RES JUDICATA NOT APPLY TO BAR OVERLAPPING DAMAGES IN SEPARATE SUITS AGAINST CONTRACTOR AND SUBCONTRACTOR

Posted on October 22, 2023October 22, 2023 by David Adelstein

Can the doctrine of res judicata bar an owner’s claim against the general contractor after the owner also sued and obtained a satisfied judgment against the subcontractor when there are identical, overlapping damages pursued in separate lawsuits. A recent case says, not really.

In Pickell v. Lennar Homes, LLC, 48 Fla.L.Weekly D2037a (Fla. 6^th DCA 2023), a homeowner sued a homebuilder and the homebuilder’s mechanical subcontractor in separate lawsuits. The claims and damages asserted in the separate lawsuits were substantially identical. The homeowner obtained a judgment against the mechanical subcontractor which was satisfied (i.e., paid). The homebuilder tried to use this as a get-out-jail-free card and claimed the homeowner was barred from suing it under the doctrine of res judicata based on overlapping claims and damages.

“To successfully assert a defense of res judicata, a party must prove four “identities”: “(1) identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made.” Pickell, supra (citation omitted).

The issue in this case was the third identity – the identity of the parties which applies to the “same parties or their privies.” Pickell, supra (citation omitted).

Here, though, the mechanical subcontractor was NOT the privy of the homebuilder. First, the homebuilder’s interest in the separate lawsuit was not bound by the final judgment of the mechanical subcontractor. This could occur if the homebuilder had indemnification responsibilities to the mechanical subcontractor. However, that was not the case. While the mechanical subcontractor owed the homebuilder an indemnification obligation, that indemnification was not reciprocal meaning the homebuilder did not owe the indemnification obligation to the mechanical subcontractor. (“But the obligation of indemnification must run from the party asserting the res judicata defense to the party who was sued in the separate action. Here, the indemnification responsibility does not run from [the home builder] to the [mechanical contractor]; rather, the subcontract requires [the mechanical subcontractor] to indemnify the homebuilder.”)

Now, you may sit back and say this seems unfair if the claims and damages are substantially identical because it allows the homeowner to double dip in damages. However, it does not. It may be inefficient in that it would have made more sense for the lawsuits to be in the same lawsuit versus separate lawsuits. I would agree with this. But there is no double dipping because “satisfaction of ‘overlapping items of compensation’ in different judgments is a ‘post-judgment collections issue.’” Pickell, supra, at n.1. In other words, “any recovery from [the mechanical subcontractor] would be set-off post-judgment from a potential future judgment against [the homebuilder].” Id

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

FLORIDA’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS / REPOSE FOR ACTIONS FOUNDED ON CONSTRUCTION IMPROVEMENT MODIFIED

Posted on April 22, 2023April 23, 2023 by David Adelstein

On April 13, 2023, Florida’s all-important four-year statute of limitations–Florida Statute s. 95.11(3)(c)–relating to actions founded on construction of an improvement of real property was modified. This is a key statute of limitations for ALL construction practitioners because it also includes the statute of repose for latent construction defects.

At the bottom of this posting is the current version fo s. 95.11(3)(c) with the underlined section being recent additions. (They hyperlink above will identify the deletions and additions.) Important things to note:

 Statute of Repose. The statute of repose has been reduced from 10 years to 7 years. There is now an objective date for when the repose period commences: “within 7 years after the date the authority having jurisdiction issues a temporary certificate of occupancy, a certificate of occupancy, or a certificate of completion, or the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, whichever date is earliest.”

 Statute of Limitations. Similarly, the commencement of the statute of limitations now commences based on an objective date: “with the time running from the date the authority having jurisdiction issues a temporary certificate of occupancy, a certificate of completion, or the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, whichever date is earliest.”

 Multiple Buildings. If dealing with a project regarding multiple buildings with each building getting its own TCO, CO, or certificate of completion: “[I]f the improvement to real property consists of the design, planning, or construction of multiple buildings, each building must be considered its own improvement for purposes of determining the limitations period set forth in this paragraph.”

