WATERING DOWN THE 10 YEAR STATUTE OF REPOSE PERIOD FOR CONSTRUCTION DEFECT DISPUTES

Posted on November 8, 2013November 8, 2024 by Edward Garber

Yes, it appears that the Second District Court of Appeals in Clearwater Housing Authority v. Future Capital Holding Corp., 38 Fla. L. Weekly D2323a (2nd DCA 2013), just entered an opinion that has watered down the ten year statute of repose for construction disputes. That is right – watered down the statute of repose. This is excellent for owners with construction latent defect disputes, but bad for contractors and design professionals.

The statute of limitations for construction disputes is governed by Florida Statute s. 95.11(3)(c):

(c) Within Four Years. An action founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property, with the time running from the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest; except that, when the action involves a latent defect, the time runs from the time the defect is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. In any event, the action must be commenced within 10 years after the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest.

The bolded language above is the ten year statute of repose language, which means that a lawsuit brought after this date is forever barred even if it is otherwise filed within four years from the date an owner discovered a latent defect (the statute of limitations period). In other words, after this repose period, latent defects become moot.

However, the Second District in Clearwater Housing Authority gave owner an excellent argument to extend the repose period. In this case, an owner hired a contractor and design professionals for purposes of building an apartment project in Clearwater. The property was then purchased by Clearwater Housing Authority. The Certificate of Occupancy was issued in 2000 and this was when Clearwater Housing Authority took possession of the property. However, a final plat was not submitted by the engineers on the project until 2003.

In 2009, Clearwater Housing Authority initiated a dispute for construction defects against various parties. But, in 2011, it amended its complaint to assert a claim against Future Capital Holding Corporation (“Future Capital”). Future Capital did the right thing and moved for summary judgment due to the expiration of the statute of repose. The math was simple. The Certificate of Occupancy occurred in 2000 and it was brought into the lawsuit in 2011, more than 10 years after-the-fact. The trial court agreed and summary judgment was entered in favor of Future Capital.

Clearwater Housing Authority creatively argued that the engineer did not submit the final plat until 2003 and this marked the date that triggered the beginning of the repose period; thus, it had until 2013 to assert claims for construction defects. This argument was based on the repose language: “[T]he action must be commenced within 10 years after the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest.” Stated differently, “the [ten year] repose period commences on the latest date that any of the listed entities—the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor—completed or terminated their contract.” Clearwater Housing Authority, supra.

The Second District reversed the summary judgment based on Clearwater Housing Authority’s argument and because an issue of fact remained as to when the contract was completed.

What effect does this have? A huge effect! An owner can sue a contractor or design professional outside of ten years from the issuance of the Certificate of Occupancy and argue that the repose period did not run based on the following arguments: (a) the contractor’s contract was not completed until well after the Certificate of Occupancy date because the contractor was doing endless punchlist work or (b) the design professional had not completed its contract because it was required to submit as-built plans (or some relatively minor task) which it did not do until well after the Certificate of Occupancy. Therefore, based on this holding, owners can be very creative as to when contracts were arguably completed to create questions of fact to postpone the repose period, especially if they are concerned with this defense. On the other hand, contractors and design professionals sued for construction defects that otherwise have a statute of repose argument, like Future Capital seemed to have in the Clearwater Housing Authority case, need to appreciate that a creative owner will be able to create a question of fact to preclude the entry of summary judgment.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

WHAT IS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION?

Posted on November 8, 2013November 8, 2024 by Edward Garber

The term “substantial completion” is in most construction contracts. And, it should be. This date marks the date the owner expects to be able to use its project for its intended purpose and, if it cannot, the contractor will (likely) be assessed liquidated damages for the delay to the substantial completion date. The owner’s contractual ability to assess liquidated damages serves to motivate the contractor to substantially complete the project by the agreed date and to reimburse the owner for delay-related damages that cannot be ascertained with a reasonable degree of certainty at the time of the contract.

A. How is Substantial Completion Defined

Under the general conditions of the AIA (American Institute of Architects A201 Document 2007), substantial completion is the “stage in the progress of the Work when the Work or designated portion thereof is sufficiently complete in accordance with the Contract Documents so that the Owner can occupy or utilize the Work for its intended use.” (AIA Document A201 s. 9.8.1) Under the AIA, the architect is required to conduct inspections to determine the date of substantial completion and certifies this date.

The general conditions of the EJCDC (Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee C-700 Document 2007) defines substantial completion similarly as:

“The time and date at which the Work has progressed to the point where, in the opinion of Engineer, the Work is sufficiently complete, in accordance with the Contract Documents, so that the Work can be occupied and/or utilized for the purposes for which it is intended….Substantial Completion cannot occur before the Project is issued a Certificate of Occupancy (or Completion, if applicable) by the governing building department that allows Owner to utilize the entire Project for the purposes for which it is intended.” (EJCDC Document C-700 s. 1.01.46)
Whether it is an AIA, EJCDC, or other industry form document, substantial completion is routinely defined as that point in time when the owner can utilize its project for the purposes for which it is intended.

