Tag Archives: delay

THERE ARE CONSEQUENCES TO EXECUTED DOCUMENTS SUCH AS THE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION DEFENSE

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A federal government contractor in Jackson Construction Co., Inc. v. U.S., 62 Fed.Cl. 84 (Fed.Cl. 2024) sought delay damages against the government. It lost. The reason for the loss is a crucial reminder that documents parties sign ALWAYS matter. ALWAYS!!

In Jackson Construction Co., the contractor’s delay claim was premised on relocating a waterline. The contractor, however, received additional money for relocating the waterline, but no additional time, and this was memorialized in a modification to the contract (i.e., a change order). In executing the modification for the additional work, the contractor did NOT reserve rights for time or money. Indeed, the modification reflected that the monetary adjustment constitutes full compensation for the additional work including delay, namely:

The contract period of performance remains the same. It is further understood and agreed that this adjustment constitutes compensation in full on behalf of the contractor and his subcontractors and suppliers for all costs and markup directly or indirectly, including extended overhead, attributable to the change order, for all delays related thereto, and for performance of the change within the time frame stated.

Jackson Construction Co., supra, at 90.

The contractor made a few arguments to try to overcome the modification it agreed to.  All failed.

An “executed bilateral modification with a release provision usually constitutes an accord and satisfaction unless that release is either ambiguous or limited in scope.” Jackson Construction Co., supra, at 92.

An ‘accord’ is a contract under which both parties agree that one party will render additional or alternative performance in order to settle an existing claim made by the other party, and ‘satisfaction’ is the actual performance of the accord. The party asserting an accord and satisfaction defense must establish four elements: (1) proper subject matter; (2) competent parties; (3) a meeting of the minds; and (4) consideration.

Id. (internal citation omitted).

The contractor could reserve rights in a modification to avoid the accord and satisfaction defense. Without the reservation of rights, “the Court must focus on whether or not the parties’ objective manifestations of intent demonstrate that they reached a meeting of the minds with respect of additional claims.” Id. at 93.

Here, the contractor did not reserve its rights in the modification it executed. Thus, the contractor did not preserve its delay claim for the additional waterline relocation. To this point, there was no evidence that the contractor intended to reserve rights to assert a delay claim at the time it executed the modification.

While the contractor looked to avoid the accord and satisfaction defense by arguing the release in the modification was ambiguous and procured through government misrepresentation, the court was having none of this. There was no evidence of any misrepresentation or ambiguity.

The contractor further argued that it signed the modification due to economic duress.

A party asserting economic duress must show more than economic tension or financial harm. Jackson Construction Co., supra, at 95.  “A party asserting economic duress must prove that: (1) its acceptance of the other party’s terms was involuntary; (2) the circumstances permitted no alternative but to accept the terms; and (3) the acceptance resulted from the coercive acts of the other party.” Id.  The contractor could not prove any of those elements.

The key takeaway is that parties need to appreciate what they execute and that there are consequences to executing documents. The contractor could have reserved rights. It did not. As a result, the contractor had to rely on weak arguments that it had no evidence to support…all because of the consequences of the modification the contractor signed.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

TAKEAWAYS FROM SCHEDULE-BASED DISPUTE BETWEEN GENERAL CONTRACTOR AND SUBCONTRACTOR

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A recent opinion out of the Southern District of Florida, Berkley Insurance Co. v. Suffolk Construction Co., Case 1:19-cv-23059-KMW (S.D.Fla. July 22, 2024), provides valuable takeaways on schedule-based disputes between a general contractor and subcontractor on a high-rise project.

In a nutshell, the general contractor’s original project schedule was abandoned due to project delays and the project wasn’t being built by any updated project schedule. The subcontractor claimed the general contractor was mismanaging the schedule putting unreasonable manpower and supervision constraints on it, i.e., it was working inefficiently. A bench trial was conducted and the Court found in favor of the subcontractor’s arguments. The Court found the general contractor had unrelated delays and that work activities were no longer methodical but, simply, piecemeal demands. The Court also rejected any inadequate manpower arguments finding the subcontract did not place any manpower requirements on the subcontractor.

Below are the high level takeaways from these facts which are takeaways relative to any schedule-based dispute between a general contractor and subcontractor.

  1. The Word “Reasonably” in the Subcontract Means Something

The subcontract provided that that the subcontractor was required to comply with the project schedule as it was “reasonably” amended from time to time.  This makes sense because no construction schedule is written in stone. Any project schedule will be updated and amended based on the progress of the project. Nothing unusual about this concept.

However, the Court found that the word “reasonably” means the general contractor did NOT have unfettered discretion or control over the schedule because it had to act reasonably.  The general contractor’s ability to amend the schedule was limited to reasonable changes. Hence, any manpower obligation of the subcontractor was tied to reasonable amendments to the schedule and the subcontractor was not required to bear the brunt of endless workers beyond its planned workforce unless the general contractor’s schedule amendments were reasonable.  Moreover, given the general contractor’s failure to adhere to the subcontract’s requirement of confirming changes in writing with the signatures of both parties, the Court held the general contractor’s unilateral changes to the schedule were violations to the express terms of the subcontract regarding changes.