 Application. The modifications to this statute of limitations apply “to any action commenced on or after the effective date of this act, regardless of when the cause of action accrued, except that any action that would not have been barred under s. 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes, before the amendments made by this act must be commenced on or before July 1, 2024. If the action is not commenced by July 1, 2024, and is barred by the amendments to s. 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes, made by this act, then the action is barred.”

Florida Statute 95.11(3)(c)

An action founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property, with the time running from the date the authority having jurisdiction issues a temporary certificate of occupancy, a certificate of occupancy, or a certificate of completion, or the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, whichever date is earliest; except that, when the action involves a latent defect, the time runs from the time the defect is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. In any event, the action must be commenced within 7 years after the date the authority having jurisdiction issues a temporary certificate of occupancy, a certificate of occupancy, or a certificate of completion, or the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, whichever date is earliest. However, counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims that arise out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out or attempted to be set out in a pleading may be commenced up to 1 year after the pleading to which such claims relate is served, even if such claims would otherwise be time barred. With respect to actions founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property, if such construction is performed pursuant to a duly issued building permit and if the authority having jurisdiction has issued a temporary certificate of occupancy, a certificate of occupancy, or a certificate of completion, then as to the construction which is within the scope of such building permit and certificate, the correction of defects to completed work or repair of completed work, whether performed under warranty or otherwise, does not extend the period of time within which an action must be commenced. If a newly constructed single-dwelling residential building is used as a model home, the time begins to run from the date that a deed is recorded first transferring title to another party. Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, if the improvement to real property consists of the design, planning, or construction of multiple buildings, each building must be considered its own improvement for purposes of determining the limitations period set forth in this paragraph.

ECONOMIC WASTE DOCTRINE AND CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS / NONCONFORMING WORK

Posted on January 21, 2023January 21, 2023 by David Adelstein

I recently did a presentation on the economic waste doctrine. It is an applicable doctrine dealing with construction defects and nonconforming work. When it comes to construction defects and nonconforming work, EVERYTHING starts with your measure of damages. How are you going to prove your damages? Next, what evidence are you going to use to prove your damages? Or, what are the defenses and how do you prove those defenses to a construction defect and nonconforming work claim including the economic waste doctrine?

If you are interested in learning more, the below presentation can shed detail. However, don’t rely on the presentation in a vacuum. Work with knowledgeable construction counsel (like me!) that can best position your case whether you are the one proving construction defects and nonconforming work or the one defending against such a claim. This way, if you are arguing economic waste, you are not just throwing it out there, but you are arguing it to actually mean it!

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SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER CAN ASSERT CLAIMS FOR CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS

Posted on September 25, 2022September 25, 2022 by Edward Garber

Can a subsequent purchaser pursue construction defect claims relating to the original construction of the property? This was the threshold issue on a motion for summary judgment by a drywall manufacturer against a subsequent purchaser of a home in Karpel v. Knauf Gips KG, 2022 WL 4366946 (S.D. Fla. 2022). This matter deals with the defective Chinese drywall that was installed in homes years ago. The plaintiffs, which were subsequent purchasers of a home, sued the manufacturer of the defective drywall for various theories including negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, breach of express and/or implied warranty, private nuisance, unjust enrichment, and Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.

The trial court noted, from the onset, that Florida does NOT have a subsequent purchaser rule that prohibits subsequent purchasers from asserting construction defect claims. With this consideration in mind, the trial court went through the claims the plaintiff, as a subsequent purchaser, asserted against the manufacturer to determine whether they were viable claims as a matter of law.

Negligence Claim

The trial court found that a subsequent purchaser could sue in negligence. “Florida courts have long allowed subsequent purchasers to sue for negligence including in construction defect litigation.” Karpel, supra, at *2.

Negligence Per Se and Strict Liability Claims

The trial court held that the plaintiff’s negligence per se and strict liability claims were duplicative. Both could not stand; for this reason, the court entered summary judgment as to the duplicative negligence per se claim. “Strict liability means negligence as a matter of law or negligence per se, the effect of which is to remove the burden from the user of proving specific acts of negligence.” Karpel, supra, at *3 (quotation and citation omitted).