A leading case in Florida discussing substantial completion is J.M. Beeson Co. v. Sartori, 553 So.2d 180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). This case involved an owner assessing liquidated damages against its contractor. The contractor was hired to construct a shopping center that required substantial completion within 300 days of commencement. The contract provided that substantial completion occurred when “construction is sufficiently complete in accordance with the Contract Documents, so the owner can occupy or utilize the work or designation portion thereof for the use for which it is intended.” J.M Beeson, 553 So.2d at 181. Although two anchor tenants in the shopping center received Certificates of Occupancy within the 300 days, another tenant did not. The owner took the position that substantial completion had not been achieved, irrespective of the Certificates of Occupancy, because items such as landscaping were not completed. The Fourth District dismissed the owner’s position finding:

“[W]hen the owner can put tenants in possession for fixturing and can begin to collect rents, the owner begins to utilize the work for its intended purpose. When the owner was able to occupy and fixture the constructed space, the construction was substantially completed.” J.M. Beeson, 553 at 182-83 (internal citations omitted).

The Fourth District indicated that the substantial completion date occurred no later than the date the shopping center was able to obtain certificates of occupancy for the tenants. Notably, if the contractor in J.M. Beeson was simply required to build shell retail space where the tenants were responsible for their own tenant improvements, the substantial completion would likely occur when an applicable certificate of completion was issued for the shell space pursuant to the shell permit that would entitle the tenants to begin their individual improvements. See, e.g., Hausman v. Bayrock Investment Co., 530 So.2d 938 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (finding that test for substantial completion for property tax purposes is the date property is put to use for which it is intended; in this case, since contactor was building shell retail space, substantial completion occurred when shells were completed).

If an owner is in a position to use its project for its intended purpose (whether for personal use, public use, whatever the project entails), this really should mark the substantial completion date. This is more of an objective date determined by the governing building department through the issuance of a certificate relating to the permit.

B. Contract Drafting / Understanding Tips

I prefer the substantial completion definition in the general conditions of the EJCDC (above) because it references that this point in time should not be earlier than the issuance of a Certificate of Occupancy (or applicable Certificate of Completion). Even though most contracts give certain discretion to the design professional to determine and certify the date, the fact remains that the Certificate of Occupancy is realistically the date that determines when an Owner can use its project for its intended purpose since it permits occupancy. I often like to tie the substantial completion date in the contract to the Certificate of Occupancy date or Temporary Certificate of Occupancy date (since the TCO date may be the date that allows occupancy under certain conditions) since this more accurately reflects the date the Owner can use its project for its purpose (or, if it is a project for shell space, the Certificate of Completion date that authorizes the tenant to construct finishes / improvements). Also, this removes some of the discretion from the design professional and shifts their focus to generating the punchlist and working towards final completion.

From an owner’s perspective, if it agrees to a mutual waiver of consequential damages in the contract, it must absolutely include a liquidated damages provision tied to the substantial completion date. If it does not want to include a liquidated damages provision, then the owner needs to ensure there is not a mutual waiver of consequential damages provision and, if there is a delay to the substantial completion date, be in a position to prove its actual delay-related damages.

From a contractor’s perspective, it wants to agree to a substantial completion date where arguably there is float built into its schedule to ensure it has enough time to substantially complete the project. Also, it will want to ensure through flow-down provisions in its subcontracts that it has the ability to flow down assessed liquidated damages to responsible subcontractors that impact its critical path.

From a subcontractors’ perspective, it needs to understand the contractor’s schedule and how the work is sequenced and ideally have input particularly relating to durations for its activities based on the sequencing of the work. Otherwise, the subcontractor could be putting itself in a position where it will be notified of delays since it is unable to meet its required durations.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION AND THE SPEARIN DOCTRINE

Posted on November 3, 2013November 3, 2013 by Edward Garber

The difference between a design specification and a performance specification is important under what is known as the Spearin doctrine–the implied warranty of constructability doctrine–based on the United Supreme Court case U.S. v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918). The Spearin doctrine is recognized in Florida. See Martin K. Eby Const. Co., Inc. v. Jacksonville Tranp. Authority, 436 F.Supp.2d 1276 (M.D.Fla. 2005).

Under the Spearin doctrine, a general contractor is not liable for defects in the plans and specifications furnished by the owner if it constructs the project pursuant to the plans and specifications. This is because the owner impliedly warrants the plans and specifications that it furnishes to its contractor. The Supreme Court in Spearin stated:

“[I]f the contractor is bound to build according to plans and specifications prepared by the owner, the contractor will not be responsible for the consequences of defects in the plans and specifications. This responsibility of the owner is not overcome by the usual clauses requiring builders to visit the site, to check the plans, and to inform themselves of the requirements of the work….”

Travelers Cas. And Surety Co. of America v. U.S., 74 Fed.Cl. 75, 89 (2006) citing Spearin, 248 U.S. at 136.

There are many cases discussing the application and limitations of the Spearin doctrine arising from federal government contract law. What is important is that the Spearin or implied warranty of constructability doctrine applies to design specifications and does not apply to performance specifications. See Martin K. Eby, 436 F.Supp.2d at 1308 (“The purpose of the Spearin doctrine is to allow contractors to recover when the government [owner] does not fulfill the responsibility it has undertaken in preparing and supplying design specifications.”)

So, what is the difference between a design and performance specification? The difference between these two types of specifications is best described as as follows:

“Design specifications dictate the ‘how’ governing a contractor’s tasks, in contrast to performance specifications, which concern the ‘what’ that is to be done…The relevant inquiring [as to the distinction between these specifications] concerns quality and quantity of the obligations that the specifications impose. Hence, detailed measurements, tolerances, materials, i.e., elaborate instructions on how to perform the contract qualify as design specifications. In other words, where the specifications are described in precise detail and permit the contractor no discretion, they are design [specifications]. In contrast, where the specifications set forth simply an objective or standard and leave the means of attaining that end to the contractor, they are performance [specifications].”

