Tag Archives: attorneys’ fees

FILING MOTION TO INCREASE LIEN TRANSFER BOND (BEFORE TRIAL COURT LOSES JURISDICTION OVER FINAL JUDGMENT)

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If a construction lien is recorded against real property, the lien can be transferred to a lien transfer bond.  This transfers the security or collateral of the construction lien from the real property to the lien transfer bond. The lien transfer bond can be a bond posted by a surety company or it can be cash.  This is governed by Florida Statute s. 713.24.  The amount of the lien does not dictate the amount of the lien transfer bond.  Rather, the lien transfer bond needs to be in the amount of the lien, plus interest on that amount for three years, plus $1,000 or 25% of the amount of the lien (whichever is greater so factor in the 25%) to cover attorney’s fees. Fla. Stat. 713.24(1).

If you are looking to transfer a construction lien to a lien transfer bond, make sure to consult with counsel.

Keep in mind there is a statutory mechanism for a lienor to increase the lien transfer bond to cover attorney’s fees and costs and notice the word “must” in the statute below. Pursuant to Florida Statute s. 713.24(3):

Any party having an interest in such security or the property from which the lien was transferred may at any time, and any number of times, file a complaint in chancery in the circuit court of the county where such security is deposited, or file a motion in a pending action to enforce a lien, for an order to require additional security, reduction of security, change or substitution of sureties, payment of discharge thereof, or any other matter affecting said security. If the court finds that the amount of the deposit or bond in excess of the amount claimed in the claim of lien is insufficient to pay the lienor’s attorney’s fees and court costs incurred in the action to enforce the lien, the court must increase the amount of the cash deposit or lien transfer bond. Nothing in this section shall be construed to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the circuit courts over transfer bond claims for nonpayment of an amount within the monetary jurisdiction of the county courts.

In a recent case, Edmondson v. Tri-County Electrical Services, Inc., 2023 WL 2995420 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), a lien was transferred to a cash bond by the real property owner.  The contractor-lienor moved to have the court increase the amount of the cash security to better cover attorney’s fees and costs accrued in the litigation. The court deferred ruling on the motion. Subsequently, the court had a bench trial and the contractor prevailed. The court entered final judgment in favor of the contractor and reserved ruling on attorney’s fees, interest, and court costs. The court thereafter entered an amended final judgment that included attorney’s fees, interest, and court costs.  The court then conducted a hearing to increase the cash bond and granted the contractor’s motion for the cash bond to be increased.  The issue was that the court no longer had jurisdiction to require the owner to increase the cash bond:

The action here was not ‘pending’ under section 713.24(3). The general rule is that an action remains pending in the trial court until after a final judgment and such time as an appeal is taken or time for an appeal expires. By the time the trial court had ruled on the motion to increase the bond, the time for an appeal had passed. Therefore, because the matter was no longer pending, the trial court lacked authority to consider the motion.

The trial court was without jurisdiction to grant Contractor’s motion to increase the bond.

Edmondson, supra, at *2 (internal citations omitted).

Here, the contractor should have requested the trial court rule on the deferred motion to increase the cash bond BEFORE the amended final judgment was entered. Or, at a minimum, the contractor should have timely filed a motion for rehearing as to the amended final judgment to address this deferred motion to increase the cash bond. Once the rehearing period expired, “the trial court no longer has jurisdiction over a final judgment.” Edmondson, supra, at *1 (“Contractor did not file a timely motion for rehearing, which would have been the time to raise the bond increase issue.”). Id.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

FLORIDA’S NEW CIVIL REMEDIES ACT – BULLETPOINTS AS TO HOW IT IMPACTS CONSTRUCTION

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There has been much talk about Florida’s new Civil Remedies Act (House Bill 837) that Governor DeSantis approved on March 24, 2023.  As it pertains to construction, here is how I see it with key bulletpoints on the impact this new Act has on the construction industry:

