NEED CONTINUING EDUCATION CREDIT IN FLORIDA? CONSIDER THESE COURSES

IMG_3655Are you a contractor and need continuing education credit?  I recently got three one-house courses approved by Florida’s Construction Industry Licensing Board.  These one-hour courses are designed for live breakfast-and-learn or lunch-and-learn sessions.  They are designed for practical application on key issues facing all in construction.  The courses are as follows:

 

 

 

1) Delay!  The Project is Late – What do You do and how do You Allocate the Delay?; 

2) Contract Risk Considerations; and

3) Effective Project Documentation & Management. 

 

 

 

Please reach out to me if you are interested in learning more about these live presentations including whether you think your employees can benefit from a breakfast-and-learn or lunch-and-learn.

 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

NEW EBOOK: INNOVATIVE ATTORNEY’S FEE ARRANGEMENTS

41b5ksdWluL._AC_US436_QL65_The traditional attorney’s fee model for business disputes including construction disputes is hourly billing.   There is certainly nothing wrong with this model.  But…it is NOT the only model and there are other models that can actually be perceived as value-added to your business.  There is nothing wrong with innovation and creativity.  This new ebook discusses Innovative Attorney’s Fee Arrangements.  It can be obtained from Amazon, iTunes, or Nook.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

WHICH CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT SHOULD I USE?

In the previous article I posted a chart that includes a side-by-side comparison of common risk allocation and risk assumption provisions in industry form construction contracts (the general conditions between the owner and contractor in the AIA, EJCDC, and ConsensusDocs industry form contracts).   This chart was used to illustrate various contractual provisions in industry form contracts in a presentation I recently did on construction contracts. The point of the presentation was to summarize many of the common risk allocation and risk assumption provisions in construction contracts that need to be considered when selecting and finalizing an industry form construction contract.  A portion of that presentation is below.  

 

[gview file=”https://floridaconstru.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Advanced-Construction-Contracts.pptx”]

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

IMPACT OF LIS PENDENS ON UNRECORDED INTERESTS / LIENS


In a previous article, I discussed the importance of recording a lis pendens in a construction lien foreclosure action.

 

There is another noteworthy point relating to the impact of lis pendens that can provide quite a bit of consternation.

 

Florida Statute 48.23(1)(d) provides:

 

Except for the interest of persons in possession or easements of use, the recording of such notice of lis pendens, provided that during the pendency of the proceeding it has not expired pursuant to subsection (2) or been withdrawn or discharged, constitutes a bar to the enforcement against the property described in the notice of all interests and liens, including, but not limited to, federal tax liens and levies, unrecorded at the time of recording the notice unless the holder of any such unrecorded interest or lien intervenes in such proceedings within 30 days after the recording of the notice. If the holder of any such unrecorded interest or lien does not intervene in the proceedings and if such proceedings are prosecuted to a judicial sale of the property described in the notice, the property shall be forever discharged from all such unrecorded interests and liens. If the notice of lis pendens expires or is withdrawn or discharged, the expiration, withdrawal, or discharge of the notice does not affect the validity of any unrecorded interest or lien.

 

The language in this statute requires persons with unrecorded interests / liens to intervene in a lawsuit subject to a lis pendens within 30 days or else they are barred from proceeding against the property (unless the property subject to the lis pendens is not foreclosed on or the lis pendens is discharged).  This is a harsh outcome because such a person’s (unrecorded) interest may not accrue until it is already too late—beyond the 30 days of the recording of the lis pendens.

 

The best way to explain the potentially harsh application of this statute is to examine its application in a few cases.