Travelers Cas. And Surety Co. of America, 74 Fed.Cl. at 89; See also Martin K. Eby, 436 F.Supp.2d at 1308, n.47 (“Design specifications explicitly state how the contract is to be performed and permit no deviations. Performance specifications, on the other hand, specify the results to be obtained, and leave it to the contractor to determine how to achieve those results.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

A CERTIFICATE OF INSURANCE IS NOT INSURANCE COVERAGE

Posted on October 29, 2013November 8, 2024 by Edward Garber

Owners always want to see the certificate of insurance (“COI”) from the general contractor. The general contractor wants to see the COI from its subcontractors. Parties want to see the COI from an entity they are hiring to confirm they have applicable insurance (proof of insurance) and so that the COI identifies them as an additional insured. (Importantly, just because an entity is listed as a “certificate holder” on the COI does not make them an additional insured; it just means they are being provided proof of the insurance identified in the COI. This is not additional insured status!) Without seeing the actual policy, specifically with respect to a liability policy, it is uncertain (a) what that entity is actually covered for and (b) what entities would be covered as an additional insured under the liability policy.

The summary judgment opinion in Bluewater Builders, Inc. v. United Specialty Ins. Co., 2013 WL 5670957 (S.D.Fla. 2013), demonstrates that a COI is not all it is cracked up to be. In this case, a general contractor sued its subcontractor’s CGL carrier for indemnification. The general contractor did so after it obtained a judgment against the subcontractor for water damage arising from the subcontractor’s work at a commercial high-rise officer tower. (Under Florida Statute s. 627.4136, the general contractor could not sue the subcontractor without first obtaining a settlement or verdict against the subcontractor-insured.) The insurer moved for summary judgment because the insured-subcontractor’s policy provided on the Declarations page that the policy covered the subcontractor’s operations for the following classification: “carpentry-construction of residential property not exceeding three stories in height.” Buewater Builders, 2013 WL at *1. The Declarations page further provided that coverage was strictly limited to this classification and that no coverage would be provided for any other classification. The policy did not cover the subcontractor’s work at a commercial high-rise tower.

The general contractor argued that the insurer should be estopped from relying on the exclusionary language in the policy because it received a COI from the subcontractor and it detrimentally relied on this COI in hiring the subcontractor. Specifically, the general contractor relied on the doctrine of promissory estoppel which applies when a “plaintiff detrimentally relies upon a defendant’s promise, the defendant should have expected the promise to induce reliance, and injustice can only be avoided by enforcement of the promise.” Bluewater Builders, 2013 WL at *3. However, the general contractor could not point to any promise the insurer actually made because the insured-subcontractor was the one that transmitted the COI. And, the COI did not state that it would insure the subcontractor’s work for the project; it was simply evidence of insurance without any “promise.” In fact, the COI at-issue is believed to have not even listed the insurer as the liability insurer for the subcontractor. Thus, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer finding there was no coverage for the subcontractor’s work at the commercial high-rise under the policy.

It is important to remember that the COI does not create an obligation for an insurer. This is demonstrated by the following portion of the Court’s opinion:

The Certificate [of Insurance] does not suggest that Defendant [insurer] would insure Ferman [insured-subcontractor], nor does it create some other obligation on Defendant’s part. Further insight into the preparation of the Certificate [of Insurance] is therefore inapposite to whether Defendant owes any obligation to Ferman or Plaintiff [general contractor] under the Policy.”

Bluewater Builders, 2013 at *4.

Remember, the COI does not create insurance coverage which is why it is always beneficial to see the policy and, as it pertains to additional insured status, to see the actual additional insured endorsement.

For more information on a third party suing a liability carrier, please see https://floridaconstru.wpengine.com/a-third-party-suing-a-liability-carrier/

For more information on additional insured status, please see https://floridaconstru.wpengine.com/understanding-your-rights-as-an-additional-insured/

PRESERVING PERFORMANCE BOND CLAIMS

Posted on October 29, 2013November 8, 2024 by Edward Garber

Performance bonds can be a valuable source of protection to owners that want their general contractors to provide a performance bond and, likewise, to general contractors that want certain subcontractors to provide a performance bond. The performance bond is designed to benefit the obligee in the event the contractor that issues the bond defaults under its contractual obligations. It is absolutely crucial that parties take the proper steps under the terms of the performance bonds to preserve their rights and arguments under the bond. To do this requires an unequivocal formal default of the contractor that issued the bond and that the party will be looking solely to the surety to complete the defaulted party’s contractual obligations. Otherwise, a court will rule in favor of the surety finding that the obligee of the bond did not comply with conditions precedent to preserve the performance bond claim and/or breached the terms of the bond by not allowing the surety to investigate and complete performance. This is exactly the situation in two federal district court summary judgment opinions relying on Florida law: North American Specialty Insurance Co. v. Ames Corp., 2010 WL 1027866 (S.D.Fla. 2010) and CC-Aventura, Inc. v. Weitz Co., 2008 WL 2699577 (S.D.Fla. 2008). Both of these cases illustrate the importance of formally and unequivocally declaring the party that issued the performance bond in default irrespective of whether the issue arises pre-completion or post-completion. Both cases also pertain to a subcontractor that provided a performance bond identifying the general contractor as the obligee (or beneficiary) of the bond.