  • New Florida Statute s. 86.121– This is an attorney’s fees statute for declaratory relief actions to the prevailing insured to determine insurance coverage after TOTAL COVERAGE DENIAL. (Note: A defense offered pursuant to a reservation of rights is not a total coverage denial.) This right only belongs to the insured and cannot be transferred or assigned. And the parties are entitled to the summary procedure set forth in Florida Statute s. 51.011 requiring the court to advance the cause on the calendar. The new statute does say it does NOT apply to any action arising under a residential or commercial property insurance policy. (Thus, since builder’s risk coverage is a form of property insurance, the strong presumption is this new statute would not apply to it.)  Rather, the recent changes to Florida Statute s. 626.9373 would apply which provides, “In any suit arising under a residential or commercial property insurance policy, there is no right to attorney fees under this section.”
  • Florida Statute s. 95.11 – The statute of limitations for negligence causes of action are two years instead of four years. This applies to “causes of action accruing after the effective date of this act.”
  • Florida Statute s. 624.155 – Adds language relative to bad faith insurance claims including bad faith claims asserted under the common law.
  • Florida Statute 768.81 – Includes a greater percentage of fault section in the comparative negligence statute  that states, “In a negligence action to which this section applies, any party found to be greater than 50 percent at fault for his or her own harm may not recover any damages. This subsection does not apply to an action for damages for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of medical negligence pursuant to chapter 766.”
  • Florida Statute s.  627.428– This statute was repealed. This was the attorney’s fees statute for insurance disputes.
  • Florida Statute s. 627.756 – This modified the language in this statute but still provides in a suit by an owner, contractor, a subcontractor, a laborer, or materialman against a surety under a payment or performance bond, if the claimant prevails, it can recover reasonable attorney’s fees for prosecuting the suit.
  • “This act shall not be construed to impair any right under an insurance contract in effect on or before the effective date of this act. To the extent that this act affects a right under an insurance contract, this act applies to an insurance contract issued or renewed after the effective date of this act.”

Please feel free to reach out to me if you view this Act differently.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

QUICK NOTE: ATTORNEY’S FEES ON ATTORNEY’S FEES

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In a recent case, the appellate court held that the attorney’s fees provision in the contract was NOT broad enough to entitle the prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees for litigating the amount of attorney’s fees.  This is known as “fees on fees” which is when you can recover your prevailing party attorney’s fees when you are fighting over the quantum that should be awarded to you as the prevailing party.

The attorney’s fees provision at-issue stated:

“In any lawsuit to enforce the Lease or under applicable law, the party in whose favor a judgment or decree has been rendered may recover its reasonable court costs including attorney’s fees from the non-prevailing party.”

Language similar to this language can be found in many contracts as a prevailing party attorney’s fees provision.

However, this provision was NOT broad enough to recover “fees on fees.”   As explained in this article, if this is a consideration, you can negotiate or include this provision into your construction contract by expanding the scope of the prevailing party attorney’s fees provision to clarify that it entitles the prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees in litigating the amount of attorney’s fees.

There is both a good and bad to this.  The good is that if you are the prevailing party, you have a contractual basis to recover your fees for litigating the amount of fees.  The bad is that if you are the other party to this equation, it becomes harder to resolve a prevailing party attorney’s fees issue when the other party is entitled to attorney’s fees to litigate the reasonableness of attorney’s fees.  Thus, you are in a position where you need to decide whether to pay the other party what they want to avoid continued fees or incurring more fees (both on your end and fees you will have to pay the other party) simply to argue over the amount of fees.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

QUICK NOTE: PREVAILING PARTY ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER A FDUTPA CLAIM ARE NOT MANDATORY

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In prior postings, I have discussed a Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices claim that goes by the acronym FDUTPA.   You can review the posts here, here, and here.

There are times a FDUTPA claim is asserted to try to trigger an argument for statutory attorney’s fees.  However, a recent case demonstrates that attorney’s fees under a FDUTPA claim are permissive, meaning the court has discretion to award attorney’s fees OR not award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.  The case talks about factors the trial court may consider to determine an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party.