A subsequent purchaser could pursue a strict liability claim against a manufacturer. “[A] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.” Karpel, supra, at *4 (quotation and citation omitted).

Even Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts, adopted by Florida’s Supreme Court, provides: “(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.” Karpel, supra, at *4.

There are, however, limits on strict liability.

“First, Florida disallows recovery in tort where plaintiffs only claim economic losses such as ‘damages for inadequate value, costs of repair, and replacement of the defective product, or consequent loss of profits—without any claim of personal injury or damage to other property.” Karpel, supra, at *4 (citation omitted).

“Second, Florida courts will disallow recovery for strict liability where the purchaser was subject to the common law doctrine of caveat emptor.” Karpel, supra, at *4.

Thus, a subsequent purchaser’s strict liability claim could be pursued against a manufacturer provided such damages are not barred by the economic loss rule or the doctrine of caveat emptor (which applies to commercial property and property purchased at judicial auction sales). Karpel, supra, at *4.

Breach of Implied Warranty

The trial court found that a subsequent purchaser could NOT sue a manufacturer for breach of implied warranty. “[I]t is abundantly clear that in cases like these, where no contractual relationship between a subsequent purchaser and a manufacturer exists, the former’s recourse is a claim for strict liability.” Karpel, supra, at *4.

Breach of Express Warranty

While a contractual relationship is typically required for breach of express warranty, this requirement is relaxed if the express warranty is intended to benefit subsequent purchasers. “A manufacturer’s liability for breach of an express warranty derives from, and is measured by, the terms of that warranty.” Karpel, supra, at *4 (quotations and citation omitted). However, in this case, plaintiff’s breach of express warranty claim failed because the plaintiff never introduced any express warranty into the record.

Private Nuisance

The trial court held that the subsequent purchaser could NOT pursue a private nuisance claim against the manufacturer. To sustain a private nuisance claim, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s maintenance of the nuisance was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages. Karpel, supra, at *8. “The Plaintiffs’ ownership and current control over the drywall conclusively forecloses them from arguing that the Defendants actively “maintain” the ‘nuisance’ they complain of.” Id.

Unjust Enrichment

The trial court held that the subsequent purchaser could NOT pursue an unjust enrichment claim against the manufacturer. An unjust enrichment claim requires the plaintiff to prove that the plaintiff conferred a direct benefit on the defendant. “The Plaintiffs conferred no direct benefit on the Defendant.” Karpel, supra, at *8 (finding that plaintiffs, as subsequent purchasers, obtained their homes from previous owners so the plaintiffs conferred no direct financial benefit on the manufacturer).

Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA)

The trial court found that a subsequent purchaser could theortetically pursue a FDUTPA claim. “Because the law is clear that a plaintiff need not have actually relied on the purported deceptive or unfair practice, the Court’s analysis need not go further….The Plaintiffs’ status as subsequent purchasers does not foreclose them from arguing that the Defendants’ practices violated FDUTPA.” Karpel, supra, at *9.

However, the trial court noted that actual damages under FDUTPA may implicate the economic loss rule because actual damages under the statute “are the difference in the market value of the product or service in the condition in which it was delivered and its market value in the condition in which it should have been delivered according to the contract of the parties.” Karpel, supra, at *9 (quotation and citation omitted). For this reason, the court ordered the plaintiff and defendant to submit supplemental briefing because if the economic loss rule is implicated, the FDUTPA claim will fail (due to the same limitations relating to the strict liability claim).