I. North American Specialty Ins. Co. v. Ames Corp. (Pre-Completion)

In this case, a general contractor hired a roofer for a federal project. The roofer provided performance bonds identifying the general contractor as the obligee. The bonds provided as follows (which is common language in performance bonds):

“Whenever Principal shall be, and be declared by Obligee to be in default under the subcontract, the Obligee having performed Obligee’s obligations thereunder:

(1) Surety may promptly remedy the default …;

(2) Obligee after reasonable notice to Surety may, or Surety upon demand of Obligee may arrange for the performance of Principal’s obligation under the subcontract …;

(3) … If the Surety arranges completion or remedies the default, that portion of the balance of the subcontract price as may be required to complete the subcontract or remedy the default and to reimburse the Surety for its outlays shall be paid to the Surety at the times and in the manner as said sums would have been payable to Principal had there been no default under the subcontract.”

Ames Corp., 2010 WL at *1.

During construction, the general contractor notified the surety that the roofer was refusing to perform and that the general contractor will look to the surety for costs incurred above the roofer’s subcontract amount. A follow-up notice advised the surety that expenses were being incurred to finish the roofer’s subcontract amount and no one from the surety visited the jobsite. The surety then commenced an investigation while advising the general contractor that the “prior letters were not accompanied by supporting documentation and/or prior notice to the principal of default and/or potential default.” Ames Corp., 2010 WL at *3. A meeting was coordinated with the owner, the general contractor, the roofer, and the roofer’s surety at which time the surety represented it would need up to 5 months to assume responsibility and take action. After this meeting, the general contractor sent another letter to the surety and the roofer explaining that the roofing subcontract was not terminated or declared in default and that the surety needed to appreciate the short time allotted for completing the roofer’s contract. The surety responded that because the general contractor had not declared the roofer in default, the surety had no obligation to act under the performance bonds.

Notwithstanding the general contractor never formally declaring the subcontractor in default, it supplemented the roofer’s scope of work. Both the roofer and the surety objected; the surety even advised that such efforts would be a material breach of the bonds. However, due to leaks with the roofing system (the manufacturer of the roofing system inspected the roof and found that there were installation defects), the general contractor incurred substantial costs to complete the roofer’s scope of work which exceeded the roofer’s subcontract balance. In addition, the general contractor incurred delay damages associated with completing the roofer’s scope of work.

The surety initiated this lawsuit based on the monetary demands from the general contractor. The surety moved for summary judgment based on the argument that a condition precedent to the bonds obligations was never triggered, that being that the general contractor never declared the roofer in default. The surety also argued that the general contractor breached the bonds by not allowing the surety the right to remedy any default and by not making available to the surety the unpaid subcontract balance in connection with the surety remedying the default.

Relying on Florida law, the Southern District found:

[A] surety’s liability on a bond is determined strictly from the terms and conditions of the bond agreement. The purpose of a performance bond is to guarantee completion of the contract upon default by the contractor.

***

A declaration of default sufficient to invoke the surety’s obligations under the bond must be made in clear, direct, and unequivocal language. The declaration must inform the surety that the principal has committed a material breach or series of material breaches of the subcontract, that the obligee regards the subcontract as terminated, and that the surety must immediately commence performing under the terms of the bond.

Ames Corp., 2010 WL at *6 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Based on this law, the Southern District held that none of the letters the general contractor sent to the surety defaulted the roofer in clear, direct, and unequivocal language. While the letters urged the surety to become involved and threatened default, they did not formally and unequivocally default the roofer. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the surety.

Furthermore, the Southern District agreed with the surety that the general contractor breached the bond by completing / supplementing the subcontract without giving the surety the opportunity to remedy any default under the subcontract. As the court explained: “‘[O]nce Ames/Dawson [general contractor] engaged in the supplementation of work without allowing NAS [surety] to perform, its conduct constituted a material breach that voided the bond.” Ames Corp., 2010 WL at *9.

II. CC-Aventura, Inc. v. Weitz Co. (Post-Completion)

In this case, the general contractor was hired to construct a senior living facility. The general contractor hired a painter with a subcontract that contained an indemnification provision and a provision that required the painter to correct defective work. The painter provided a performance bond identifying the general contractor as the obligee.

After completion of the project, the owner sued the general contractor for water intrusion and damage. The general contractor sued subcontractors including its painting subcontractor. The general contractor also asserted a claim against the painting subcontractor’s performance bond surety for breach of the bond. The surety moved for summary judgment arguing that the bond obligations were never triggered because the general contractor never formally declared the painting subcontractor in default.

The general contractor argued that it did provide default notices when it transmitted the owner’s expert and its expert reports regarding the paint that the painter applied. In the notices, the general contractor demanded that the surety correct the defects and that the painter’s failure to take corrective action will be a default under the subcontract.

The surety took the position that these types of notices were insufficient. The Southern District of Florida agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the surety finding:

“Both of Weitz’s [general contractor] letters do state that Delta [subcontractor] is in ‘default’ of its Subcontract-and had Weitz maintained that position and indicated that Weitz now looked to American Casualty [surety] alone, both of its letters could reasonably be interpreted as declarations of default sufficient to trigger American Casualty’s liability on the Bond. However, in its December 30, 2005 letter Weitz also advised Delta to ‘please accept this letter as The Weitz Company’s final written demand that Delta Painting or its Surety take appropriate corrective action’….In its April 11, 2006 letter, Weitz reiterated that it had made ‘numerous demands upon both Delta and American to correct [the painting] deficiency.’ Weitz then stated its intention to perform the corrective work itself and announced that ‘Weitz will seek such costs and all other damages from Delta and American.’ If Weitz wanted to trigger American Casualty’s obligations on the Bond, it would have had to clearly and unambiguously notify American Casualty that it now looked to it to complete Subcontract obligations, in accordance with the Bond.”