  1. No Damage for Delay Provisions are Not Absolute

The subcontract included a no damage for delay provision. While these provisions are enforceable in Florida, they do “not preclude recovery for delays resulting from a party’s fraud, concealment, or active interference with performance under the contract.” Berkley Insurance Co., supra (citation omitted). “This restriction comports with a contracting party’s implied promise not to hinder the other party’s ability to perform its contractual obligation.” See id.

Here, the Court held that the general contractor actively interfered with the subcontractor’s ability to complete its work by failing to prepare floors for the subcontractor to work sequentially; mismanaging other trades causing active damage to work already completed by the subcontractor; and misallocating building resources and personnel creating a chaotic and unstable situation.

  1. Notice Provisions

The general contractor argued that the subcontractor did not provide formal contractual notice of claims within ten days of them arising. The Court found this argument unpersuasive as the subcontractor preserved its claims through numerous emails to the general contractor regarding delay, damage, or other impacts to the subcontractor. Indeed, the subcontractor submitted potential change orders for loss of production and informed the general contractor that labor and supervision expenses were becoming untenable due to the out of sequence work.

  1. Recovering delay and Lost Productivity (Inefficiency Damages)

While the court allowed lost productivity damages from the subcontractor, it disallowed delay damages believing it would create a windfall to the subcontractor since courts view delay damages as a subset of lost productivity damages. See Berkley Insurance Co., supra, citing JH Kelly, LLC v. AECOM Tech. Servs., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1308 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (holding “damages for the delay and disruption” were among the “five categories of lost productivity damages” at issue).

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

FIVE ISSUES TO CONSIDER IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING (OR ANY CONTRACTING!)

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The appeal of Appeals of – Konecranes Nuclear Equipment & Services, LLC, ASBCA 62797, 2024 WL 2698011 (May 7, 2024) raises interesting, but important, issues that should be considered.  In this case, the government (in a supply contract) procured four portal cranes from the claimant.  After an initial test of one of the cranes failed, the government refused to accept delivery even after the issue was addressed by the claimant. The government did not accept the manner in which the claimant addressed the issue and would only accept cranes if the claimant employed “an unnecessary alternative solution [that] caused further delay and increased [claimant’s] costs.” On appeal, it was determined the government’s decision to delay delivery based on its demand for the alternative solution was not justified, i.e., constituted a breach of contract.  Below are five issues of consideration in government contracting, or, for that matter, any contracting.

Issue #1- Patently Ambiguous Specifications

The government argued that the specifications were patently ambiguous and because the claimant failed to inquire regarding the ambiguous specifications prior to performance, its interpretation of the ambiguous specifications should govern. The contractor countered that the specifications were unambiguous and it met the specifications.

“Contract interpretation begins with the language of the written agreement.” If unambiguous, the plain meaning of a contract controls. “A contract term is unambiguous if there is only one reasonable interpretation.” However, “[w]hen a contract is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it contains an ambiguity.” “‘To show an ambiguity it is not enough that the parties differ in their respective interpretations of a contract term,’ rather, both interpretations must be reasonable.”  To show a patent ambiguity, which we construe against the non-drafting party, the drafting party must show an ““obvious, gross, [or] glaring” ambiguity so substantial as to impose a “duty to inquire” before contract formation. 

Appeals of – Konecranes, supra (internal citations omitted).

Here, it was determined “there was no ambiguity, much less an obvious, gross, or sufficiently glaring ambiguity that would trigger [claimant’s] duty to inquire before contract formation.”  Id.

Issue #2 – Rejection of Work Based on Specifications

The government rejected the cranes for not complying with the specifications.

“When the Government rejects work as being not in compliance with its specifications, the Boards of Contract Appeals have held that the burden is upon the Government to demonstrate that fact.” We have explained this anomaly of the government bearing the burden for a contractor claim “as a variation of the implied warranty of specifications seen in impossibility and defective specifications cases and characterized it as the government ‘putting in issue the sufficiency of its own specifications.”’ In assessing these ““inspection and rejection cases,” we focus on whether the evidence demonstrates that a product fails “to meet contract requirements.”

Appeals of – Konecranes, supra (internal citations omitted).

Here, it was determined, “[r]egardless of which party bears the burden of proof, [claimant] proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the luffing drums [in the cranes] complied with the Contract’s specifications after changing the wire rope and should not have been found defective with the new rope.” Id.

Issue #3 – Delay

The claimant argued the government had no basis to reject delivery of a crane because it complied to the specifications after the claimant addressed the initial issue.  To this point, the claimant argued the government’s refusal to allow it to ship cranes unless it employed the unnecessary alternative solution resulted in delays.