COMMENCING OF THE STATUTE OF REPOSE FOR CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS

Posted on October 24, 2021October 24, 2021 by Edward Garber

Florida has a ten-year statute of repose which applies predominantly to construction defect claims. This can be found in Florida Statute s. 95.11(3)(c). After ten years, any rights relative to a construction defect claim are time-barred. However, the statute of repose date has been watered down and can be made to be more of a factual question due to the lack of objectivity as to the date that starts the ten-year repose clock. The watering down of the statute of repose date benefits parties asserting construction defect claims provided they strategically appreciate the question of fact that can be created when up against the statute of repose. Stated differently, when up against the clock to assert a construction defect claim, strategically develop those facts, evidence, and arguments to maximize creating a question of fact as to when the statute of repose clock commenced. Conversely, as a defendant sued for construction defects, you want to maximize the facts, evidence, and arguments to fully establish the date the statute of repose clock had to commence for purposes of a statute of repose defense.

The recent opinion in Spring Isle Community Association, Inc. v. Herme Enterprises, Inc., 46 Fla. L. Weekly D2306b (Fla. 5^th DCA 2021) demonstrates the factual question associated with the clock that starts the statute of repose date. This factual question is created by Florida Statute s. 95.11(3)(c) that provides:

[T]he action [founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property] must be commenced within 10 years after the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest.

Spring Isle Community Association, supra. (Note, see also current s. 95.11(3)(c) version in effect per hyperlink above.)

Thus, the statute of repose must commence AFTER: (1) after the date of actual possession by the owner, (2) the date of the issuance of the certificate of occupancy, (3) the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or (4) the date of completion or termination of the contract, WHICHEVER DATE IS LATEST. This foster the factual argument — which is the latest date and the facts supporting the latest date.

In this case, an association of a townhome community sued a homebuilder for construction defects. The homebuilder third-partied in implicated subcontractors. The homebuilder had a master contract with subcontractors and would issue applicable work orders to the subcontractors, which is a common practice with homebuilders. The stucco subcontractor moved for summary judgment based on the ten-year statute of repose arguing that the statute of repose period started when each townhome was issued a certificate of occupancy. This was based on this date occurring AFTER the homebuilders’ records reflecting it made payment to the stucco subcontractor after the stucco work was complete on a townhome building but prior to the certificate of occupancy on each townhome building. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment as to the homebuilder’s third-party claim against the subcontractor. The homebuilder appealed arguing that the statute of repose period started when their contract was completed which occurred after the certificate of occupancy date. The appellate court found this was a question of fact and reversed summary judgment:

Additionally, the fact that [the homebuilder] may have made payments to [the stucco subcontractor] after completion of each unit does not establish that the payment constituted “final payment”…. Quite simply, the summary judgment evidence presented below was insufficient, as a matter of law, to determine the number of contracts that may have existed between [the homebuilder] and [stucco subcontractor] or to determine the completion date of the contract(s).

In the absence of competent evidence as to the date of occurrence for each of the four triggering events set forth in section 95.11(c)(3), or evidence that one or more statutory events is inapplicable, there is no way to determine which event occurred last. Therefore, without sufficient evidence to determine the contract completion date, a genuine issue of material fact remains as to the commencement date of the repose period. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting [the stucco subcontractor’s] motion for partial final summary judgment.

Spiring Isle Community Association, supra (internal citations omitted).

ECONOMIC LOSS RULE BARS CLAIMS AGAINST MANUFACTURER

Posted on September 20, 2020September 20, 2020 by Edward Garber

The economic loss rule lives to bar a claim against a product manufacturer in a real estate transaction. In a products liability action, there needs to be personal injury or property damage, other than to the property itself, in order to recover economic damages. Otherwise, the economic loss rule will bar the recovery of such economic losses when the economic losses deal to the product itself. This is important to keep in mind in any product liability action against a manufacturer.