CC-Aventura, 2008 WL at *4.

As illustrated above, there are certainly procedural hurdles that are required to take place in order to properly default a contractor that provided a performance bond. Not doing so can be fatal to the performance bond claim. Default is always viewed as a last resort because parties do not want to be in material breach for incorrectly defaulting or terminating a party. However, by not defaulting a party, the performance bond’s obligations are not triggered. Due to these hurdles, general contractors are now obtaining subguard (subcontractor default insurance) instead of requiring individual subcontractors to provide performance bonds. This allows the general contractor to be more involved in the process since it is the one obtaining subguard and it eliminates subcontractors from having to obtain the bond (which could be problematic for certain subcontractors).

For more on performance bonds, please visit: https://floridaconstru.wpengine.com/statute-of-limitations-on-performance-bond-claims/

MORE ON A SURETY’S RIGHT TO DEMAND COLLATERAL SECURITY FROM THE CONTRACTOR BOND-PRINCIPAL AND BOND GUARANTORS

Posted on October 17, 2013November 8, 2024 by Edward Garber

I previously discussed a surety’s right to demand collateral security from its bond principal and personal guarantors by discussing the case Developers Surety and Indemnity Co. v. Bi-Tech Construction, Inc., 2013 WL 4563657 (S.D.Fla. 2013). (Please see below for the link where this blog article can be located.)

To add to this discussion, the Middle District of Florida in Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co. of America v. Industrial Commercial Structures, Inc., 2012 WL 4792906 (M.D.Fla. 2012), a case that preceded Bi-Tech Construction, dealt with a similar issue of a performance bond surety demanding the bond principal and guarantor to post / deposit collateral to offset the surety’s liability exposure. In this case, the surety issued a performance bond to the contractor in connection with a residential project. A dispute arose between the contractor and the owner and the contractor sued the owner for, among other claims, breach of contract and to foreclose a construction lien. The owner countersued the contractor and the performance bond surety (which is not uncommon in a payment dispute where the owner asserts construction defects or incomplete performance). The dispute was hotly contested.

During the dispute with the owner, the surety demanded that the contractor post collateral – it demanded that the contractor deposit money into a reserve account that would be used to offset the surety’s liability. When the contractor did not post / deposit the amount of money the surety wanted, the surety filed a lawsuit against the contractor (principal) and the contractor’s guarantors that executed the General Agreement of Indemnity (the agreement the surety requires to be executed before it issues bonds on the principal’s behalf). The surety moved for a preliminary injunction asking the Court to order the contractor to deposit the money into a reserve account. The surety also moved for an injunction demanding that the contractor not transfer or encumber assets, allow the surety to have a full accounting of the contractor and guarantor’s assets, and allow the surety access to the contractor and guarantor’s books and records.

The Middle District, analyzing the requirements for a preliminary injunction, agreed with the surety and ordered that the contractor post / deposit collateral into the reserve account. Of interest, the surety prior to the lawsuit demanded collateral of $1.5 million that it subsequently reduced to $300,000. Although the surety in its motion for preliminary injunction demanded that the contractor deposit the $1.5 million in collateral, the court ordered the contractor to deposit $300,000 to the reserve account. (There was some indication in the opinion that the contractor posted approximately $139,000 as collateral, but it is uncertain whether this was collateral provided in connection with the issuance of the bonds or the lawsuit with the owner.)

The MIddle District elaborated:

“As one federal court of appeals has succinctly explained, ‘[a] collateral security provision [in an indemnity agreement] provides that once a surety…receives a demand on its bond, the indemnitor must provide the surety with funds which the surety is to hold in reserve. If the claim on the bond must be paid, then the surety will pay the loss from the indemnitor’s funds; otherwise, the surety must return the funds to the indemnitor.’ Moreover, ‘[s]ureties are ordinarily entitled to specific performance of collateral security clauses.’ This is because ‘[i]f a creditor is to have the security position for which he bargained, the promise to maintain the security must be specifically enforced.’ Industrial Commercial Structures, supra, at *2 (internal citations omitted).

However, the court did not order the contractor or guarantor to give a full accounting, provide the surety access to books and records, or prohibit the transferring of assets as the surety did not establish it would be irreparably harmed (a requirement for an injunction) if this relief was not granted. Also, the court, unlike the court in Bi-Tech Construction, required the surety to post a $100,000 bond for the injunction to cover damages in the event the injunction was wrongly ordered.

Although the court in this case did not discuss the collateral security provisions, such provisions are virtually identical in most General Agreements of Indemnity. Even in a hotly contested dispute between the contractor and the owner (such as the situation in Industrial Commercial Structures), if a claim is asserted against the surety or it is sued, the surety can demand for the principal and guarantor to post collateral into a reserve account to offset the surety’s liability exposure. However, if the surety demands more, such as an accounting, access to books, etc., this case can support the argument that these remedies are not warranted because the surety has not established it will be irreparably harmed if this recourse is not ordered. Now, if the circumstances are different and the surety carries its burden of establishing irreparable harm, it is possible that this recourse will also be ordered; however, this additional recourse should ideally result in a higher injunction bond amount.

The objective is for the contractor (bond-principal) and guarantors to understand their rights and options in the event a claim or lawsuit is asserted against the bond.