“A contractor seeking to prove the government’s liability for a delay must establish the extent of the delay, the contractor’s harm resulting from the delay, and the causal link between the government’s wrongful acts and the delay.” As to causation, “a contractor has the burden of demonstrating that the specific delays were due to government-responsible causes, that the overall completion was delayed as a result, and that any government-cause[d] delays were not concurrent with delays within the contractor’s control.”

Appeals of – Konecranes, supra (internal citations omitted).

Here, it was determined the government’s refusal to accept delivery when the cranes met the specifications resulted in compensable delay.

Issue #4 – Implied Duty Not to Interfere

Yes, there is an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing that exists in government contracts:

In the absence of a contract provision allowing the government to unilaterally stop or delay a contractor’s performance, any government caused delay constitutes a breach of the government’s implied duty not to interfere with a contractor’s performance.The implied duty not to interfere derives from the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, assuring that one party cannot destroy the other party’s reasonable expectations regarding the fruits of a contract. “An implied duty of good faith and fair dealing exists in government contracts and applies to the government just as it does to private parties.”

Any implied duty derives from the explicit terms of a government contract. Here, as we concluded above, the [government] unreasonably inspected [claimant’s] cranes pursuant to the inspection provisions of the Contract Terms and Conditions — Commercial Items clause and Contract’s specifications. The [government’s] unreasonable inspection and ensuing delays resulted in a breach of the implied duty not to interfere.

Appeals of – Konecranes, supra.

Issue # 5 – Christian Doctrine

This was a supply contract so it did not incorporate a provision that allowed the government to stop or suspend work where it was determined such provision did not need to be incorporated:

However, the Contract does not include a Stop-Work Order, Government Delay of Work, or Suspension of Work clause. Instead, because we cannot incorporate these clauses by operation of law in a commercial items contract, we find that the Navy breached its implied duty not to interfere by unreasonably inspecting the cranes. There can be no “constructive” suspension or stop-work order if there is no clause to base it on. It becomes a breach.

For our Board “to incorporate a clause into a contract under the Christian doctrine, it generally must find (1) that the clause is mandatory; and (2) that it expresses a significant or deeply ingrained strand of public procurement policy.” Here, the Suspension of Work, Government Delay of Work, and the Stop-Work Order clauses are not mandatory for commercial items contracts and, thus, we will not incorporate any of these clauses into the contract by operation of law.

In particular, the Contract does not incorporate a Suspension of Work, Government Delay of Work, or Stop-Work Order clause.  … Notably, the FAR implements the congressional requirement that commercial items contracts “shall, to the maximum extent practicable, include only those clauses” required by law or “consistent with customary commercial practice.” So, given the policy preference to limit the number of standard FAR contract clauses in a commercial items contract, we should not be surprised that there is no explicit suspension, delay, or stop-work provision to hang the parties’ “constructive” hat on.

Instead, we must assess whether any of these clauses is mandatory and must be incorporated by operation of law under the Christian doctrine. Only fixed-price construction or architect-engineer contracts, not commercial items contracts, require the Suspension of Work clause. The Government Delay of Work clause would permit similar suspension of work for a fixed-price supply contract. FAR However, the Government Delay of Work clause is “optional,” not required, for commercial supply contracts such as this one.

Appeals of – Konecranes, supra (internal citations omitted).

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

DELAYS AND SUSPENSION OF THE WORK UNDER FIXED PRICE GOVERNMENT CONTRACT

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Here is an interesting fact pattern and case decided by the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals dealing with (1) force majeure type events and epidemics (Covid-19); (2) suspension of the work; and (3) delays. These are three topics important to all contractors including federal contractors.

In Lusk Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v General Services Administration, 2024 WL 1953697, CBCA 7759 (CBCA 2024), a contractor entered into a fixed price contract with the government to repair, replace, and modernize site and building systems at a federal building. The contractor commenced work right before Covid-19.  When Covid-19 hit, the government issued the contractor a two-week suspension of work notice on March 27, 2020. The suspension of work allowed off-site administrative work to continue but suspended on-site physical work.  The government extended the suspension of work three more times. The contractor could resume work on the exterior on June 1, 2020, but was not permitted to resume work on the interior until July 20, 2020.  On the same date that the contractor was able to commence interior work, it submitted a modification for delay caused by the suspension – 64 days for the time period the entire site shutdown, and 51 days for the interior work shutdown.

The contracting officer responded stating that under FAR Clause (FAR 52.249.10) dealing with fixed priced contracts, epidemics (such as Covid-19) that impact the critical path will entitle the contractor to a no-cost extension of time and the government grants the contractor a 66-day extension of time. The contractor was also seeking compensation, so it then certified its claim seeking an equitable adjustment in its compensation based on FARS’ suspension of work clause – FAR 52.242-14.