 

In Adhin v. First Horizon Home Loans, 44 So.3d 1245 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010), a lender recorded mortgages associated with a construction loan.  The borrower entered into an agreement to sell parcels and any homes currently built on the parcels.  The parcels were sold, however, the closing agent failed to record the deeds and mortgages associated with the closing, and failed to secure any release from the construction lender as to the parcels that had been sold.   Subsequently, the construction lender foreclosed on its mortgage which included a foreclosure that applied to the parcels that had been sold.  A lis pendens had been recorded.   Approximately two months after the lis pendens was recorded, the purchasers of the parcels recorded their deeds and corresponding mortgages and moved to intervene in the construction lender’s foreclosure lawsuit.   The construction lender opposed the motion to intervene arguing that the purchasers of the parcels failed to timely intervene pursuant to s. 48.23(1)(d) since the lender’s foreclosure action impacted their rights to the parcels they purchased.  The appellate court agreed with the lender finding that the language operates as a nonclaim statute that bars enforcement against the property by a holder of an unrecorded interest (such as the purchasers of the parcels in this case) after the prescribed statutory period (30 days), provided the litigation proceeds to a final judgment and judicial sale of the foreclosed property.  This meant the purchasers of the parcels could not intervene and their rights as it related to their parcels were entirely dependent on whether the construction lender’s foreclosure action proceeded to a final foreclosure judgment and judicial sale of the property (inclusive of their property).  Ouch!!!

 

In Jallali v. Knightsbridge Village Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 2016 WL 3548843 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), a homeowner’s lender filed a mortgage foreclosure action and recorded a lis pendens.   While the mortgage foreclosure action was pending, the homeowner’s association recorded a lien for unpaid assessments and moved to foreclose its assessment lien.  The issue was whether the lender’s notice of lis pendens barred the homeowner’s association’s subsequent foreclosure action based on its lien for unpaid assessments.   The appellate court held it did not because the lien was based on a recorded Declaration of Covenants that was recorded prior to the filing of the lis pendens—thus, s. 48.23(1)(d) did not apply because the Declaration was an interest recoded prior to the lis pendens.

 

In Ober v. Town of Lauderdale-by-the-Sea, 2016 WL 4468134 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), a lender filed a foreclosure action and recorded a lis pendens.  The lender obtained a final judgment in foreclosure.  Subsequent to the final judgment in foreclosure, but before any foreclosure sale, the Town of Lauderdale-by-the-Sea recorded liens against the property for code violations that occurred post-final judgment.  The property was sold at a foreclosure sale and the new owner filed suit to quiet title and remove the Town’s liens.  The appellate court held that s. 48.23(1)(d) does not operate to bar liens that accrue and are recorded AFTER the final judgment.  Hence, recording a lis pendens does not operate to bar liens that occur (accrue) and are recorded post-final judgment but before a foreclosure sale.

 

When it comes to construction projects, sometimes there are multiple construction lien foreclosure actions relating to the same property. All of these foreclosure actions are routinely accompanied by a lis pendens.  Some of these actions could arguably be barred under s. 48.23 since they may be based on liens recorded outside of the 30-day window of the first lis pendens that was recorded.  So, if the initial foreclosure action results in a judicial sale of the property, the subsequently recorded liens on the property whose holder’s failed to timely intervene may be out of luck – they would not be able to foreclose on the same property that was already sold at a judicial sale.  On the other hand, under Jallali, liens relate to a notice of commencement, and similar to a Declaration of Covenants (or Condominium), could be considered a recorded interest.  The notice of commencement would be recorded prior to any construction lien, meaning that any construction lien is not based on an unrecorded interest at the time a lis pendens is recorded.  If this is true, than s. 48.23(1)(d) arguably would not apply to bar any liens that accrue and/or are recorded after 30 days from the initial lis pendens.  To preserve this argument, it is important that liens are recorded within the effective period of a notice of commencement so that the liens can relate back to the date the notice of commencement is recorded. 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

MILLER ACT CLAIM FOR UNSIGNED CHANGE ORDERS


Contracts and subcontracts often contain language that requires change orders to be in writing and that no change order work shall be performed unless agreed to in advance in a signed change order.  Oftentimes change order work is performed but the parties have not complied with the strict requirements of the contract by having this work signed off by the parties in a change order prior to the commencement of the work.  Well, can such requirements be waived?  If so, can such change orders form the basis of a Miller Act claim?   The answer is generally yes provided the party arguing waiver can support the waiver with evidence (that the other party voluntarily relinquished the requirements through its course of conduct / actions).