In a recent case, 2711 Hollywood Beach Condominium Ass’n, Inc., v. TRG Holiday, Ltd., 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2179a (Fla. 3d DCA 2020), a condominium association purchased the condominium from the developer. Subsequently, it noticed leaks with the fire suppression system in the condominium and sued multiple parties for damages for repairs due to the leaks and the replacement of the fire suppression system. One of the parties sued in negligence and strict liability was a manufacturer of pipe fittings used in the fire suppression system. The manufacturer moved for summary judgment based on the economic loss rule and relying on the 1993 Florida Supreme Court opinion in Casa Clara Condominium Ass’n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So.2d 1244 (Fla. 1993), holding “the economic loss rule limited a defendant’s tort liability for allegedly defective products to injuries caused to persons or damage caused to property other than the defective product itself.” 2711 Hollywood Beach Conominium Ass’n, supra. The trial court agreed with the manufacturer and granted summary judgment. On appeal, the Third District affirmed based on the economic loss rule:

The Association bargained for, purchased and received a building; [the manufactuer’s] fittings were only a component of the FSS [fire suppression system], incorporated into the building. Applying the rule set forth in Casa Clara, the Association purchased a completed building from the developer. [The manufactuer’s] fittings were “an integral part of the finished product and, thus, did not injure ‘other’ property.” Injury to the building itself is not injury to “other” property because the product purchased by the Association was the building. See Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247. The economic loss rule therefore bars the Association’s recovery as to [the manufacturer] to the extent that it sought damages to replace the FSS [fire suppression system] and repair damage to the building.

2711 Hollywood Beach Conominium Ass’n, supra (internal citations omitted).

Notably, in Casa Clara, homeowners sued a concrete supplier for supplying defective concrete that caused the reinforcing steel in the concrete in their homes to rust. The concrete supplier, in an action that went up to the Florida Supreme Court, prevailed based on the economic loss rule because there was no personal injury or damage to property other than the property itself, which was the completed building. As the Florida Supreme Court held:

The homeowners also argue that [the supplier’s] concrete damaged “other” property because the individual components and items of building material, not the homes themselves, are the products they purchased. We disagree. The character of a loss determines the appropriate remedies, and, to determine the character of a loss, one must look to the product purchased by the plaintiff, not the product sold by the defendant. Generally, house buyers have little or no interest in how or where the individual components of a house are obtained. They are content to let the builder produce the finished product, i.e., a house. These homeowners bought finished products—dwellings—not the individual components of those dwellings. They bargained for the finished products, not their various components. The concrete became an integral part of the finished product and, thus, did not injure “other” property.

We also disagree with the homeowners that the mere possibility that the exploding concrete will cause physical injury is sufficient reason to abrogate the economic loss rule. This argument goes completely against the principle that injury must occur before a negligence action exists. Because an injury has not occurred, its extent and the identity of injured persons is completely speculative. Thus, the degree of risk is indeterminate, with no guarantee that damages will be reasonably related to the risk of injury, and with no possibility for the producer of a product to structure its business behavior to cover that risk. Agreeing with the homeowners’ argument would make it difficult “to maintain a realistic limitation on damages.”

Casa Clara, supra, at 1247 (internal citations omitted)

ALLEGING PROPERTY DAMAGE IN CONSTRUCTION DEFECT LAWSUIT

Posted on August 22, 2020August 22, 2020 by Edward Garber

When there is a construction defect lawsuit, there is an insurance coverage issue or consideration. As I have said repeatedly in other articles, it is all about maximizing insurance coverage regardless of whether you are the plaintiff prosecuting the construction defect claim or the contractor(s) alleged to have committed the construction defect and property damage. It is about triggering first, the insurer’s duty to defend, and second, the insurer’s duty to indemnify its insured for the property damage.

The construction defect claim and lawsuit begins with how the claim and, then, lawsuit is couched knowing that the duty to defend is triggered by allegations in the lawsuit (complaint). Thus, preparing the lawsuit (complaint) is vital to maximize the insurer’s duty to defend its insured.

In a recent opinion out of the Eleventh Circuit, Southern-Owners Ins. Co. v. MAC Contractors of Florida, LLC, 2020 WL 4345199 (11^th Cir. 2020), a general contractor was sued for construction defects in the construction of a custom home. A dispute arose pre-completion and the owner hired another contractor to complete the house and remediate construction defects. The contractor’s CGL insurer originally provided a defense to the general contractor but then withdrew the defense and filed an action for declaratory relief asking for the declaration that it had no duty to defend the contractor because the underlying lawsuit did NOT allege property damage. The trial court agreed with the contractor and granted summary judgment in its favor finding that the underlying complaint did not allege property damage beyond defective work. But, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed.