First, because the contractor entered into a fixed price contract, it assumed the monetary risk of delays caused by Covid-19:

It is “well-established that ‘a contractor with a fixed price contract assumes the risk of unexpected costs not attributable to the Government.”’ Absent a special adjustment clause, this Board has held that an unforeseen pandemic does not shift the risk to the Government for any unexpected costs incurred under a firm, fixed-price contract. Here, there is no such adjustment clause in the contract. “FAR clause 52.249-10 explicitly addresses how acts of God, epidemics, and quarantine restrictions are to be treated. A contractor is entitled to additional time but not additional costs.” 

Lusk Mechanical Contractors, supra (internal citations omitted).

Second, regarding the suspension of work argument under FAR 52.242-14:

[A] contractor may recover an equitable adjustment from the Government if the contractor shows that ‘(1) contract performance was delayed; (2) the Government directly caused the delay; (3) the delay was for an unreasonable period of time; and (4) the delay injured the contractor in the form of additional expense or loss.”  [The contractor] has not established that [the government’s] successive suspensions were the sole cause of the delay or that the work was delayed for an unreasonable period of time.

[The government] suspended [the contractor’s] construction on the exterior and interior portions of the project from March 27 to June 1, 2020, for a total of sixty-six days. [The contractor] contends that [the government’s] suspension of work directives were the sole cause of the delay. We disagree. The executive orders issued by the Governor, at least in part, caused [the government] to suspend [the contractor’s] work.

A contractor may only recover under the Suspension of Work clause “when the Government’s actions are the sole proximate cause for the contractor’s additional loss, and the contractor would not have been delayed for any other reason during that period.”  The stay-at-home order issued by the Governor…in March 2020 equally interfered with [the contractor’s] performance of the work because there was no stay-at-home exemption for construction work that was not a “core life service” or maintained “the safety, sanitation, and essential operation to properties and other essential businesses.”

***

Even had [the government] been the sole cause of delay, the length of the suspension period was reasonable (based on Covid-19), precluding recovery by [the contractor].

Lusk Mechanical Contractors, supra (internal citations omitted).

Third, as it related to the additional delay to the interior work, that additional suspension also was not unreasonable. The contractor had been able to resume exterior work earlier, and its administrative work was never suspended. And, the contractor never proved that the suspension of work to the interior work impacted its critical path:

Because [the contractor] resumed work on the exterior portion of the project much earlier and the administrative work was never suspended, [the contractor] had to prove that the interior work was on the critical path of the project during the additional suspension period. [The contractor], however, has not established, or even asserted, that the interior work was on the critical path of the project. When establishing a Government-caused delay, the contractor bears the burden of proving that the delay affected the critical path of the project. “‘The reason that the determination of the critical path is crucial to the calculation of delay damages is that only construction work on the critical path  had an impact upon the time in which the project was completed.”’  Here, [the contractor] provides no proof that the interior work was on the project’s critical path. Therefore, [the contractor] is not eligible for delay damages for the suspension of the interior work through July 20, 2020.

Lusk Mechanical Contractors, supra (internal citations omitted).

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

THINK BEFORE YOU EXECUTE THAT RELEASE – THE LANGUAGE IN THE RELEASE MATTERS!

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If you execute a release in exchange for payment or other consideration, remember the language in the release means something.  THE RELEASE LANGUAGE MATTERS! And the meaning in the release may be way more than you intended so please make sure you truly digest and consider release language before executing.

This sentiment could not be truer than in the 2009 decision Bell BCI Company v. United States, 570 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In this case, a contractor entered into a modification (change order) with the government.  The modification included the following language:

increase the contract amount by $2,296,963 … as full and equitable adjustment for the remaining direct and indirect costs of the Floor 4 Fit-out (EWO 240–R1) and full and equitable adjustment for all delays resulting from any and all Government changes transmitted to the Contractor on or before August 31, 2000.

***

The modification agreed to herein is a fair and equitable adjustment for the Contractor’s direct and indirect costs. This modification provides full compensation for the changed work, including both Contract cost and Contract time. The Contractor hereby releases the Government from any and all liability under the Contract for further equitable adjustment attributable to the Modification.

Bell BCI, supra, at 1339.

The release language was also included in subsequent modifications.

Thereafter, the government issued 113 additional modifications to the contractor, and there were numerous unresolved extra work orders that were not turned into a modification. After the contractor completed the project, it submitted a request for equitable adjustment to the contracting officer.  The contracting officer denied the request for equitable adjustment and asserted liquidated damages against the contractor for delays to the project. The contractor filed a lawsuit against the government claiming inefficiencies and delays caused by the cumulative impact and disruption from all the modifications issued by the government. The trial court found in favor of the contractor.  The government appealed and the finding was much different. This is why.

Regardless of the cumulative impact claim, the contractor signed a modification that “‘provides full compensation for the changed work’” and that [the contractor] “‘hereby releases the Government from any and all liability under this Contract for further equitable adjustment attributable to the Modification.’”  Bell BCI, supra, at 1340.   Under the modification and release language, the appellate court held the issue was not whether the contractor sustained a cumulative impact, but whether the contractor released the government for the impact through the language in the executed modification.