 

This is exemplified in U.S. f/u/b/o Agate Steel, Inc. v. Jaynes Corp., Case No. 2:13-CV001907-APG-NJK (D. Nev. June 17, 2016), where a sub-subcontractor asserted a Miller Act payment bond claim for non-payment largely dealing with change order work that was never signed by the subcontractor that hired it.   The subcontract stated:

 

No change orders or contract additions will be made unless agreed to in writing….If additional work is performed and not covered in this contract [sub-subcontractor] proceeds at [its] own risk and expense. No alterations, additions, or small changes can be made in the work or method of the performance, without the written change order signed by [subcontractor] and [sub-subcontractor]. 

Jaynes, supra.

 

The sub-subcontractor submitted change order requests and time and material summaries to the subcontractor that hired it.  However, the subcontractor never signed the change orders or time and material summaries. The sub-subcontractor acknowledged that most of the requests for change order work was prompted by verbal authorizations, including written authorizations. Shortly thereafter, the subcontractor disputed the change order requests and claimed that the sub-subcontractor performed work without signed change orders.  The prime contractor and its Miller Act payment bond surety disputed the sub-subcontractor’s payment bond claim contending the sub-subcontractor never complied with its subcontract by not obtaining prior written approval in a change order before performing the change order work.

 

Here, the trial court held that the subcontractor waived the subcontract’s requirement that change orders be in writing signed by both parties thereby allowing the sub-subcontractor to recover against the Miller Act payment bond:

 

Here, Agate [sub-subcontractor] has presented evidence that American Steel [subcontractor] waived the requirement that change orders be approved in a writing signed by both American Steel and Agate. Agate presented change orders and T&M summaries for payment. In his June 18 email, American Steel’s president, Williamson, approved a revised contract amount of $126,907.00. He also directed Agate to proceed with work as soon as possible and asked how soon Agate could return to the work site. Agate subsequently performed more work on the project based on the approval of the change orders. No issue of fact remains that the parties therefore waived the requirement that the change orders be in a writing signed by both parties.

Ideally this issue would never arise because the parties would comply with the strict requirements of the contract and change orders would never be performed without there being a signed change order.  But we all know that this does not always happen leading to disputes relating to change orders after the work is already performed.  While such strict language is certainly beneficial, it is not absolute and the party performing the change order work can navigate around the strict requirements by presenting evidence establishing this requirement was waived.  Such evidence can be in the form of written authorizations to perform the work, the manner in which other change orders were handled, testimony from fact witnesses regarding oral authorizations, meeting minutes discussing the change, and other evidence that shows the party looking to enforce the requirements waived them through their course of conduct and actions.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

A DAVIS BACON SNACK – PREVAILING MINIMUM WAGE RATES ON CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS


Contractors working on federal projects should be familiar with the Davis Bacon Act (40 USC s. 3142 and formerly cited as 40 U.S.C. 276a).  This Act requires contractors to pay, at a minimum, prevailing wage rates including fringe benefits for labor as determined by the Secretary of Labor.  The wage rate for select workers is oftentimes an exhibit to the contract.  To confirm parties are complying with the Act and paying prevailing wage rates including fringe benefits, parties are responsible for submitting certified payroll certifying the rates they are paying labor.   For more information on the Davis Bacon Act and submitting certified payroll, please click here and here.

 

Violations of the Davis Bacon Act are bad!  Violations can include contract termination, fines in the form of liquidated damages, debarment from federal projects for a period of time, claims by improperly paid laborers, potential violations of the False Claims Act, and potential criminal prosecution.

 

Many local jurisdictions also have their form of prevailing wage rates that they require for the labor working on their projects.

 

By way of example, Miami-Dade County has what it refers to as “Responsible Wages and Benefits” embodied in Section 2-11.16 of its Code.  You will see minimum wage rates  for labor (e.g., glazers, carpenters, drywall finishers, electrical workers, plumbers, roofers, etc.).  Any failure to pay these minimum rates can result in fines/ penalties and the County withholding payment to cover the required payment and penalties/ fines.