To find out more about this issue and the requirements for a preliminary injunction, please see
https://floridaconstru.wpengine.com/a-suretys-right-to-demand-collateral-security/

PROVING LOST PROFIT DAMAGES WITH A REASONABLE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY

Posted on October 13, 2013November 8, 2024 by Edward Garber

Lost profit damages are challenging damages to prove, but are an important form of consequential damages that parties seek based on the dynamics of the case. These damages must be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. The recent Southern District of Florida opinion, Topp Paper Co., LLC v. ETI Converting Equipment, 2013 WL 5446341 (S.D.Fla. 2013), explained:

“Under Florida law, lost profits must be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty before the loss is recoverable. Courts have construed this standard as requiring that the mind of a prudent or impartial person be satisfied that the damages are not the result of speculation or conjecture. In unproven businesses such as Topp’s [plaintiff], Florida courts have allowed damages where the plaintiff proves that (1) the defendant’s action caused the damage and (2) there is some standard [yardstick] by which the amount of damages may be adequately determined.” Id. at *7 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

The first step is the causation requirement, i.e., that the defendant’s conduct caused the lost profit damages that the plaintiff seeks.

The second step is the lost profit methodology demonstrating the plaintiff’s lost profit damages with a reasonable degree of certainty and without speculation. Oftentimes parties retain experts to prove these damages based on the yardstick or standard in which the lost profit damages are determined. However, in Topp Paper, the Southern District maintained that both steps “may be satisfied without resort to expert testimony.” Topp Paper, supra, at *8. In this case, the plaintiff, a new business, planned to show lost profits without an expert by laying the foundation for cancelled contracts with its clients that were solely caused by the defendant’s actions. The plaintiff’s position was that but for defendant’s actions, it would have been able to satisfy the contracts with its actual clients and, because it was not able to, it lost the profit associated with those contracts.

On the other hand, the Southern District would not allow the plaintiff to prove its lost profit damages through income projections by comparing projected income with actual income to assess lost profits. The reason is that establishing lost profit damages through projections would be purely speculative, especially considering the plaintiff’s business was a new business without a history of profits.

In Topp Paper, the plaintiff could be in a position to establish lost profits because it actually had contracts with clients that had to be cancelled due to the defendant’s alleged actions. This was vital because the plaintiff could establish lost profits without the need to retain an expert. However, what if the plaintiff, as a new business, did not actually have cancelled contracts? It would not be able to prove damages through income or profit projections. In this scenario, the plaintiff would need to establish some yardstick to prove its damages with a reasonable degree of certainly. One yardstick could be the plaintiff’s past business and profit history. A plaintiff’s accountant or financial officer could assist in this methodology / calculation (although, if possible, it helps to have this supported by an expert). However, as a new business, the plaintiff did not have a business history. The other way would be to find a comparable business with a comparable business model as the yardstick to establish lost profits. This should require expert testimony and it will be important to work with the expert and cross-examine the expert to flesh out any speculative portion of the yardstick.

The bottom line is that lost profit damages are challenging and require a game plan that will be used to support (1) causation–that the defendant’s action caused these damages and (2) the standard or yardstick that will be utilized to support lost profit damages. A new business will likely have a different game plan than an established business unless there is documentary evidence (such as in Topp Paper) that the business had actual clients that would have been serviced but for the defendant’s actions. Also, knowing that income projections or pro forma profit and loss statements will be deemed speculative, getting an expert involved sooner than later is important to assist with establishing the yardstick or methodology that will be used to prove lost profits with a reasonable degree of certainty.

For more information on lost profit damages, please see https://floridaconstru.wpengine.com/the-difference-between-lost-profit-and-loss-of-use-damages/

PAY-WHEN-PAID PROVISIONS AND PAYMENT BONDS

Posted on October 12, 2013November 8, 2024 by Edward Garber

Pay-when-paid (also known as pay-if-paid) provisions are customary in subcontract agreements. These provisions provide that the contractor must be paid by the owner for the subcontractor’s work as an express condition precedent to the contractor’s payment to the subcontractor. Thus, if the contractor does not get paid by the owner, the subcontractor does not get paid by the contractor. This is a must-include provision to contractors as it shifts the risk of the owner’s nonpayment to the subcontractor.

However, on public projects and even many large-scale private projects, the contractor is required to obtain a payment bond that guarantees the contractor’s payment to subcontractors. Importantly, the pay-when-paid language does not protect a payment bond surety; it is not a defense to a payment bond surety. See OBS Co., Inc. v. Pace Construction Corp., 558 So.2d 404 (Fla. 1990) (finding that pay-when-paid language in subcontract does not prevent subcontractor from suing payment bond); see also Everett Painting Co. v. Padula& Wadsworth Const., Inc., 856 So.2d 1059, 1061 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“However, this [pay-when-paid] contract provision is not a defense that is available to Surety.”).

From a subcontractor’s perspective, it is important on the front-end to know whether a payment bond is in place and, if so, what steps need to be taken to preserve a payment bond claim in the event of nonpayment. If there is any concern as to whether the general contractor was paid by the owner, it may be advisable to pursue the payment bond directly (instead of the contractor) unless there are reasons not too such as issues with the subcontractor’s compliance with statutory conditions precedent to sue on the bond. (Also, if there are concerns with the venue provision in the subcontract, pursuing a claim against the bond may create an argument to sue in a venue outside of the venue provision in the subcontract.)