The appellate court maintained that a release is interpreted no different than any other contract and parol evidence will be reviewed only in the event of an ambiguity.  Bell BCI, supra, at 1341. If there is no ambiguity, the plan language in the release will control. Id.

We hold that the language in paragraph 8 of Mod 93 is unambiguous, and the [trial] court clearly erred in holding that [the contractor] did not release its cumulative impact claims attributable to that modification. The language plainly states that [the contractor] released the government from any and all liability for equitable adjustments attributable to Mod 93. At best, there may be ambiguity as to which claims are “attributable to” a given modification, but we cannot glean any ambiguity about which types of claims are released-Mod 93 clearly, unambiguously releases the government from “any and all” liability. As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Co., “[i]f parties intend to leave some things open and unsettled, their intent so to do should be made manifest.” 206 U.S. 118, 128, 42 Ct.Cl. 532, 27 S.Ct. 676, 51 L.Ed. 983 (1907). Further, the government’s payment of over $2,000,000 in Mod 93 constitutes adequate consideration for [the contractor’s] release.

In the absence of an ambiguity, we decline to examine the parties’ extrinsic evidence [i.e., parol evidence].

Bell BCI, supra, at 1341-42.

Is this the right ruling? Did the contractor intend to release cumulative impacts such that the ruling from the trial court, that entertained the evidence, should control? Unfortunately for the contractor, the intent did not matter to the appellate court because the plain language of the unambiguous release eliminated the need to hear parol evidence on intent.  Hence, the overarching takeaway – think before you execute that release!

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

SPECIFICATION CHALLENGE; EXCUSABLE DELAY; TYPE I DIFFERING SITE CONDITION; SUPERIOR KNOWLEDGE

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An Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals dispute, Appeal of L.S. Black-Loeffel Civil Constructors JV, ASBCA No. 62402, 2023 WL 5827241 (ASBCA 2023), involved which party bore liability for delay—the federal government or the prime contractor–based on various legal theories.  Without detailing the factual details, a number of interesting legal issues were raised in this dispute including (1) a defective specification challenge, (2) excusable delay, (3) Type I differing site condition, and (4) superior knowledge.  These legal issues are discussed below.

1. Specification Challenge (Defective Specifications)

The contractor claimed that the government’s specifications were defective in regard to a thermal control plan. The government countered that the specifications were not design specifications but performance specifications. The specifications were performance based because they did not tell the contractor how to achieve the performance-based criteria.

[A] defective specification cause of action only applies to defective design specifications; it does not apply to allegedly defective performance specifications.

***

Performance specifications set forth an objective or standard to be achieved, and the successful bidder is expected to exercise his ingenuity in achieving that objective or standard of performance, selecting the means and assuming a corresponding responsibility for that selection. Design specifications, in contrast, describe in precise detail the materials to be employed and the manner in which the work is to be performed. The contractor has no discretion to deviate from the specifications, but is required to follow them as one would a road map.

The amount of discretion the specifications give to the contractor in execution of the contract is a question of contract interpretation, which is a matter of law for this Board to decide.

L.S. Black-Loeffel, supra (internal citations and quotations omitted).

2. Excusable Delay

The contractor claimed the government constantly rejected its thermal control plan without providing any reason other than it was incomplete and did not meet the specifications, and this caused an excusable delay to the project.

To establish entitlement to an extension based on excusable delay, a contractor must who that the delay resulted from unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the Contractor, and the unforeseeable cause must delay the overall contract completion, i.e., it must affect the critical path of performance. Similarly, where both parties contribute to the delay, neither can recover damage, unless there is the proof of clear apportionment of the delay and the expensive attributable to each party.

L.S. Black-Loeffel, supra (internal citations and quotations omitted).

The Board found that the government reviewed the contractor’s thermal control plan within the timeframe in the contract. “The fact that [the contractor] needed multiple submittals speaks more to the incomplete nature of its submittals than it does to any delays on the part of the government.” L.S. Black-Loeffel, supra (“[I]n every instance, the government provided a facially reasonable basis for rejecting the submittal and [the contractor] has not presented a single piece of evidence challenging those bases.”).

3. Type I Differing Site Condition

The contractor further contended that historical water tables incorporated into the contract “bound the government regarding the water levels [the contractor] would encounter and that water levels it encountered constituted a Type I differing site condition.” L.S. Black-Loeffel, supra.

In order to establish a Type I differing site condition, a contractor must prove all four of the following elements: (1) that a reasonable contractor would interpret the contract documents as making a representation of the site conditions; (2) the actual site conditions were not reasonably foreseeable such that the contractor reasonably relied on the representations; (3) the contractor did in fact rely on the contract representation; and (4) the conditions differed materially from those represented and the contractor suffered damages as a result.

L.S. Black-Loeffel, supra.