 

In Broward County, Section 26-5 of the County’s Code contains “Rate of Wages, fringe benefits on county construction contracts.”   It requires minimum wages pursuant to the wages promulgated by the United States Department of Labor in the Federal Register.

 

If you are working on a federal or state or local government public construction project, make sure you know what the minimum prevailing wage rates are for labor.  Not only will this help you in accurately projecting the costs of the work, but will help to avoid harsh consequences if that labor is not paid the minimum wage rates or, worse, there is a false certification of wage rates.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

HOME OFFICE OVERHEAD (EICHLEAY) AND GOVERNMENT-CAUSED STANDBY


JMR Construction Corp. v. United States
, 2014 WL 3418445 (Fed.Cl. 2014) is a good federal government contracting case discussing a prime contractor’s challenging burden to support unabsorbed home office overhead damages caused by a government-caused delay.  The United States Court of Federal Claims described unabsorbed home office overhead damages and the required elements (under the Eichleay methodology) for a prime contractor to prove these damages:

 

The term “home office overhead” refers to the general administration costs of running a business, such as accounting and payroll services, general insurance, salaries of upper-level management, heat, electricity, taxes, and depreciation. These are indirect costs, expended for the benefit of the whole business, [and thus] by their nature cannot be attributed or charged to any particular contract.

***

Contractors typically recoup these indirect costs by allocating them to individual contracts in proportion to those contracts’ direct costs. But, in the event of a government-caused delay or suspension of work, the stream of direct costs against which to assess a percentage [of home office overhead] is decreased. The resulting shortfall is termed unabsorbed home office overhead.

***

The Circuit has held that the so-called Eichleay formula is the sole method through which contractors are able to recover unabsorbed home office overhead. The Eichleay formula requires that contractors satisfy several strict prerequisites. First, the contractor must demonstrate that there was a government-caused delay not excused by a concurrent contractor-caused delay. Second, the contractor must show that it incurred additional overhead expenses, either because the contract’s performance period was extended or because the contractor would have finished prior to the un-extended performance period’s close. Third, the contractor must establish that it was required to remain on standby for the duration of the delay. [Standby does not require the prime contractor to prove that it was completely idle but that its work was significantly slowed such that it was performing minor tasks.]

***

In order to establish standby, contractors must demonstrate three things. First, the contractor must show that the government caused delay was not only substantial but was of an indefinite duration. Second, the contractor must demonstrate that, during the delay, it was required to return to work at full speed and immediately [once the suspension period is over.  If the prime contractor is given a reasonable period of time to remobilize after the suspension is lifted, it will not be able to satisfy this requirement]. Third, the contractor must show a suspension of most if not all of the contract work. If the contracting officer has issued a written stop work order proving these elements the contractor can utilize that order to provide direct evidence of standby. Otherwise, these elements can be proven through indirect evidence.

***

If the contractor can make a prima facie showing of the standby elements, the burden of production shifts to the government to show either that it was not impractical for the contractor to obtain replacement work during the delay, or that the contractor’s inability to obtain or perform replacement work was caused by a factor other than the government’s delay.

JMR Construction, supra, at *5-7 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also P.J. Dick, Inc. v. Principi, 324 F.3d 1364 (Fed.Cir. 2003) (finding that contractor could not support claim for unabsorbed home office overhead as it could not support it was on standby).

 

The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals summarized these requirements by the following questions:

 

In short, a court evaluating a contractor’s claim for Eichleay damages should ask the following questions: (1) was there a government-caused delay that was not concurrent with another delay caused by some other source; (2) did the contractor demonstrate that it incurred additional overhead…; (3) did the government CO [contracting officer] issue a suspension or other order expressly putting the contractor on standby; (4) if not, can the contractor prove there was a delay of indefinite duration during which it could not bill substantial amounts of work on the contract and at the end of which it was required to be able to return to work on the contract at full speed and immediately; (5) can the government satisfy its burden of production showing that it was not impractical for the contractor to take on replacement work (i.e., a new contract) and thereby mitigate its damages; and (6) if the government meets its burden of production, can the contractor satisfy its burden of persuasion that it was impractical for it to obtain sufficient replacement work. Only where the above exacting requirements can be satisfied will a contractor be entitled to Eichleay damages.