Among other allegations, the owner’s underlying complaint against the contractor asserted that the contractor committed defects through chipped pavers in the driveways and walkways, inconsistent paint finish, marks on ceilings, damage to exterior doors, damage to the top stair tread, damage to hardwood floors, metal roof dents, scratches in granite, holes in ceilings, etc. The owner sought its costs to repair and remediate the defects and damage from the contractor. In looking at whether the contractor’s CGL insurer had a duty to defend the contractor–the insured–the Eleventh Circuit (focusing on precedent out of the Eleventh Circuit) stated:

The operative amended complaint alleged that [the contractor] used subcontractors for work on the residence and that the residence was “replete with construction defects” and various damage. It did not further allege which subcontractors performed which work or how the damage occurred. Given these ambiguities, the complaint’s allegations are broad enough to allow [the contractor] to prove that one subcontractor negligently damaged nondefective work performed by another subcontractor. If [the contractxor] could establish that at least some of the damage arose in this way, there would be “damage apart from the defective work itself” and therefore “property damage.”

***

For these reasons, we conclude that the underlying operative complaint can fairly be construed to allege “property damage” within the meaning of the CGL policy and Florida law. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to [the CLG insurer] on this basis.

MAC Contractors of Florida, 2020 WL at *4 (internal citations omitted).

CONSTRUCTION DEFECT DAMAGES: BENEFIT-OF-THE-BARGAIN OR RELIANCE RECOVERY

Posted on July 27, 2020July 27, 2020 by Edward Garber

In the preceding article, I discussed a case where an owner sued its contractor and design professional for construction defects and design defects that contributed to the same damage. There was a valuable discussion in this case as to the measure of damages in a construction defect dispute. It is a discussion that construction defect parties and practitioners need to know. A plaintiff needs to know for purposes of proving damages at trial and working with an expert in furtherance of proving their damages. A defendant needs to know for the same reasons and to work with experts in establishing defenses to an owner’s construction defect and design defect damages.

“The proper measure of damages for construction defects is the cost of correcting the defects, except in certain instances where the corrections involve an unreasonable destruction of the structure and a cost which is grossly disproportionate to the results to be obtained.” Stated another way, “the measure of damages for breaching a construction contract is the reasonable cost of construction and completion in accordance with the contract, if this is possible and does not involve unreasonable economic waste.” However, “[i]f in the course of making repairs the owner elects to adopt a more expensive [i.e., a better] design, the recovery should be limited to what would have been the reasonable cost of repair according to the original design.” [This measure of damages is known as benefit-of-the-bargain damages.]

***

As an alternative to benefit-of-the-bargain damages, an injured party has a right to damages based on its reliance interest, including expenditures made in performance or in preparation for performance, the recovery of which will place the injured party in the position it occupied before entering into the contract. However, “[a]ny benefit retained from the expenditures made in reliance on the contract must be offset against the injured party’s damages.” In other words, a reliance recovery may be reduced to the extent that the breaching party can prove that a “deduction” is appropriate for any benefit received by the injured party. [This measure of damages is referred as a reliance recovery to damages.]

Broward County, Florida v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1736a (Fla. 4^th DCA 2020) (internal citations omitted).

In this case, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in its measure of damages because the owner’s damages were based on a redesign that was a different, better design than the bargained for original design (as there was evidence that the original design was doomed from the get-go even if constructed correctly). Thus, benefit-of-the-bargain damages did not apply–the owner did not present damages to correct defects per the original design but put on damages associated with its different and better redesign. Yet, the appellate court maintained that if the public owner could not repair the defects in the original design, “a viable alternative measure of damages [under the reliance recovery] was the [owner’s] out-of-pocket costs, less any benefits the [owner] received from the contracts.” Broward County, supra. For this reason, the Fourth District remanded back to the trial court to enter judgment based on the owner’s reliance recovery based on the evidence already presented at trial relating to the owner’s out-of-pocket costs for the original design and construction and a potential deduct for the benefit the owner received relative to the original design and construction.