The first element is based on the contract; it’s a matter of contract interpretation. Id.   However, here, the contract stated that the actual water levels may vary from those indicated in the historical hydrographs.  Id. (“The contract, and the hydrographs themselves, say nothing about the precise conditions the contract would encounter during performance.”). Thus, the Board found that the historical hydrographs of water tables did not constitute a representation of site conditions.  Id.

The second element includes reasonable foreseeability. Weather, regardless of severity, is not considered a differing site condition under the Federal Acquisition Regulations differing site conditions clause.  Id. (“[T]he differing site conditions clause applies only to conditions which existed at the time of contracting; weather conditions which occur during the contract period are not covered by the differing site conditions clause.”).  Here, the Board found that high water tables was a weather condition where the contractor was offered additional time, but not additional compensation. Id. (“A contractor usually is only entitled to additional time for unusually severe weather, but the government has no legal responsibility for the additional costs incurred.”).

4. Superior Knowledge

The contractor also claimed the government had superior knowledge of the design and construction of a component of the project and did not share it. “The doctrine of superior knowledge is based upon the premise that, where the government has knowledge of vital information that will affect a contractor’s performance, the government is obligated to share that information.” L.S. Black-Loeffel, supra.

“In order to recover a claim based on superior knowledge, the contractor must show: (1) the contractor undertook performance without vital knowledge of a fact that affects performance costs or duration; (2) the government was aware the contractor had no knowledge of the vital information and no reason to obtain such information; (3) the contract specification supplied misled the contractor or did not put it on notice to inquire; and (4) the government failed to provide relevant information.” Id.  This argument is “grounded in the government’s warranty of its contract specifications.” Id.

However, because the specifications were performance-based, the Board found this did not apply – “[b]ecause no warranty attaches to the government’s performance specifications, it has no duty to disclose superior knowledge.” Id.  Moreover, the government had no way of knowing the contractor had no knowledge of the purported vital information and no reason to obtain it to support a superior knowledge argument.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

THE CREDIBILITY OF YOUR EXPERT (INCLUDING YOUR DELAY EXPERT) MATTERS IN CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES

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Here is a quote from a judge in an order after the bench trial of a complex construction dispute between a prime contractor and subcontractor on a federal project:

The evidence received in this case demonstrates the dynamic nature of complicated construction projects. At every step, the details matter, and coordination and cooperation among the companies tasked with performing the job is essential. Thankfully, as even this case shows, most disagreements that arise as projects evolve are handled during construction, far away from a courthouse, by the professionals who know best how to achieve the ultimate goal of a completed project.

U.S. f/u/b/o McKenney’s, Inc. v. Leebcor Services, LLC, 2022 WL 3549980, *1 (E.D. Va. 2022).

This is a true statement.  A statement that parties should remember as they navigate the nuances of a complicated construction project and dispute.

The facts of the case, however, would hardly be construed as a win for either party. Something else for parties to consider as they navigate the nuances of a complicated construction project and dispute.

While there were many components in dispute, one component is worthy of discussion.  That is competing delay claims between the subcontractor and prime contractor.  The prime contractor claimed the subcontractor delayed the critical path.  The subcontractor claimed the prime contractor delayed the critical path.  Both parties had experts supporting their conflicting delay theories.  The question became which expert is more persuasive? Stated differently, which expert is the most credible? Perhaps neither as neither party recovered delay damages against the other.

The subcontractor’s delay expert did not appear to assign much blame to the subcontractor.  The court did not find this to be credible because the evidence demonstrated the subcontractor’s “own shortcomings consistently delayed its work and, in turn, Project completion.”  Leebcor Services, supra, at *25.  The court understood that the subcontractor needed to prove that but for the prime contractor, the subcontractor would not have completed its work late. Yet, evidence demonstrated there was deficient and untimely work performed by the subcontractor. “Because [subcontractor] failed to disentangle its evidence of alleged [prime contractor]-caused delay from delay caused by its own shortcomings, it failed to demonstrate that [prime contractor] was required under the Subcontract to adjust its fixed-price to account for [prime contractor]-caused delay.”  Leebcor Services, supra, at *26.

The court found the prime contractor’s delay expert, while maybe more credible in certain respects, was not more convincing.  For instance, during a period of time, the court found that while the subcontractor may have been behind schedule, “[prime contractor] has failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that delays to the Project arising during this period are attributable to [subcontractor’s] failure to timely complete [the scheduled activity].  This is because the court concludes that other activities outside of [subcontractor’s] scope of work were delaying the completion of successor activities.”  Leebcor Services, supra, at *28.  In another instance, the court found that “concurrent issues within [prime contractor’s] control also delayed them, and no evidence was offered that would permit the court to disentangle [subcontractor’s] deficiencies from those attributable to [prime contractor].”  Id. at *29.