P.J. Dick, Inc. v. Principi, 324 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed.Cir. 2003).

 

In JMR Construction, the prime contractor was hired to build an aircraft maintenance facility.  The prime contractor sued the government pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act for government-caused delays. The period of delay the prime contractor was seeking to recover damages for was January 16, 2009 (day after the government occupied the facility) through September 4, 2009 (completion).

 

 

The government took occupancy of the facility on January 15, 2009.  The prime contractor continued to perform work after this date, although its workforce slowed down.   On February 3, 2009, the prime contractor demobilized its jobsite trailer and was finishing the balance of its work including the manufacturing and installation of a permanent power converter and the installation of ceiling lights in one of the rooms.  Temporary stopgap measures had been implemented to address these electrical issues that likely allowed the government to utilize the facility.

 

The government moved for summary judgment as to the prime contractor’s entitlement to unabsorbed home office overhead damages. The Court broke the prime contractor’s unabsorbed home office overhead claim into two discrete periods: (1) January 16, 2009 (day after the government took occupancy) to February 3, 2009 (when the contractor demobilized jobsite trailer) and (2) February 4, 2009 to September 4, 2009 (period when the permanent power and room lighting were being installed).  Because the contracting officer never issued a standby notice, the prime contractor had the burden to prove by indirect evidence the factors (referenced above) supporting its entitlement to unabsorbed home office overhead.

 

First Period: 1/16/09-2/3/09

 

The Court did not grant summary judgment during this period because there was a disputed issue of fact as to materiality of the work the prime contractor was performing during this time period.  The prime contractor contended the work it was performing was minor whereas the government contended the work was material. If the work is deemed material (or more than just minor tasks) the prime contractor’s unabsorbed home office overhead claim will fail since it was never on standby or suspended.  If it was minor, the prime contractor would still need to prove the elements of standby. Although the Court declined to grant summary judgment based on this disputed factual issue, it seems from the Court’s ruling during the second time period (below) that the prime contractor will have difficulty proving the elements of standby.

 

Second Period: 2/4/09-9/4/09

 

The Court granted summary judgment on the prime contractor’s claim for unabsorbed home office overhead during this period because the prime contractor could NOT prove the elements of standby. In particular, the prime contractor could not prove it was required to resume work at full speed and immediately once the “suspension period” was over.  The prime contractor did not appear to maintain any personnel or equipment on site during this period that eliminated any argument that it was required to return to work with any degree of urgency once the suspension was lifted.  The prime contractor also utilized a subcontractor to perform the incomplete electrical work, and the use of subcontractors can limit a prime contractor’s ability to prove standby since it was only monitoring the work and not actually required to return to work at all.  And last, temporary stopgap measures were implemented relating to the lighting that negated the time sensitivity of the remaining work meaning there was no urgency for the contractor to resume work immediately.

 

Eichleay-formulaFinally, even assuming the prime contractor could support its entitlement to unabsorbed home office overhead, the Court did not go into any discussion regarding the Eichleay formula–the specific formula utilized to determine the allocable unabsorbed home office overhead associated with a government-caused delay.  The objective of the Eichleay formula is to obtain a daily rate for the home office overhead allocated to the specific contract and multiply the daily rate by the number of delay days to determine the contractor’s unabsorbed home office overhead caused by the government’s delay.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

CONSTRUCTION RENTAL EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF LIEN RIGHTS


Construction rental equipment suppliers play a large role in the performance of construction projects, whether it is through furnishing a crane, barge, excavator, scissor lift, scaffolding, loader, compressor, generator, shoring, pump, etc. Routinely, the trade subcontractor that needs the equipment to perform its contractual scope of work procures the rental equipment.

 

Well, how do these rental equipment suppliers enforce lien rights on private projects if they remain unpaid?