From the general contractor’s perspective, if there is a payment bond in place, it needs to appreciate that the pay-when-paid defense will not apply to its surety. One thought is to include a provision in the subcontract that references that the subcontractor understands that the surety is an intended-third party beneficiary of pay-when-paid language and can utilize the pay-when-paid defense in the event the general contractor is not paid for the subcontractor’s work. There is, however, a strong argument that this language would not be enforceable based on caselaw set forth above that does not allow a surety to benefit from the pay-when-paid defense. The leading Florida Supreme Court case, OBS Co. (cited above), that finds that a surety cannot benefit from this pay-when-paid defense, states:

“The payment bond is a separate agreement, and any inability to proceed against the general contractor does not necessarily prevent recovery against the sureties under the bond. In this case recovery under the payment bond is in no way conditioned on the owner making final payment to Pace [general contractor]. Nor does the bond incorporate the payment terms of the subcontract.”

Based on that bolded language, it is an uphill battle to create an argument that the surety can be protected by the pay-when-paid defense because the payment bond does not incorporate each and every subcontract and such language would merely turn the bond into a conditional payment bond, i.e., a bond conditioned on the owner’s payment to the contractor. Including language in the subcontract that says the surety is an intended third-party beneficiary of the pay-when-paid language is definitely a tough sell, but it has little downside, as the worst that happens is that the pay-when-paid defense does not apply to claims against the surety no matter what, which is likely the case.

Notably, it is advisable for the general contractor to include language in subcontracts that provides to the extent the pay-when-paid provision conflicts with language in the prime contract, the pay-when-paid language shall govern. The reason being is to avoid any argument that the pay-when-paid language is ambiguous because it conflicts with language in the prime contract (that is incorporated into the subcontract) which would not have a pay-when-paid provision.

For motion information on pay-when-paid provisions, please see: https://floridaconstru.wpengine.com/careful-drafting-of-pay-when-paid-provisions/

CONTRIBUTION CLAIMS TO PASS-THROUGH LIABILITY

Posted on October 7, 2013November 8, 2024 by Edward Garber

In lawsuits, there are times the defendant elects to sue a third-party defendant to pass-through its liability to the plaintiff to the third-party defendant. For example, in a construction defect scenario where the owner sues the general contractor, the general contractor will often sue subcontractors (third-party defendants) in order to pass-through its liability to the owner to subcontractors that performed the scopes of work at-issue. In other situations, a defendant may assert a cross-claim against another defendant to, among other things, pass-through any liability it has to the plaintiff to the other defendant. For example, in a construction defect scenario where the owner sues both the general contractor and subcontractors, the general contractor will often assert a cross-claim against the subcontractors to pass through its liability to the subcontractors.

A claim for contribution used to be a common claim asserted to pass-through liability in negligence-related actions. Contribution claims were routine in negligence actions when there used to be joint and several liability, i.e., a party could be responsible for all of the plaintiff’s damages irrespective of its percentage of fault with other defendants. “To state a claim for contribution, the claimant must allege a common liability to the injured party [plaintiff].” Horowitz v. Laske, 855 So.2d 169, 174(Fla. 5th DCA 2003). In other words, the defendant and third-party defendant must be jointly liable / negligent to the plaintiff for the injuries the plaintiff sustained. Therefore, by asserting a contribution claim, the defendant ensures that fault is allocated to another party that is jointly liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff.

However, Florida abolished joint and several liability in negligence actions and, now, a defendant can only be liable based on its determined percentage of fault. See Fla. Stat. s. 768.81; see also T&S Enterprises Handicap Accessibility, Inc. v. Wink Indus. Maintenance & Repair, Inc., 11 So.3d 411 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (affirming dismissal of defendant’s third party claim for contribution in underlying negligence action due to abolishment of joint and several liability). Because of this, third-party defendants or cross-claim defendants that are sued for contribution should argue that the contribution claim is moot because the party suing it can only be held liable for its percentage of fault or negligence. Some judges will dismiss a contribution claim for this reason on a motion to dismiss, but others will still allow the claim to proceed beyond a motion to dismiss for judicial efficiency and economy since it is easier to wrap up a dispute in one litigation instead of many (considering contribution claims have been routine claims to pass-through liability).

The opinion in Martinez v. Miami-Dade County, 2013 WL 5434159 (S.D.Fla. 2013) is a non-construction case that illustrates how a claim for contribution can proceed. In this case, a plaintiff sued Miami-Dade County and a bar for injuries the plaintiff sustained by off-duty police officers providing security for the bar. The claims against Miami-Dade Couty were sounded in intentional tort theories and not negligence theories. Miami-Dade County asserted a cross-claim against the bar and included a claim for contribution. The bar moved to dismiss the contribution claim arguing that contribution claims are obsolete under Florida law since there is no more joint and several liability. The Southern District Court disagreed expressing that because the plaintiff’s theories against Miami-Dade County were sounded in intentional tort and not negligence, section 768.81 did not apply. (Notably, section 768.81 section does not apply to intentional tort theories of liability.)

Under section 768.81, a negligence action means “without limitation, a civil action for damages based upon a theory of negligence, strict liability, products liability, professional malpractice whether couched in terms of contract or tort, or breach of warranty and like theories. The substance of an action, not conclusory terms used by a party, determines whether an action is a negligence action.” Fla. Stat. s. 768.81(1)(c). Therefore, even if the claims asserted are not labeled negligence claims, this section still applies to bar joint and several liability to ensure a party is only liable for their percentage of fault. It is designed so that substance over form is analyzed to determine whether the plaintiff’s underlying action is a negligence action even if it is not labeled as such.

