurance, supra, at *6 (internal citations omitted)

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

HOW YOU PLEAD ALLEGATIONS TO TRIGGER LIABILITY INSURER’S DUTIES IS CRITICAL

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How you plead allegations in your lawsuit to trigger duties of a liability insurance carrier is a critical consideration.  If the complaint is not pled appropriately, it can result in the carrier NOT owing a duty to defend its insured, which is the party(ies) you are suing. If there is no duty to defend, there will be no duty to indemnify the insured to cover your damages.  For this reason, in a number of circumstances, this is NOT what you want because you want to trigger insurance coverage and potential proceeds to be paid by a carrier to cover your damages. There are times when you are confronted with a case that just is not a good insurance coverage case.  This may result in you coming up with creative arguments to maximize insurance coverage.  Even in these times, you want to plead the complaint to best maximize coverage under the creative arguments you have developed.

An example of not pleading allegations in a complaint to trigger an insurer’s duties can be found in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision in Tricon Development of Brevard, Inc. v. Nautilus Insurance Co., 2021 WL 4129373 (11th Cir. 2021).   This case involved a general contractor constructing condominiums.  The general contractor hired a subcontractor to fabricate and install metal railings.  The subcontractor had a commercial general liability (CGL) policy that named the general contractor as an additional insured with respect to liability for property damage “caused in whole or in part” by the subcontractor’s direct or vicarious acts or omissions.  (This is a good additional insured endorsement.)

A dispute arose as to defective work by the subcontractor in fabricating and installing the railings.  The general contractor, therefore, engaged another subcontractor to fabricate new railings and remove the current railing to install the new ones. The general contractor submitted a claim to its original railing subcontractor’s insurer.  The insurer denied the claim and the general contractor filed a coverage action against the insurer as an additional insured under the CGL policy.

The problem, however, is that the general contractor’s complaint did not appear to truly consider insurance coverage, although it appeared to be a case where insurance coverage was not a great option.   The Eleventh Circuit explained there was no coverage based on the allegations in the complaint:

Here, [the general contractor] alleges that the subcontractor’s railings were deficient due to having defects and damage, not being installed properly, and not satisfying the project’s specifications; it does not allege that the subcontractor’s faulty workmanship damaged otherwise non-defective components of the project…. Thus, the costs that [the general contractor] incurred in removing the subcontractor’s railings and the fabrication and installation of new railings do not constitute “property damage” under the policies….

Tricon Development of Brevard at *2.

This is obviously not what the general contractor wanted and had it pled allegations differently, the outcome may have turned out different.  Although, the general contractor may have been faced with trying to come up with a creative argument recognizing it was not a great insurance coverage action.

Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit, finding there was no insurance coverage, includes a worthy paragraph when it comes to property damage in a construction defect/damage dispute so that parties recognize CGL policies do not cover defective workmanship. Take note of this discussion so that you can ensure allegations are pled to best maximize coverage:

The policies at issue in this appeal are post-1986 standard form commercial general liability policies with products-completed operations hazard coverage, which are governed by Florida law. We have held that such policies do not cover the costs of replacing defective products. In Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company v. Auchter Company, we examined a post-1986 standard form commercial general liability policy with products-completed operations hazard coverage. That policy “define[d] ‘property damage’ as ‘physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property … or … loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured.’ ” 673 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). Applying Florida law, we held that “there is no coverage if there is no damage beyond the faulty workmanship, i.e., unless the faulty workmanship has damaged some otherwise nondefective component of the project.” Id. at 1306 (citing U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So.2d 871, 889 (Fla. 2007)). We also held that “if a subcontractor is hired to install a project component and, by virtue of his faulty workmanship, installs a defective component, then the cost to repair and replace the defective component is not ‘property damage.’ ” Id. (citing Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Pozzi Window Co., 984 So.2d 1241, 1248 (Fla. 2008)). We further held that “nondefective and properly installed raw materials can constitute a defective project component when the contract specifications call for the use of different materials, yet the cost to reinstall the correct materials is not ‘property damage’—even though the remedy for such a nonconformity is to remove and replace that component of the project.” Id. (citing Pozzi, 984 So.2d at 1248).

Tricon Development of Brevard at *2.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

INSURER’S DUTY TO INDEMNIFY NOT RIPE UNTIL UNDERLYING LAWSUIT AGAINST INSURED RESOLVED

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A liability insurer has two duties:  1) the duty to defend its insured; and 2) the duty to indemnify its insured.

With respect to the second duty – the duty to indemnify – this duty is typically “not ripe for adjudication unless and until the insured or putative insured has been held liable in the underlying action.” Hartford Fire Ins Co. v. Beazer Homes, LLC, 2019 WL 5596237, *2 (M.D.Fla. 2019) (internal quotation omitted).