COMPARATIVE FAULT APPLIED IN OWNER’S LAWSUIT AGAINST CONTRACTOR AND ENGINEER

Posted on July 26, 2020July 26, 2020 by Edward Garber

There is nothing like a good old-fashioned dispute between an owner and its general contractor and design professional relating to construction and design defects where both parties have a role in the owner’s damages. There are arguments that both the general contractor and design professional substantially contributed to the defects and damages. Are the contractor and design professional jointly and severally liable for the owner’s damages? Or, does comparative fault apply where the trial of fact allocates the contractor’s and engineer’s percentage of fault for the defects and damage? A recent case found that comparative fault applied such that the trier of fact, in this case the judge, could allocate damages based the judge’s finding of the parties’ percentage of fault. (For more information in comparative fault, please check this article.). Comparative fault is not what an owner ideally wants because joint and several liability would be preferred. However, this is what the contractor and engineer would want since their liability for damages is predicated on their percentage of responsibility as opposed to being liable for all of the damages.

In Broward County, Florida v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1736a (Fla. 4^th DCA 2020), a public owner hired an engineer for airport improvements that included a taxiway to be designed and constructed in accordance with the Federal Aviation Administration’s design requirements. The public owner also hired (i) a program manager to serve as its on-site representative and (ii) a separate engineering firm to provide materials testing and inspection services. The public owner also hired a contractor to construct the taxiway.

Prior to substantial completion of the taxiway, the public owner discovered indentations in the surface of the taxiway (referred to as rutting). This discovery prompted the public owner to investigate. The public owner directed the contractor to mill away two inches of asphalt and install new asphalt. The contractor achieved substantial completion in September 2008 and final completion in November 2008. The contractor then submitted its final payment application to the public owner. The public owner notified the contractor that it would retain money to deal with repairs associated with the indentations in the surface of the taxiway. The public owner hired a new engineer to design the repairs. The repair design was more robust (better) than the original engineer’s design because the repair engineer believed the new design was necessary to achieve a 20-year lifespan for the taxiway. A new contractor performed the repairs.

The contractor sued the public owner for nonpayment. The contractor also sued the engineer for professional negligence in the design of the taxiway. The pubic owner counter-sued the contractor for breach of contract and sued the engineer for breach of contract and indemnification. The public owner asserted that the contractor performed defective construction and the engineer committed errors, omissions, and defects in the design and was obligated to indemnify the public owner for liability arising out of the design. The public owner also sued its program manager (on-site representative) and testing engineer; these two parties settled prior to trial.

At trial, the public owner’s expert testified that both the contractor and engineer contributed to the indentations in the surface of the taxiway. The expert testified that the engineer’s design deviated from the Federal Aviation Administration’s requirements and was doomed to fail such that if the contractor complied with the design, it would still fail. The expert further testified that while the contractor contributed to the indentations as it failed to construct subgrade per the engineer’s design, it was to a lesser contributing factor than the engineer.

The engineer’s expert testified that the indentations were caused by undercompaction performed by the contractor. The expert further testified that the public owner’s program manager violated its standard of care by allowing the contractor to deviate from the engineer’s original design in numerous ways.

The contractor’s expert testified that the indentations were caused by the design and undercompaction.