The takeaway is that attorney’s fees under a FDUTPA claim are not mandatory and that asserting a FDUTPA claim may not give you the leverage you think due to the permissive nature of prevailing party attorney’s fees and, of course, the fact such claims are not easy to prove.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

APPLICATION OF SET-OFF WHEN DETERMINING PREVAILING PARTY FOR PURPOSES OF ATTORNEY’S FEES

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The recent opinion from the Second District Court of Appeal in Hayward Baker, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2020 WL 7767859 (2nd DCA 2020) demonstrates that the significant issues test for determining the prevailing party for purposes of attorney’s fees applies to disputes involving payment bonds under Florida’s Lien Law (Florida Statutes Chapter 713).  The significant issues test is more or less a subjective test where the party that is deemed to have prevailed on the significant issues in the case is the prevailing party for purposes of attorney’s fees in the case.  A trial court has discretion to determine the prevailing party which will not be disturbed absent an appellate court finding the trial court abused that discretion.   This significant issues test is an important consideration so that parties understand just because money ends up going their way does not necessarily mean they prevailed on the significant issues in the case.  It could mean that.  But it may not based on the claims and moneys involved in the dispute.

In Hayward Baker, the subcontractor recovered a final judgment of $290,000 against the general contractor and payment bond surety. Both the subcontractor and general contractor moved for attorney’s fees as the party that prevailed on the significant issues in the dispute.  The subcontractor was awarded the full amount due under the subcontract; however, there was a set-off issue.  The general contractor asserted a claim against the subcontractor for property damage associated with the subcontractor’s work and received $450,000 from an insurance carrier relative to that claim in a settled dispute.   The subcontractor was able to set-off this recovered amount from the property damages the general contractor sought against the subcontractor. Thus, the issue was when factoring in the set-off, which party prevailed on the significant issues.  The Second District held it was the subcontractor that recovered the final judgment in its favor:

[T]he ruling on [the subcontractor’s] motion to set off the $450,000 [the general contractor] had received from the [insurance carrier] in the 2012 [settled] Case against the damages award entered against [the subcontractor] was pivotal to the prevailing party determination. The result of applying the setoff against [the general contractor’s] damages award was that [the general contractor] received none of the benefit it sought in the litigation: a judgment was not entered against [the subcontractor] for any of the damage caused to the hospital property. On the other hand, [the subcontractor] received all of the benefit it sought in the litigation, as it obtained $290,000 plus prejudgment interest for the work it performed under the subcontract and it was relieved from paying any damages to [the general contractor]. [The subcontractor], therefore, was the prevailing party in the underlying litigation and entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees

Hayward Baker, 2020 WL at *2.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

QUICK NOTE: DISCRETION IN DETERMINING PREVAILING PARTY FOR PURPOSES OF ATTORNEY’S FEES

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In prior articles I have discussed that courts apply the significant issues test to determine the prevailing party for purposes of being entitled to attorney’s fees.   A party that recovers an affirmative judgement is NOT the de facto prevailing party for purposes of an entitlement to attorney’s fees in a breach of contract action (or a construction lien foreclosure action).  This was the issue in a recent appeal discussed here where the party that recovered an affirmative judgment on a breach of contract case was not deemed the prevailing party for purposes of attorney’s fees.  While the party prevailed on one of its claims, it did not prevail on others, and it recovered less than half of the damages it originally sought.  The appellate court, affirming the trial court, held that the trial court has discretion to determine that the party that recovered an affirmative judgement was not the prevailing party entitled to its attorney’s fees under the signifiant issues test.  This was not what the party was expecting when the attorney’s fees it expended far exceeded the judgment it recovered.

There is not an objective, brightline standard to determine which party should be deemed the prevailing party for purposes of an attorney’s fees award.  There is subjectivity involved at the discretion of the trial court.  This is a valuable consideration as the case progresses and there are decisions relating to settlement.  Banking on recovering attorney’s fees is not always the wisest of choices.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

FORECLOSING JUNIOR LIENHOLDERS AND RECORDING A LIS PENDENS

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When you foreclose on a construction lien, there are a couple of pointers to remember.