For instance, Beazer Homes involved an insurance coverage dispute stemming from construction defects.  An owner sued its general contractor for construction defects relating to stucco problems.  The general contractor paid for the repairs.   The general contractor then sued its stucco subcontractor to recover the costs it incurred.  The subcontractor tendered the defense of the lawsuit to its commercial general liability insurer which is defending its insured-subcontractor under the commonly issued reservation of rights.

During the pendency of the general contractor’s lawsuit against its subcontractor, the subcontractor’s commercial general liability insured filed an action for declaratory relief in federal court seeking a declaration as to whether it owes its subcontractor a duty to indemnify.  The issue was whether this action for declaratory relief was ripe since there was no adjudication against the insured-subcontractor in the general contractor’s lawsuit against the subcontractor.   The Middle District Court of Florida held that it was not ripe: “The Eleventh Circuit agreed that an insurer’s duty to indemnify is not ripe until the underlying lawsuit is resolved.”  Beazer Homes, 2019 WL at *2 (internal quotation omitted)

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

LIABILITY INSURER’S DUTY TO DEFEND INSURED IS BROADER THAN ITS DUTY TO INDEMNIFY

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When it comes to liability insurance, an insurer’s duty to defend its insured from a third-party claim is much broader than its duty to indemnify.   This broad duty to defend an insured is very important and, as an insured, you need to know this.   “A liability insurer’s obligation, with respect to its duty to defend, is not determined by the insured’s actual liability but rather by whether the alleged basis of the action against the insurer falls within the policy’s coverage.”  Advanced Systems, Inc. v. Gotham Ins. Co., 44 Fla. L. Weekly D996b (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (internal quotation omitted).  This means:

 

Even where the complaint alleges facts partially within and partially outside the coverage of a policy, the insurer is nonetheless obligated to defend the entire suit, even if the facts later demonstrate that no coverage actually exists.  And, the insurer must defend even if the allegations in the complaint are factually incorrect or meritless.  As such, an insurer is obligated to defend a claim even if it is uncertain whether coverage exists under the policy.  Furthermore, once a court finds that there is a duty to defend, the duty will continue even though it is ultimately determined that the alleged cause of action is groundless and no liability is found within the policy provisions defining coverage.

Advanced Systems, supra(internal citations and quotations omitted).

 

In Advanced Systems, an insurer refused to defend its insured, a fire protection subcontractor.   The subcontractor had been third-partied into a construction defect lawsuit because the foam fire suppression system it installed had a failure resulting in the premature discharge of foam.  The owner sued the general contractor and the general contractor third-partied in the subcontractor.  However, the subcontractor’s CGL carrier refused its duty to defend the subcontractor from the third-party complaint because of the pollution exclusion in the CGL policy.  In other words, the insurer claimed that the foam the subcontractor installed constituted a pollutant within the meaning of the exclusion and, therefore, resulted in no coverage and, thus, no duty to defend the insured in the action.  

 

To determine the foam was a “pollutant”–which the policy defined as any “solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste”—the insurer relied on extrinsic evidence, specifically the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS Sheet) for the foam.   The insured objected to the insurer’s reliance on extrinsic evidence since it was beyond the scope of the insurer’s duty to defend which should be based on the allegations in the underlying complaint.  (The insurer tried to support its reliance on extrinsic evidence under a very limited exception that supports the reliance on extrinsic facts to form the refusal to defend when the extrinsic facts are uncontroverted and manifestly obvious, not normally alleged in the complaint, and that place the claim outside of coverage.  However, this is a very narrow exception that the court was not going to apply here.) 

 

It is important to consult with counsel if you have an issue with your insurer refusing to defend you in an underlying action and/or your insurer denies coverage.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

CGL INSURER’S DUTY TO DEFEND BROADER THAN DUTY TO INDEMNIFY AND BASED ON ALLEGATIONS IN UNDERLYING COMPLAINT

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shutterstock_111496388The duty to defend an insured with respect to a third-party claim is broader than the duty to indemnify the insured for that claim.  The duty to defend is triggered by allegations in the underlying complaint. However, an insurer is only required to indemnify its insured for damages covered under the policy.   A recent case example demonstrating the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify can be found in Southern Owners Ins. Co. v. Gallo Building Services, Inc., 2018 WL 6619987 (M.D.Fla. 2019).  

 

In this case, a homebuilder built a 270-unit condominium project where the units were included in 51-buildings.  Upon turnover of the condominium association to the unit owners, the condominium association served a Florida Statutes Chapter 558 Notice of Construction Defects letter. There was numerous nonconforming work spread out among various subcontractor trades including nonconforming stucco work.  The homebuilder incurred significant costs to repair defective work and resulting property damage, and relocated unit owners during repairs.  The homebuilder then filed a lawsuit against implicated subcontractors.  One of the implicated subcontractors was the stucco subcontractor.