Remember, many construction disputes require expert witnesses including delay experts.  The expert needs to carry the day on an issue.  To do this, the expert needs to be credible and persuasive.  This case demonstrates why this should not be overstated and why, even with experts, a trier of fact may still find that neither carry the day.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

 

IS THE EVENT YOU ARE CLAIMING AS UNFORESEEABLE DELAY REALLY UNFORESEEABLE?

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Is the item or event you are claiming as an unforeseeable, excusable delay really unforeseeable?  This is not a trick question.

Just because your construction contract identifies items or events that constitute unforeseeable, excusable delay does not mean those items can be used as a blanket excuse or crutch for the contractor.  That would be unfair.

For instance, it is not uncommon for a construction contract to list as unforeseeable, excusable delay the following events or items: “(i) acts of God or of the public enemy, (ii) act of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, (iii) acts of another Contractor in the performance of a contract with the Government, (iv) fires, (v) floods, (vi) epidemics, (vii) quarantine restrictions, (viii) strikes, (ix) freight embargoes, (x) unusually severe weather, or (xi) delays of subcontractors or suppliers at any tier arising from unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of both the Contractor and the subcontractors or suppliers.” See, e.g., F.A.R. 52.249-10(b)(1).  While the itemization of excusable delay may be worded differently, the point is there may be a listing as to what items or events constitute excusable delay.  An excusable delay would justify additional time and, potentially, compensation to the contractor.

The Civilian Board of Contract Appeals explained that a listing of items or events leading to unforeseeable, excusable delay is NOT intended to give the contractor free rein or a get-of-jail free card if the contractor encounters such delaying item or event:

Nevertheless, the mere fact that a delay is caused by a type of activity listed in the contract as generally excusable does not give the contractor carte blanche to rely upon such excuses. “The purpose of the proviso,” which is “to protect the contractor against the unexpected, and its grammatical sense both militate against holding that the listed events are always to be regarded as unforeseeable, no matter what the attendant circumstances are.” As the Supreme Court has explained, “[a] quarantine, or freight embargo, may have been in effect for many years as a permanent policy of the controlling government” and, if so, may not meet the definition of a cause “unforeseeable” at the time of contract award, even if quarantines and freight embargoes are listed in the contract as examples of possible excusable causes of delay.

Further, even if an unforeseeable cause of delay occurs, the contractor cannot sit back and fail to take reasonable steps in response to it — once such an unforeseeable event occurs, the contractor affected by it has an obligation to attempt to mitigate the resulting damage to the extent that it can. If the contractor fails to do so, it “may not recover those damages which could have been avoided by reasonable precautionary action on its part.”

Yates-Desbuild Joint Venture v. Department of State, CBCA 3350, 2017 WL 4296219 (CBCA 2017) (internal citations omitted).

Now, think about your construction contract.  It may list similar items or events constituting delay.  Perhaps it expands on this list and identifies COVID, the Russia-Ukraine war, or supply chain impacts.  Similar to the reasoning above, “the mere fact that a delay is caused by a type of activity listed in the contract as generally excusable does not give the contractor carte blanche to rely upon such excuses.”  Yates-Desbuild Joint Venture, supra.  We know of the existence of COVID, the Russia-Ukraine war, and current supply chain impacts such that they are not unforeseeable.  And, encountering such an item or event cannot be used to compensate for other delays as the contractor “cannot sit back and fail to take reasonable steps in response to it.”  Yates-Desbuild Joint Venture, supra. The contractor still must mitigate the item or event it claims is causing excusable delay.

This serves as an example as to why you want clarity in your construction contract.  If you are identifying an item or event as unforeseeable, make sure it truly is or specify the context in which the item or event constitutes excusable delay.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

PRESENTING A “TOTAL TIME” DELAY CLAIM IS NOT SUFFICIENT

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When presenting a delay-type of claim on a construction project, a claimant MUST be in a position to properly PROVE the claim.  Trying to present a delay claim loosey-goosey is not a recipe for success.  In fact, it can be a recipe for an easy loss. This is not what you want.  To combat this, make sure you engage a delay expert that understands delay methodologies and how to calculate delay and do NOT present a total time claim. Presenting a delay claim using a total time approach, discussed below, makes it too easy to attack the flaws and credibility of the approach.  Per the discussion of the case below, a total time claim with a contractor that used its project manager, versus a delay expert, to support its claim turned the contractor’s claim into a loss.

In French Construction, LLC v. Department of Veteran Affairs, 2022 WL 3134507, CBCA 6490 (CBCA 2022), a contractor submitted a delay claim to the government for almost $400,000. The contractor was hired to construct a two-story corridor to connect hospital buildings.  The contractor was required to be complete within 365 days. It was not.  The contractor was seeking 419 days of delay from the government. The contractor’s “delay expert” was its project manager who compared the contractor’s as-planned schedule to an as-built schedule he prepared for the claim.

“To show how the critical path of contract performance evolved over the life of the contract and how excusable delays impacted that path, a contractor, at a minimum, needs a reasonable ‘as planned’ schedule and an ‘as built’ schedule, which it can incorporate into an analysis to show ‘the interdependence of any one or more of the work items with any other work items’ as the project progressed.” French Construction, supra (quotation and citation omitted).