First, you want to make sure you include junior lienholders or interests you are looking to foreclose (or you want to be in a position to amend the foreclosure lawsuit to identify later).  The reason being is you want to foreclose their interests to the property. “[J]unior interest holders are a narrow class of mortgagees whose interest in the underlying property is recorded after the foreclosing contractor’s claim of lien is filed. This class is routinely joined to the construction lien enforcement action under section 713.26 to allow the construction lienor to foreclose out the junior lienholder’s interest in the property encumbered by the construction lien.” See Decks N Sunch Marine, infra.

Second, you want to record a lis pendens with the lien foreclosure lawsuit.  Failure to do so could be problematic because Florida Statute s. 713.22(1) provides in part, “A lien that has been continued beyond the 1-year period by the commencement of an action is not enforceable against creditors or subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration and without notice, unless a notice of lis pendens is recorded.”

A recent case, Decks N Such Marine, Inc. v. Daake, 45 Fla.L.Weekly D1168b (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), discusses these pointers.  In this case, a contractor filed a construction lien foreclosure action in 2006 against residential real property. However, the contractor did not record a lis pendens until 2013.  The lis pendens, however, was recorded after the owner had a mortgage recorded on the property.  The contractor amended its construction lien foreclosure action to foreclose the mortgagee claiming the mortgagee was a junior lienholder.  The mortgagee moved for summary judgment pursuant to Florida Statute s. 713.22 arguing the lien was “not enforceable against creditors or subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration and without notice, unless a notice of lis pendens is recorded.”   In other words, the mortgagee was not a lienholder that could be foreclosed in light of the untimely recording of the lis pendens.  The mortgagee prevailed on this issue.

The mortgagee then sought its attorney’s fees against the contractor as the “prevailing party” under Florida Statute s. 713.29 (in Florida’s Lien Law).  The trial court agreed.  The appellate court did not.  The appellate court held that a junior lienholder is not entitled to attorney’s fees under Florida Statute s. 713.29 when prevailing in a construction lien enforcement action.  The contractor is not enforcing its lien against the junior lienholder but “joining it to the underlying action to ensue determination of superiority of liens or security interests upon a foreclosure sale.” Decks N Sunch Marine, supra.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR LITIGATING THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES

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Attorney’s fees’ provisions are common in construction contracts.  They are an important provision if you want to create a contractual entitlement to recover your attorney’s fees in the event there is a contractual dispute.  Presuming you prevail on the significant issues of your dispute and are entitled to attorney’s fees, there is an evidentiary hearing as to the reasonableness of attorney’s fees — both as to the reasonableness of the hours expended and of the hourly rates.   Generally, the attorney’s fees incurred in litigating the amount of attorney’s fees is not recoverable.  This is oftentimes referred to as “fees on fees.”  With that said, such fees on fees can be recoverable if the contractual provision is drafted broad enough to allow the prevailing party to recover reasonable attorney’s fees including fees incurred in litigating the reasonable amount of fees.   If you want to recover fees on fees, you will want to include this language in your construction contract.  For more information on this issue, please check this article.   

 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

QUICK NOTE: CONTRACTOR’S STATUTORY BASIS TO RECOVER ATTORNEY’S FEES AGAINST PERFORMANCE BOND

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On October 1, 2019, a modification to existing law (Florida Statute s. 627.756) will take place that allows general contractors to have a statutory basis to recover attorney’s fees against its subcontractor’s performance bond.     (Obviously, the subcontractor will need to be properly defaulted pursuant to the terms of the performance bond and incorporated subcontract.)  Now, while some manuscript subcontractor performance bonds already give the general contractor a contractual right to recover attorney’s fees against the performance bond, this right will also exist by statute for performance bonds issued on or after October 1, 2019.  This modification is good news for contractors that require certain subcontractors to obtain a performance and payment bond (as opposed to enrolling the subcontractor in a subcontractor default insurance program).  Irrespective of this modification, it is still good practice for a contractor requiring a subcontractor to provide a performance and payment bond to also ensure a contractual right exists to recover attorney’s fees under a bond claim.  However, with this modification, a contractor defaulting a bonded subcontractor will also seek to recoup its attorney’s fees against the performance bond under this statute.   Good news for contractors.  Perhaps, not so good news for sureties and subcontractors required to indemnify their sureties.  