 

 

The stucco subcontractor’s insurer filed an action for declaratory relief claiming it had NO duty to defend or indemnify the subcontractor in the underlying action because the subcontractor had a stucco/EIFS exclusion through an endorsement in its policy, referred tp as the “Exterior Finishing System and Stucco Exclusion.”  The subcontractor’s policy also did not contain a subcontractor exception to the “your work” exclusion.

 

Regarding the elimination of the subcontractor exception to the “your work” exclusion, the Court noted that the elimination of the subcontractor exception was largely irrelevant since the stucco subcontractor was a subcontractor so its work was not the entire project (unlike the homebuilder or general contractors’ work). Rather, the stucco subcontractor’s work was its scope of work and the underlying complaint referenced damages beyond the stucco subcontractor’s own work to other building components.  Thus, based on the allegations in the underlying complaint, the “your work” exclusion was not a basis to deny the duty to defend.

 

Regarding the stucco exclusion, the homebuilder argued that the subcontractor performed work outside of stucco work and the underlying complaint contained allegations unrelated to the application of stucco including framing work, miscellaneous work, and wrapping the buildings.  In other words, the Court did not have sufficient evidence that each allegation of nonconforming work related to the stucco subcontractor related to or arose out of the installation of stucco to trigger the full application of the stucco exclusion. Thus, this was not a basis to deny the subcontractor the duty to defend.

 

At this time, it is uncertain the magnitude of covered damages under the policy in light of the stucco exclusion and property damage resulting from the subcontractor’s defective work (certainly an issue to consider).  However, the insurer owed the subcontractor a duty to defend based on the allegations in the underlying complaint demonstrating the importance of crafting allegations in the underlying complaint.   The insurer’s indemnification obligation for covered damages, however, may be a different story and it is uncertain how a stucco subcontractor could have an endorsement that contains a stucco exclusion.  Take a look at your policy and, particularly, endorsements that further restrict coverage to ensure you do not have an exclusion relating to your own scope of work that would negate the value of the policy to you for property damage claims.

 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

CGL POLICIES AND THE PROFESSIONAL LIABILITIES EXCLUSION

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shutterstock_1140059885Commercial general liability (CGL) policies for contractors traditionally contain a professional liabilities exclusion.  This exclusion is generally added through a specific endorsement to eliminate coverage for professional services. Read the endorsement   The point of the exclusion, in a nutshell, is simply to eliminate a CGL policy for a contractor serving as a professional liability policy. 

 

Contractors need to appreciate a professional liabilities exclusion added through endorsement because oftentimes there are delegated design components they are responsible for. Perhaps the contractor value engineered a system and is responsible for engineering and signing and sealing the engineered documents (through its subcontractor) associated with that system.  Perhaps there is a performance specification that requires the contractor to engineer a system.  Perhaps there is a design-build component.  Regardless of the circumstance, this professional liabilities exclusion can certainly come into play, particularly if a defect is raised with the design or professional services associated with the engineered system.

 

In a non-construction case dealing with a professional liabilities exclusion, the Second District Court of Appeal in Alicea Enterprises, Inc. v. Nationwise Ins. Co. of America, Inc., 43 Fla.L.Weekly D1713b (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) held:

 

Whether a professional service has, or has not, been rendered is a fact-intensive analysis.  Thus, when deciding whether an act arises out of the rendering of or failure to render a professional service, the court must focus on the act itself and not the character of the individual performing the act.  The act from which the claim arises must be related to a professional service that requires the use of professional judgment or skill. 

 

Id. (internal citations omitted).

 

 

In this case, the insurer issued a CGL policy to a pharmacy.   The pharmacy was sued in a negligence action.  The pharmacy’s CGL insurer filed an action for declaratory relief claiming it had neither a duty to defend nor indemnify its insured (the pharmacy) since the underlying claims arose out of professional services and the CGL policy contained a professional liabilities exclusion.

 

The Second District maintained, as to the insurer’s duty to defend its insured, that the insurer had a duty to defend the pharmacy (insured) in the negligence action because the allegations in the underlying complaint could be deemed unrelated to professional services. 

 

The Second District maintained, as to the insurer’s duty to indemnify its insured, that this duty is more fact-intensive and without sufficient discovery, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the evidence brought the pharmacy’s conduct within the meaning of the professional liabilities exclusion in the CGL policy.

 

Here, while the pharmacy will get the benefit of the insurer’s duty to defend since that is triggered by the underlying complaint, the duty to indemnify is different and triggered by the facts.  It is likely that the facts in this case trigger the application of the professional liabilities exclusion, meaning the CGL insurer does NOT have a duty to indemnify the insured for the damages proven against it.  Not the situation an insured wants to be in!

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.