 

To begin with, they need to serve preliminary notices such as the Notice to Owner within 45 days from initial furnishing, which is the date rental equipment is delivered to the site.  The lien must then be recorded within 90 days from final furnishing, which is the last date the rental equipment is on the job site and available for use.  These dates should (hopefully) be pretty easy to determine as suppliers document the date rental equipment was delivered to the job site and the date the equipment was picked-up from the job site.  If not, these dates should be obtained by the renting party’s records.

 

Before recording the lien, the rental equipment supplier needs to determine the lien amount. The rental equipment supplier will typically lien for the entire amount of the rental equipment it furnished to the renting party / lessee for the project pursuant to the contractual rate(s) in the rental agreement.  This is generally the appropriate strategy because Florida’s Lien Law provides in pertinent part:

 

The delivery of rental equipment to the site of the improvement is prima facie evidence of the period of the actual use of the rental equipment from the delivery through the time the equipment is last available for use at the site, or 2 business days after the lessor of the rental equipment receives a written notice from the owner or the lessee of the rental equipment to pick up the equipment, whichever occurs first.”

Fla. Stat. s. 713.01(13). 

 

This language is important to the rental equipment supplier because if the supplier has the documentation as to when the rental equipment was delivered and picked-up, then this should shift the burden to the owner to prove that the rental equipment was not actually used on the project to diminish the amount of the lien.

 

Notably, the language in Florida’s Lien Law regarding rental equipment used to provide: “to the extent of the reasonable rental value for the period of actual use (not determinable by the contract for rental unless the owner is a party thereto),” meaning that the onus was on the rental equipment supplier not in privity with the owner to determine actual usage of the equipment on the project and the reasonable value for the period the equipment was actually used on the project.  This verbiage has since been removed from Florida’s Lien Law (in 2007), such that burden is really shifted to the owner to prove that the equipment was not actually used on the job site irrespective of when it was delivered and when it was picked-up.  While an owner may still argue that the supplier must also prove the “reasonable value” of the equipment actually used on the job site (with the reasonable value differing from the contract rental rate), this argument is based on the statutory language and case law interpreting the verbiage that has since been removed from Florida’s Lien Law. See, e.g., Rosenholz v. Perrine Development Co., 340 So.2d 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (interpreting older version of Fla. Stat. s. 713.01 and finding that contractual rental rate, although unchallenged, did not support the reasonable rental value because the supplier did not introduce evidence of the reasonable, actual use of the equipment required for the lessee’s scope of work).  In other words, to the extent the owner wants to maintain this argument, it really should have the burden challenging (a) the actual use of the equipment, perhaps by resorting to daily reports showing the equipment was not actually used and (b) the reasonable rental value should be different than the contractual rental rate based on evidence supporting this position.

 

Now, even under the older verbiage in Florida’s Lien Law, a rental equipment supplier did not have to jump through hoops in an action against a payment bond for a private project (issued per Florida Statute s. 713.23) to prove both the actual use of the rental equipment and the reasonable rental rate for that equipment.  See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. America v. Julien P. Benjamin Equipment Co., 481 So.2d 511, 513 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (“We distinguish from this [language in the payment bond] the language found in the statute [Fla. Stat. s. 713.01], which, in our view, is substantially more restrictive and clearly requires actual proof of the time of use of rental equipment and the reasonable value thereof unless the owner of the project is shown to have been a party to the rental contract covering such equipment.”).

 

Therefore, it is important for the rental equipment supplier to keep records documenting the delivery date and pick-up date from the specific project in which it plans to lien.  The owner, especially an owner that did not contract for the rental equipment, needs to obtain this information and, to the extent there are daily reports from the lessee (party that rented the equipment), cross-reference the equipment with the daily reports to examine when the equipment was actually used.  While the owner may still choose to argue the “reasonable rental value” for the equipment based on “actual usage,” this burden should fall on the owner with evidence supporting the reasonable rental value the owner believes should apply based on actual usage.  Sometimes, even though these arguments may have teeth, it may be efficient for the owner to negotiate a resolution with respect to equipment it recognizes was utilized on its project in the performance of the work.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.