Unfortunately, because the project manager was not a true delay expert, there were material flaws in his methodology from a critical path causation standpoint and a calculation of delay standpoint.  Basically, which is a big no-no, the project manager did a total time claim by simply taking the delta between as-planned and actual completion dates and focusing on durations while skipping the causation.

Under the ‘total time theory,” the contractor simply takes the original and extended completion dates, computes therefrom the intervening time or overrun, points to a host of individual delay incidents for which defendant was allegedly responsible and which ‘contributed’ to the overall extended time, and then leaps to the conclusion that the entire overrun time was attributable to defendant. The [total time] theory of proving delay is insufficient to meet the contractor’s burden to prove that government-caused delay actually delayed the overall completion of the project. [The contractor’s project manager] testified about the drawing delays and other problems that delayed demolition of the building without providing a sufficient showing that all the days of delay were attributable to this cause….

The remainder of [the contractor’s] delay claim suffers from the same problem. [The project manager] simply subcontracted the planned duration from the actual duration and identified that as the period of delay. [The project manager], in his report, then generally describes challenges or issues that [the contractor] faced during periods…without any specifics, to those issues.  [The project manager’s] opinions regarding the causes of delay amount to ‘broad generalities and inferences” that are insufficient to carry [the contractor’s] burden to prove compensable delay.

French Construction, supra (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

A RETROSPECTIVE AS-BUILT SCHEDULE ANALYSIS CAN BE USED TO SUPPORT DELAY

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Delay claims are part of construction.   There should be no surprise why.  Time is money.  A delay claim should be accompanied by expert opinions that bolster evidence that gets introduced.  The party against whom the delay claim is made will also have an expert – a rebuttal expert.  Not surprisingly, each of the experts will rely on a different critical path as to relates to the same project.   The party claiming delay will rely on a critical path that shows the actions of the other party impacted their critical path and proximately caused the delay.  This will be refuted by the opposing expert that will challenge the critical path and the actions claimed had no impact on the critical path (i.e., did not proximately cause the delay). Quintessential finger pointing!

This was the situation in CTA I, LLC v. Department of Veteran Affairs, CBCA 5826, 2022 WL 884710 (CBCA 2022), where the government terminated the contractor for convenience and the contractor claimed equitable adjustments for, among other things, delay.   The contractor’s expert relied on an as-built critical path analysis by “retrospectively creating updates to insert between the contemporaneous updates.”  Id., supra, n.3.  The government’s expert did not do a retrospective as-built analysis and relied on only contemporaneous schedule updates.  Id.

The government’s expert testified he was not a fan of a retrospective (after-the-fact) as-built analysis because this analysis can lead to manipulation.  He testified that he prefers to rely on contemporaneous schedule updates versus an as-built analysis where activities are added.   The contractor’s expert countered by saying the government’s expert wants to ignore as-built facts which would warrant adjustments to contemporaneous project schedules to account for what actually occurred in the field.

Who is right?  Is a retrospective (after-the-fact) as built analysis credible?   YES, it is.  But, in an answering this question, let’s bullet point some key aspects as articulated by the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, which need to be underscored for importance:

The contractor “has burden of proving the extent of the delay, that the delay was proximately caused by government [owner] action, and the delay harmed” the contractor.  CTA I, supra (citation omitted).

“Only delay on a project’s critical path results in overall delay.”  Id.

 “As as-built critical path that reconstructs schedule updates is an acceptable methodology” “[A] rigorous ‘as-built’ approach- reviewing contemporaneous evidence in hindsight to trace the activities on the actual, longest path to completion-has been endorsed by government contracts tribunals.”  Id.

“Because we must determine why a project lasted as long as it did, we [the Board] want to know the path to the latest work – including the critical work immediately preceding that work, and just before that, and so on.” Id.

“We reject [the government’s] accusation that retrospectively adjusting as-built schedules based on project documentation or other evidence necessarily turns the schedules into ‘fiction.’ There is, to be sure, a heavy presumption that regularly updated, contemporaneous schedules are the best evidence of project progress.”  Id.

“[F]orensic schedule analysis is ‘both a science and an art’ and ‘not a magic wand’ but a set of techniques requiring ‘the application of an expert’s well-considered judgment in evaluating the logic of underlying the various pieces of information that support the analysis.’”  Id.

Even if relying on an as-built analysis, there needs to be persuasive contemporaneous project documents – “[e]xpert opinions offered on certain matters that…are not supported by the record tend[] to cast a shadow on the value of other opinions concerning issues where the underlying factual matters were less clear.” Id. (citation omitted) (discussing aspects of contractor’s experts opinion that relied on an unknown extent of hindsight with interviews of the contractor’s project team which the government and the Board were not privy, and where there was not persuasive contemporaneous evidence).

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.