The trial court found that both the engineer and the contractor’s breaches were the proximate cause of the redesign of the taxiway. The trial court also found that the public owner’s program manager, which had settled prior to trial, was also liable. The trial court further found that public owner’s total damages were $6,2703,303 of which $725,000 was paid to the public owner pre-suit by the program manager and testing engineer. After deducting this amount from the total damages, the trial court allocated damages as follows: (1) 60% was allocated to the non-party program manager (that had settled pre-suit); (2) 25% was allocated to the contractor; and (3) 15% was allocated to the engineer. The public owner appealed the allocation in the final judgment. The public owner argued that the trial court should not have apportioned liability at all because comparative fault does not apply in breach of contract cases. Instead, the public owner contended that the trial court should have found that the engineer and contractor were jointly and severally liable for the damage (indentations) because their separate contractual breaches caused a single, indivisible injury.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed with the public owner concluding that Florida Statute s. 768.81 dealing with comparative fault authorized the trial court to allocate fault. While comparative fault under s. 768.81 deals with negligence actions, it defines a negligence action as a “civil action for damages based upon a theory of negligence, strict liability, products liability, professional malpractice whether couched in terms of contract or tort, or breach of warranty and like theories. The substance of an action, not conclusory terms used by a party, determines whether an action is a negligence action.” Broward County, Florida, supra, quoting Fla. Stat. s. 768.81.

The public owner’s claim against the professional engineer was predicated on the engineer breaching a contractual standard of care that required it to design the taxiway pursuant to the Federal Aviation Administration’s standards. Although the public owner’s claims against the engineer were couched as a breach of contract, it was based on a theory of professional negligence (violation of a standard of care) warranting the application of comparative fault.

However, the public owner’s claims against the contractor were not based on a professional negligence theory. Nonetheless, the Fourth District held that comparative fault did apply:

Applying a holistic approach to analyzing the complaint, we conclude that the contract action against [the contractor] fell under the umbrellas of the ‘negligence action’ against [the engineer], so that the circuit court’s allocation of fault was appropriate. After all, [the contractor] was to perform the contract according to specifications designed by [the engineer], so the causes of action against each were necessarily intertwined. To prove its case against [the contractor], the public owner was required to prove that [the contractor’s] ‘breach of its contractual responsibilities was a substantial factor in causing the [public owner’s] extensive damages.’ This is compatible with the concept of ‘fault’…and parallels the tort notion of a violation of a duty of care that is the proximate cause of damages. Based on the evidence, the circuit court properly allocated fault among all actors whose conduct substantially contributed to the [public owner’s] damages.

TEN-YEAR STATUTE OF REPOSE TO SUE FOR LATENT CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS

Posted on August 18, 2019August 18, 2019 by Edward Garber

If you are dealing with latent construction defects, it is imperative that you consult with counsel to understand your rights. This not only includes claims for property damage stemming from latent construction defects, but also personal injury stemming from such defects. There is a ten-year statute of repose to sue for latent construction defects. See Fla.Stat. s. 95.11(3)(c). After the expiration of this statute of repose you are out of luck, meaning you can no longer sue.

Now, I probably will not be the first to tell you that the statute of repose is not written so clear that you know the precise date it ends (or the last date you can sue for a latent defect). For this reason, you really want to operate conservatively, meaning it is always better to sue early if you think you could be running on the end of the statute of repose period. It is always advisable to avoid any legitimate argument that you filed your construction defect lawsuit too late.

In Harrell v. The Ryland Group, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2054b (Fla. 1st DCA 2019), a subsequent owner of a house sued the original homebuilder in negligence for a construction defect causing a personal injury. The subsequent owner claimed the homebuilder defectively installed an attic ladder (that provided access to the attic for the original construction) which collapsed as he was using it. The homebuilder filed a motion for summary judgment that the statute of repose expired so the owner’s claim was time-barred. The First District agreed.

The subsequent owner tried to argue that the statute of repose did not apply because the installation of an attic latter does not constitute an “improvement” to real property and the statute of repose is based on actions “founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property.” The First District was not having this argument because “the attic ladder at issue here was installed as part of the construction process of the home, required labor and money, made the property more useful/valuable in that it provides a more convenient means of access to another level, was not mere repair or replacement, and was affixed to the attic, making it an integral part of the home.”

Even something perceived as nominal like the installation or construction of an attic ladder can constitute an improvement to real property making it subject to the ten-year statute of repose to sue for latent defects. Hence, do not sit idle if you are dealing with a latent construction defect – take the conservative approach and start the required litigation process sooner than later.