This opinion in Martinez, however, could support the argument that a contribution claim could be asserted outside of a negligence claim such as a breach of contract action (since, in the case, a contribution claim was still allowed to proceed in an intentional tort action). And, even though section 768.81 shifts the focus from the label of the plaintiff’s claims to the actual substance underlying the claims, the objective is to argue that plaintiff’s claims are not based in negligence, but based in a material breach of a contractual provision. For example, in a construction defect setting, when the general contractor is sued for breach of contract, there may be strategic reasons why the general contractor would want to attempt to assert a contribution claim in addition to an indemnification claim against subcontractors to pass-through liability. The general contractor would argue that the plaintiff’s claims are not based in negligence but based in contract since the plaintiff is asserting that the project was not constructed per the contract documents (or in a workmanlike manner) per contractual provisions.

Finally, if a general contractor elects to assert a contribution claim, it is important to remember that the claim will only survive if it asserts and can establish that it and the subcontractor(s) share a common liability to the owner. This is challenging.

In Helmet House Corp. v. Stoddard, 861 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), a contractor was sued by an owner for breach of contract and breach of warranty for defective construction of a roof. The contractor asserted a third party party complaint against its roofing subcontractor for contribution. The Fourth District held that the contractor could not pursue a contribution claim against its subcontractor because the subcontractor did not share a common obligation / liability to the owner. The Fourth District found that parties share a common liability if they are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on an obligation. Importantly, many subcontracts contain flow-down provisions that bind the subcontractor to the general contractor to the same extent the general contractor is bound to the owner. Flow-down provisions attempt to impose the exact same liability on the subcontractor that the general contractor assumes towards the owner. With this type of provision, or an alternative provision that would make the owner an intended third-party beneficiary of the subcontract, there may be an argument that subcontractors do indeed share a common liability to the owner with the general contractor for defects with their scopes of work. From the general contractor’s perspective, the objective is to pass-through liability for defective construction with arguments based on the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON PERFORMANCE BOND CLAIMS

Posted on October 1, 2013November 8, 2024 by Edward Garber

Owners need to understand the benefit of a performance bond before deciding they do not want to reimburse the contractor for the premium associated with the bond. The performance bond is designed to guarantee the contractor’s faithful performance of the contract. There are numerous ways the bond can come into play. If the contractor goes bankrupt during construction, the owner can assert a claim against the bond. If the contractor gets terminated for default, the owner can assert a claim against the bond. And, if there are construction defects, particularly latent defects, the owner can assert a claim against the bond. Naturally, a benefit of the performance bond is that the contract is presumably guaranteed by a solvent surety (insurance company), which is important based on the value of the contract and/or perceived solvency of the hired contractor.

Importantly, performance bonds have a five year statute of limitations irrespective of the ten year statute of repose period in Florida. See Federal Ins. Co. v. Southwest Retirement Center, Inc., 707 So.2d 1119 (Fla. 1998). The Florida Supreme Court in Southwest Retirement Center held that the statute of limitations on a performance bond in a case involving latent defects accrues (begins to run) “on the date of acceptance of the project as having been completed according to terms and conditions set out in the construction contract.” Id. at 1121. Thus, the statute of limitations begins to run on this date and expires five years thereafter—no matter when the defect was discovered.

A factual issue can arise based on parties’ differing interpretations as to the meaning of “acceptance of the project as having been completed according to terms and conditions set out in the construction contract.” The opinion in GBMC, LLC v. Proset Systems, Inc., 2013 WL 1629162 (N.D.Fla. 2013), illustrates this factual issue. In this case, the performance bond surety moved for summary judgment arguing that the statute of limitations began to accrue on the date of substantial completion. To support this position, the surety pointed to the construction contract that maintained that the statute of limitations accrues no later than the date of substantial completion. (Notably, this is common language in construction contracts, particularly the AIA Document A201 which appears to be the general conditions of the contract executed by the parties.) The Northern District of Florida, however, did not buy this argument because it is illegal under Florida law for parties to contractually shorten the statute of limitations. See Fla. Stat. s. 95.03. In other words, if substantial completion occurred before the “acceptance of the project has having been completed according to the terms and conditions set out in the contract,” then the parties were illegally agreeing to shorten the limitations period. Because there were material facts in dispute as to when the contract was accepted as completed, the surety’s motion for summary judgment was denied.

Owners that plan on asserting a claim against a performance bond for latent defects need to understand when the statute of limitations accrues for purposes of their claim. Based on the project’s completion, the owner will want to create a factual issue as to when it accepted as completed the contract since this date is arguably later than the substantial completion date and, thus, the certificate of occupancy date. This language is a benefit to the owner asserting a latent defect claim on the cusp of five years from the date it started using the project for its intended purpose, particularly if the owner did not release retainage until well after occupancy. Contractors (indemnifying their surety) and sureties need to recognize this so they can start framing a statute of limitations defense based on facts supporting when the contract was accepted as completed by the owner. The contractor should do this by tracking the temporary and/or final certificate of occupancy dates and when final payment was made to argue that the owner accepted the project when it started occupying the project for its intended purpose. A contractor or surety will need to persuasively make this argument if the certificate of occupancy was issued more than five years from the lawsuit but the owner’s final payment to the contractor for retainage was within five years from the lawsuit. The reason being is that language “accepted as completed” allows the owner to argue that they never accepted the project as completed by virtue of not issuing the final payment until an extended period after the certificate of occupancy.