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

 

ATTORNEY’S FEES ENTITLEMENT AND APPLICATION UNDER SUBCONTRACT DEAULT PROVISION

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Many subcontracts contain a provision in the default section that reads something to the effect:

 

“Upon any default, Subcontractor shall pay to Contractor its attorney’s fees and court costs incurred in enforcing this Subcontract or seeking any remedies hereunder.” 

 

Oftentimes, a party may wonder as to the enforceability of the provision and how it is applied in the context of a dispute between a contractor and its subcontractor where both parties have asserted claims against the other.   

 

In an opinion out of the Middle District of Georgia, U.S. f/u/b/o Cleveland Construction, Inc. v. Stellar Group, Inc., 2019 WL 338887 (M.D.Ga. 2019), a subcontractor and prime contractor on a federal construction project each asserted claims against the other in the approximate amount of $4 Million, meaning there was a potential $8 Million swing in the dispute.

 

The subcontract contained a provision entitling the contractor to recover attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing the subcontract or seeking remedies under the subcontract upon any default, identical to the provision above. 

 

The case proceeded to a jury trial and a general verdict form was presented to the jury that did not differentiate between the claims each party sought.  The jury found the contractor was liable to the subcontractor for approximately $2.5 Million and the subcontractor was liable to the contractor for approximately $1.3 Million, leaving a net verdict in favor of the subcontractor for approximately $1.2 Million.

 

The contractor, however, sought its attorney’s fees (and costs) pursuant to the default provision since the jury found the subcontractor was liable to it for approximately $1.3 Million.   The subcontract provided that upon a default, the contractor is entitled to attorney’s fees incurred in (i) enforcing the subcontract or (ii) seeking remedies under the subcontract.  But, to be entitled to fees, there had to be a subcontractor default. 

 

The trial court found the subcontract was unclear as to the actual connection that needed to exist between the default and what is actually recoverable at trial.  In other words, it was unclear whether there needed to be a relationship between the default and the recoverable attorney’s fees or whether the contractor could recover attorney’s fees upon any default regardless of whether the attorney’s fees incurred related to that specific default.  The trial court did not interpret the default attorney’s fees provision that broadly and held the contractor must show a causal connection between the default, the enforcement of the subcontract or remedies sought under the subcontract, and the attorney’s fees incurred.  “Under the [subcontract] enforcement prong, [Contractor] would be expected to show that the fees it incurred related to the successful pursuit of the claim for default.  Similarly, under the remedies [sought under the subcontract] prong, [Contractor] would only be entitled to fees incurred in the actual obtaining of a remedy for [Subcontractor’s] default.”  Stellar Group, 2019 WL at *2.  

 

This is not an easy feat, and here lies the problem.    Based on a general jury verdict form, the jury was not asked to make specific findings as to facts that could support the issues relating to the default or the claims prevailed on.  Thus, allocating those attorneys’ fees incurred to the default and enforcement of the subcontract it prevailed on is taking a shot in the dark.

 

Notwithstanding, there are lessons learned from this case.  First, the trial court did not find the attorney’s fees provision unenforceable even through the net judgment went in favor of the subcontractor.  That is promising.  Second, for purposes of a jury trial, had the contractor objected to a general verdict form and requested special interrogatories in the verdict form relating to this issue, the contractor may have been able to allocate certain attorney’s fees incurred to the claims or issues it prevailed on at trial.  And, third — perhaps the most important — this subcontract language can be revisited to make the entitlement and application of attorney’s fees more clear in favor of the contractor.   With that said, the trial court’s interpretation that the fees incurred should have a causal connection to the default and enforcement / remedies under the subcontract prevailed on is not an unreasonable application by any means. 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.